- Франция
France — PFAS risks: impacts on professional liability for insurance sectors in France and Europe
6 июня 2024
- Судебная практика
PFAS are chemicals that have been used in industry for over 50 years. Between 4,000 and 5,000 varieties are used for various everyday consumer applications, and they are renowned for their non-stick, waterproofing, and heat-resistant properties. They have come under scrutiny in recent years, and are covered by European regulations, as they are in the USA, where the public authorities have imposed maximum use values, as well as reporting obligations. EU Regulation 2019/1021 (POP) restricts the production and use of certain categories of PFAS in specific industries or above certain values and their use with food products. France has gone further, regulating the levels of discharges into watercourses.
Scientific research suspects that PFAS cause illnesses such as cancer and reproductive disorders. Given the extent of contamination not only in everyday products but also in the environment, particularly waterways, the issue is likely to pose major public health problems in the years to come. This concern is more pressing given that PFASs are considered ‘eternal pollutants’, as there is currently no way of eliminating them from the environment.
The impact on companies’ and insurers’ liability is already significant. In the USA, more than 6,000 lawsuits have been filed since 2005. Three groups have already paid more than USD 1.2 billion in settlements due to contamination, and another group has paid more than USD 10 billion to end a class action.
In France, the Metropole of Lyon has brought a summary expert appraisal action against two chemical companies before considering bringing a liability action. In addition, several criminal complaints have been lodged for endangering the lives of others and damaging the environment.
Under French law, companies and their insurers could be liable on various legal grounds. In addition to ordinary civil liability law — based on article 1240 of the Civil Code — the special system of liability for defective products could also serve as a basis for a liability action (articles 1245 et seq. of the Civil Code), with French law defining a defect as any product that does not offer the safety that can legitimately be expected.
Although it is currently difficult to identify a causal link with an identified disease, asbestos-related case law has shown in the past that victims can take action if they can demonstrate that they suffered anxiety-related harm as a result of their exposure to the product, even if they are not positively suffering from a disease at the time of their claim.
In addition, the reporting obligations imposed by the public authorities will undoubtedly facilitate the filing of liability actions by facilitating the identification of the emitters and users of these pollutants.
Insurers are directly affected by this phenomenon, which for them constitutes an «emerging» risk («silent cover») because, for the most part, this risk was not identified when the policy was taken out, which exposes them directly and is all the more problematic because insurance premiums have not been able to take such a risk into account.
Civil liability or professional indemnity insurance policies, especially if they are drafted with «all risks except» clauses (“tous risques sauf” in French legal vocabulary, i.e. covering all liability risks vis-à-vis third parties except those strictly listed), as well as those including clauses relating to environmental risks, are particularly targeted.
Lloyd’s has already published model exclusion clauses for the attention of insurers, although such clauses can obviously only cover future insurance contracts or endorsements:
https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA_Bulletins/LMA23-039-SD.aspx
The clauses contained in insurance policies must be drafted with particular care, considering each country’s specific features. In France, for example, to be enforceable against the insured, clauses must be «formal and limited», which means that the exclusion must be both clearly expressed and that it must be possible to determine its content perfectly.
For example, the Court of Cassation recently ruled that the use of the terms «such as» or «in particular» (“tells que” “en particulier”) in an exclusion clause led to confusion in the interpretation of the exclusion clause, rendering it invalid (Civ. 2e, 26 Nov. 2020, no. 19-16.435). There was also a debate on the validity of an exclusion clause relating to bodily injury caused by asbestos, a risk which at the time had not been identified by insurers, who subsequently excluded it from most policies (Cass. 2e civ., 21 Sept. 2023, nos. 21-19801 and 21-19776). Similarly, policies should clearly indicate whether cover is provided based on a harmful event or based on a claim (i.e “base dommage” or “base reclamation”, which indicates if the risk is covered, depending on if the damage happened during the policy was valid, or if it depends on the moment when the risk was notified by the insured during such period).
One thing is sure: the risks associated with PFAS and claims are only just beginning to emerge in Europe, where the conditions for group actions have recently been extended with EU Directive 2020/1828, which came into force on 25 June 2023 and is currently the subject of a draft law under discussion in the French Parliament with a view to its transposition.
