Russia – Contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract

18 septiembre 2018

  • Rusia
  • Derecho Societario
  • Litigios

The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

What barristers do

What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

  1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
  2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
  3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

Not what you would expect 

When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

“…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

“…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

“Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

Conclusions

If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

  • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
  • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
  • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

  • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
  • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

Alexander Katzendorn

Áreas de práctica

  • Arbitraje
  • Derecho Societario
  • Comercio internacional
  • Derecho Internacional Privado
  • Derecho Fiscal y Tributario
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    Israel – Termination of international business

    4 septiembre 2018

    • Israel
    • Contratos de distribución
    • Litigios

    The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

    The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

    This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

    Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

    To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

    Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

    Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

    What barristers do

    What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

    1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
    2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
    3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

    But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

    English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

    Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

    The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

    That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

    The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

    The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

    All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

    Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

    Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

    Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

    In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

    In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

    So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

    Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

    Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

    In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

    The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

    A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

    One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

    Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

    The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

    Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

    In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

    In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

    The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

    The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

    In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

    In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

    In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

    The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

    As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

    The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

    The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

    The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

    The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

    The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

    Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

    Not what you would expect 

    When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

    The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

    This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

    However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

    In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

    Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

    What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

    Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

    Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

    As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

    The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

    However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

    In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

    There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

    Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

    Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

    The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

    In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

    It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

    At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

    One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

    Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

    No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

    The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

    Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

    The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

    Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

    The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

    Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

    The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

    In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

    From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

    What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

    Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

    The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

    With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

    Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

    From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

    It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

    By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

    In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

    State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

    Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

    “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

    “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

    The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

    One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

    “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

    As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

    Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

    There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

    A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

    The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

    In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

    The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

    The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

    The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

    The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

    In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

    Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

    Conclusions

    If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

    If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

    And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

    La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

    Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

    Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

    No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

    Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

    A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

    Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

    Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

    A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

    El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

    Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

    Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

    Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

    Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

    Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

    En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

    En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

    El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

    Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

    Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

    El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

    A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

    Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

    Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

    La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

    Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

    El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

    ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

    Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

    A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

    • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
    • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
    • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

    Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

    • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
    • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

    Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

    Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

    El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

    Benjamin Leventhal

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