Dealing with unpaid invoices can be challenging for any business. In Belgium, where judicial processes can seem daunting, understanding how to manage debt collection effectively is crucial. This article offers practical guidance derived from a comprehensive legal guide to help your company navigate Belgium’s judicial debt recovery landscape.
Understanding Your Options
Assess the Situation: Before taking legal action, evaluating the amount owed and the debtor’s financial status is essential. This assessment will guide you in choosing the appropriate legal avenue, as Belgium offers different courts and procedures based on the dispute’s value. For instance, for claims up to € 5,000, the local court or ‘justice de paix’, which is a court of first instance for minor civil cases, is typically used due to its cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
Send a Notice of Default: Under Belgian law, a notice of default is mandatory before initiating legal proceedings. This step adheres to legal requirements and gives the debtor one last chance to settle their dues without further legal complications.
Efficient Legal Procedures
Use Simplified Procedures for Small Amounts: A simplified legal procedure can be utilized for undisputed money debts up to €1,860, which expedites the payment request process significantly. This approach can be particularly advantageous for recovering smaller debts quickly.
Consider Direct Bailiff Intervention: For undisputed amounts, irrespective of their size, between companies, creditors can authorize a bailiff to recover the debt directly without a court judgment. This procedure reduces legal fees and speeds up the debt collection process.
Leveraging Legal and Financial Advice
Consult with a Belgian Attorney: Navigating the Belgian legal system can be complex. Consulting with a local attorney can provide insights into the most effective procedures tailored to your case. This is especially true for international debt collection, where regulations and guidelines vary significantly.
Prepare Necessary Documentation: Ensure you have all necessary documents, such as contracts, invoices, and payment records, organized. These documents are essential to support your claim, whether you are dealing with local or international debt recovery.
After Initiating Debt Recovery
Use Interim Measures: If immediate action is needed, interim measures like seizing bank accounts or assets may be applicable. These measures, which are temporary and can be requested even before legal proceedings, can ensure that the debtor’s assets are secured while the legal process unfolds.
Conclusion
Recovering debts through judicial means in Belgium requires understanding the legal landscape and an appropriate strategy based on the debt’s nature and amount. While this article provides practical guidance, it is important to note that each case is unique, and professional legal advice is recommended for complex debt recovery cases. Businesses can enhance their chances of successful debt recovery while maintaining financial stability by utilizing simplified procedures for smaller or undisputed debts and consulting with legal experts. This proactive approach ensures that your business can continue to thrive even in the face of financial adversity.
What do the mythical Vega Sicilia wines, El Cid Campeador and the abuse of rights have in common? If you read on, you will find out.
The Vega Sicilia Único was for many years considered the best, the most prestigious and the most expensive Spanish wine.
The abuse of rights is a legal institute that allows the defense of situations in which the opponent acts with (apparent and formal) subjection to the law, but making a spurious use of the law with the intention of harming the injured party.
Last October, the Supreme Court handed down a judgment declaring certain agreements adopted by Bodegas Vega Sicilia S.A., producer of Vega Sicilia Único wine, to be null and void based on the principle of abuse of rights.
The judgment in question is doubly interesting.
Firstly, because it highlights the endemic evil of Spanish justice: it declares the nullity of resolutions adopted at a meeting held in March 2013, which were the subject of a lawsuit in February 2014, with a first instance ruling that same year, appealed to the Provincial Court of Valladolid who issued its judgement on 2019 and four years later the Supreme Court has put an end to the lawsuit: nine years after the shareholders meeting whose resolutions were the subject of the challenge.
As the Constitutional Court very recently reiterated in its ruling dated last October, «judicial slowness has no place in the Magna Carta». But, although it has no place, or should not have a place, our courts continue to insist that it does and, as an example, this case that we are commenting on is, unfortunately, no exception.
Beyond the barbarity of a litigant having to wait for nine years to find a final solution to his claim, the judgment we are commenting on is of interest for other reasons.
The plaintiffs sought the nullity of certain resolutions adopted at a shareholders’ meeting, basing their claim on the fact that these resolutions constituted an abuse of rights since, through them, the shareholders of Bodegas Vega Sicilia S.A. sought to take control of Bodegas Vega Sicilia away from the company of which the plaintiffs were in turn shareholders.
The legislation in force at the time the meeting was held (prior to the 2014 reform) established that «resolutions that are contrary to the law, oppose the articles of association or harm the corporate interest to the benefit of one or more shareholders or third parties» could be challenged, adding that those contrary to the law would be null and void and the remaining resolutions could be annulled.
Following the 2014 reform, article 204 considers that «corporate resolutions that are contrary to the law, are contrary to the articles of association or the regulations of the company meeting or harm the corporate interest to the benefit of one or more shareholders or third parties» can be challenged and no longer distinguishes between null and voidable resolutions; although it partially recovers the concept of radical nullity in the case of resolutions contrary to public order by establishing that in such cases the action does not have a statute of limitations or lapse.
But both with the regulations prior to the reform and with those currently in force, the controversy resolved by the ruling we are commenting on is the same: when the legislator requires the agreement to be contrary to «law» in order to be able to challenge it, does he mean that it contravenes a precept of the Capital Companies Act (LSC), or can it be considered a requirement for challengeability if it contravenes any other positive precept of any other legal text? And finally, if the resolution in question is classified as constituting an «abuse of rights», can such a situation be considered as «contrary to law» for the purposes of the application of article 204 LSC?
The Chamber reminds us of the requirements for the concurrence of abuse of rights in corporate matters:
- formal or outwardly correct use of a right
- causing damage to an interest not protected by a specific legal prerogative, and
- the immorality or antisociality (sic) of that conduct manifested subjectively (intention to damage or absence of legitimate interest) or objectively (abnormal exercise of the right contrary to the economic and social purposes of the same).
And it then refers to the numerous occasions on which its case law has reiterated that, although the regulation on challenging corporate resolutions does not expressly mention abuse of rights, this is no obstacle to annulling resolutions in such cases, since according to article 7 of the Civil Code (which prohibits abuse of rights), they must be deemed as contrary to the law.
The interest and peculiarity of this case lies in the fact that the contested resolutions were neither adopted in the interests of the company nor did they cause any harm to it, since the alleged harm was caused to a third party formally outside the company.
And on these premises, the Supreme Court reiterates and insists that the expression «contrary to the law» in article 204 LSC must be understood as «contrary to the legal system», which includes those agreements adopted in fraud of the law, in bad faith or with abuse of rights, all of which are included and regulated in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. For these reasons, the judgment of the Provincial Court upholds the claim and declares the nullity of the contested agreements.
And what has El Cid got to do with all this? Is it a typo? No, not at all. Legend has it (invented, it seems, by a monk of the monastery of San Pedro de Cardeña to attract visitors) that Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar won a battle on the walls of Valencia against the Almoravids, after his death, saddling his corpse on his legendary horse Babieca.
It turns out that his almost fellow countryman, David Alvarez, buyer of the winery in the 1980s, the latter from León, the former from Burgos, but both old Castilians, also won his last battle after his death; David Alvarez was, together with one of his daughters, a plaintiff against the agreements of Bodegas Vega Sicilia and died in 2015; seven years later the Supreme Court has given him the right against the Almogavars, in this case, his own children.
And two lessons: first, justice is not justice if it is slow, a phrase apocryphally attributed to Seneca; it was not in this case for David Alvarez. Secondly, the abuse of rights is not only an «in extremis» recourse when one does not find frank legal support for one’s claims; on the contrary, it is, on many occasions, the solution.
Every employer should manage the risk of employee lawsuits. Many companies believe that they treat their workers well and that their employees are happy. As a result, they believe that they are not at risk of a lawsuit. But in my work, I frequently see employment relationships sour and employees surprise management by retaining a lawyer.
Employers should proactively manage this risk instead of hoping lawsuits never come. Defending a business against litigation by a current or former employee takes a lot of time and can be very expensive. It can also be incredibly frustrating to see an employee the company once trusted making false and damaging allegations. But employers can take steps before a dispute arises to reduce the impact of a lawsuit. I discuss eight such steps below.
First, employers should consider purchasing insurance that may cover employee claims. In the United States, this insurance is called Employment Practices Liability (“EPLI”) Insurance. These kinds of insurance policies may pay for a lawyer to defend the company in the event of a lawsuit. They may also pay the employee the amount he or she demands or that a court awards. Although insurance costs money, many companies prefer to pay regular and foreseeable premiums than sudden, steep, and unpredictable legal fees and employee payouts.
Second, employers should implement and enforce sexual harassment policies. Policies like these discourage the type of behavior that can subject a company to liability. But in many jurisdictions, they may also provide a defense to a company in the event an employee sues the company for allowing the harassment to take place.
Third, employers should seriously examine disparities in pay and job roles. If the highest paid employees at a company are largely male and the lowest paid employees are largely female, then an employee may claim that the employer engages in sex discrimination. Similarly, if the executives of a company are largely white but its blue-collar workers are largely people of color, an employee may allege that the company engages in racial discrimination. Rather than litigate these issues, a company should investigate whether those disparities exist in its own workplace and address them if they do.
Fourth, employers should consider whether they want employment disputes to go to arbitration instead of to court. Employers can largely determine this by including an arbitration clause in the offer letters they send to employees upon hiring them. Arbitration has some advantages: it tends to move quicker, it is private, it has the reputation for being a friendly forum for employers, and it tends to cost less. But it also has some downsides: it does not permit appeals on the merits of the dispute and it can cost more than litigation depending on the kind of case.
Fifth, any time an employee discloses that he or she has a health issue, the company should immediately consider how to accommodate that issue. Many employers may disregard the disclosure of a health issue if it does not seem important to the employee’s job. But if the employee later believes that the employer penalized him or her because of the health issue, the employee may claim discrimination. Before that happens, an employer should work with an employee to make sure the health issue does not impede job performance.
Sixth, employers should ensure they make consistent decisions. If an employer allows one employee to work from home, other employees may want the same treatment. And if an employer lays one employee off, she may wonder why another employee did not meet the same fate. Employers may reduce the risk of a lawsuit by setting firm policies and abiding by them.
Seventh, employers should frequently consult a lawyer they trust when employment issues arise. Spending a few hundred dollars to speaking to a lawyer for an hour before firing an employee or before responding to an employee complaint can help an employer avoid a lawsuit that may cost tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars.
And finally, employers should consider settling disputes with employees, even if they are meritless. No company wants an employee to take advantage of them. But lawsuits are often more expensive and a hassle than the cost of a settlement. Spending a lot of money on defense, even if successful, may be more expensive than just compromising and paying the employee a fraction of what they demand.
Summary
Courts around the world issue judgments against defendants who hold assets in the United States. For example, some judgments may be against American corporations that do business abroad or local citizens who maintain bank accounts with American banks. Once a plaintiff prevails in the foreign lawsuit, she may have to initiate a proceeding in the United States to use that judgment to actually collect the defendant’s American assets. But this process, which is called domestication, has some specific rules that may be helpful to know before moving forward.
Why should you read this post about issues that may arise in domesticating foreign judgments in the United States?
- You already read my post about enforcing judgments issued by one court in the United States in a different court elsewhere in the country, but you want more judgment enforcement content.
- Cross-border disputes feel more exotic and fancy than local people who are mad at each other.
- The word domesticating makes you think that lawyers can take a wild judgment and teach it to live in a house with people.
Is the Judgment Debtor Subject to Personal Jurisdiction?
Pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, American courts may seek proof that a foreign judgment is legitimate before enforcing it. One issue courts often examine is whether the judgment debtor was subject to personal jurisdiction in the foreign country. If the court holds that the defendant was not subject to jurisdiction abroad, the court may not enforce the judgment in the United States. To determine whether personal jurisdiction existed abroad, courts may examine both the foreign jurisdiction’s law and American law, as the court did in this case.
Additionally, American courts may also require that the judgment debtor also be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States. Following a New York appellate court decision, some lawyers argued that the process of domesticating a judgment in the United States was a merely “ministerial function” and not a full lawsuit that required personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. But the New York appellate court clarified in another decision that personal jurisdiction is required over judgment debtors when domesticating foreign judgments.
The Separate Entity Rule
Litigants frequently seek to domesticate foreign judgments in the United States because defendants often have accounts at American banks. The United States may also seem like an attractive place to domesticate a judgment because nearly every major bank in the world has an office or does business in the United States. But just because a bank is subject to jurisdiction in the United States does not mean that courts will definitely enforce foreign judgments against the assets they hold.
Instead, jurisdictions like New York apply the “Separate Entity Rule.” This rule treats each branch of a financial institution as if it were a separate entity. This means that, for example, a New York judgment can only be used to collect assets from a Swiss bank that are held at a New York branch of that bank. The judgment cannot, however, be used to collect assets held at Swiss branches.
According to New York’s highest court, the purpose of the Separate Entity Rule is to encourage banks to do business in a jurisdiction without fear that they are subjecting all of their international assets to local judgments. And it is to prevent other jurisdictions from exposing American banks to foreign judgments in return. It also makes it easier for bank branches to comply with only one country’s laws, avoiding conflicts between different countries’ laws or judgments, and to perform searches of only local assets and not assets worldwide.
Because of this rule, judgment creditors from outside of the United States should only domesticate judgments in the same place where the judgment debtors’ assets are, not just where their banks are located.
Bringing Assets into the Jurisdiction
Although litigants often need to domesticate a judgment to collect assets in another jurisdiction, there are some instances where a court can order a party to move assets into the jurisdiction.
This issue arose in a prominent case in New York. In that case, the court held that a defendant that is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York can be ordered to bring physical property it possesses into New York to satisfy a judgment. It held in a later case that this does not conflict with the Separate Entity Rule because that rule only applies to bank accounts at bank branches.
This principle may be helpful for litigants who want to domesticate a judgment against a defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States, but who has physical property outside of the country. This may provide the American legal system’s procedures for judgment collection while also enabling the judgment creditor to collect foreign property.
Takeways:
- plaintiffs should ensure that they have personal jurisdiction over defendants not just under the laws of the jurisdiction where they bring suit, but also under the laws of the jurisdiction where they intend on enforcing judgments;
- plaintiffs should ensure that the jurisdictions in which they enforce judgments have the power to actually collect defendants’ assets, since some may not do so under rules like the Separate Entity Rule.
On 6 January 2022 Ukraine finally cancelled almost a two-year long moratorium for the creditor-trigged insolvencies. The moratorium was imposed in the late spring 2020 as a part of the nation’ response to first wave of COVID pandemic.
In a nutshell, the moratorium prohibited creditors from requesting insolvency action against those debtors whose obligations matured after 12 March 2020. A separate set of measures also lifted an early warning duty obliging directors of the companies in distress to file for insolvency within one month from a moment when the distress appeared.
The moratorium was heavily criticized by both domestic and international creditors, who legitimately blamed it for a non-selective approach.
As further 2021 statistic shown, the moratorium never seemed to reach a goal proclaimed by it authors and made no increase for insolvency relief requests by the debtor companies.
Instead, the country has been facing a steady increase in “zombie” companies having little to none liquidation value — and their owners clearly intending to get away with no creditor repayment.
With the moratorium being lifted off the creditors do expect to show no mercy to their Ukrainian debtors. This particularly worries those debtors potentially involved in wrongful trade or fraudulent action. Even with the moratorium in place in 2021 Ukrainian courts confirmed more than UAH 150 mln in creditors loss to be paid by the insolvent companies’ management and owners themselves. This number is expected to triple in 2022 – and there already were Supreme Court’s 2021 judgements confirming liability of the real owners standing behind opaque shareholder company and nominal directors.
As the creditors’ agitation grows, so do the debtor company owners’ concerns. As the owners\management liability process is extremely bespoke and often requires swift action, it is of crucial importance to get a throughout legal advise on either side – and much better to do that before the actual claim has been brought.
In an important and very reasoned judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation of France on September 30, 2020, relating to the enforceability of arbitration clauses in international consumer contracts, the Supreme Court judged that these clauses must be considered unfair and cannot be opposed to consumers.
The Supreme Court traditionally insisted on the priority given to the arbitrator to decide on his own jurisdiction, laid down in Article 1448 of the Code of Civil Procedure (principle known as «competence-competence», Jaguar, Civ. 1re, May 21, 1997, nos. 95-11.429 and 95-11.427).
The ECJ expressed its hostility towards such clauses when they are opposed to consumers. In Mostaza Claro (C-168/05), it referred to the internal laws of member states, while considering that the procedural modalities offered by states should not “make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by public order to consumers (“Directive 93/13, concerning unfair terms in consumer contracts, must be interpreted as meaning that a national court seized of an action for annulment of an arbitration award must determine whether the arbitration agreement is void and annul that award where that agreement contains an unfair term, even though the consumer has not pleaded that invalidity in the course of the arbitration proceedings, but only in that of the action for annulment”).
It therefore referred to the national judge the right to implement its legislation on unfair terms, and therefore to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the arbitration clause should be considered unfair. This is what the Court of Cassation decided, ruling out the case-by-case method, and considering that in any event such a clause must be excluded in relations with consumers.
The Court of Cassation adopted the same solution in international employment contracts, where it traditionally considers that arbitration clauses contained in international employment contracts are enforceable against employee (Soc. 16 Feb. 1999, n ° 96-40.643).
The Supreme Court, although traditionally very favourable to arbitration, gradually builds up a set of specific exceptions to ensure the protection of the «weak» party.
Summary
The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.
Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.
The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.
Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause
If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.
Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.
On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory — or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.
Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?
What happened?
The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.
So where do we look for law on those matters?
We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.
Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.
The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.
The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention
The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.
While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.
Where are we now?
If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.
If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.
The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:
- The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
- There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
- The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.
There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.
If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.
The Norwegian exception
The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.
How should your business act now?
The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.
Scrivi a Alexandre
Belgium — How to recover unpaid receivables
8 мая 2024
- Бельгия
- Судебная практика
PFAS are chemicals that have been used in industry for over 50 years. Between 4,000 and 5,000 varieties are used for various everyday consumer applications, and they are renowned for their non-stick, waterproofing, and heat-resistant properties. They have come under scrutiny in recent years, and are covered by European regulations, as they are in the USA, where the public authorities have imposed maximum use values, as well as reporting obligations. EU Regulation 2019/1021 (POP) restricts the production and use of certain categories of PFAS in specific industries or above certain values and their use with food products. France has gone further, regulating the levels of discharges into watercourses.
Scientific research suspects that PFAS cause illnesses such as cancer and reproductive disorders. Given the extent of contamination not only in everyday products but also in the environment, particularly waterways, the issue is likely to pose major public health problems in the years to come. This concern is more pressing given that PFASs are considered ‘eternal pollutants’, as there is currently no way of eliminating them from the environment.
The impact on companies’ and insurers’ liability is already significant. In the USA, more than 6,000 lawsuits have been filed since 2005. Three groups have already paid more than USD 1.2 billion in settlements due to contamination, and another group has paid more than USD 10 billion to end a class action.
In France, the Metropole of Lyon has brought a summary expert appraisal action against two chemical companies before considering bringing a liability action. In addition, several criminal complaints have been lodged for endangering the lives of others and damaging the environment.
Under French law, companies and their insurers could be liable on various legal grounds. In addition to ordinary civil liability law — based on article 1240 of the Civil Code — the special system of liability for defective products could also serve as a basis for a liability action (articles 1245 et seq. of the Civil Code), with French law defining a defect as any product that does not offer the safety that can legitimately be expected.
Although it is currently difficult to identify a causal link with an identified disease, asbestos-related case law has shown in the past that victims can take action if they can demonstrate that they suffered anxiety-related harm as a result of their exposure to the product, even if they are not positively suffering from a disease at the time of their claim.
In addition, the reporting obligations imposed by the public authorities will undoubtedly facilitate the filing of liability actions by facilitating the identification of the emitters and users of these pollutants.
Insurers are directly affected by this phenomenon, which for them constitutes an «emerging» risk («silent cover») because, for the most part, this risk was not identified when the policy was taken out, which exposes them directly and is all the more problematic because insurance premiums have not been able to take such a risk into account.
Civil liability or professional indemnity insurance policies, especially if they are drafted with «all risks except» clauses (“tous risques sauf” in French legal vocabulary, i.e. covering all liability risks vis-à-vis third parties except those strictly listed), as well as those including clauses relating to environmental risks, are particularly targeted.
Lloyd’s has already published model exclusion clauses for the attention of insurers, although such clauses can obviously only cover future insurance contracts or endorsements:
https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA_Bulletins/LMA23-039-SD.aspx
The clauses contained in insurance policies must be drafted with particular care, considering each country’s specific features. In France, for example, to be enforceable against the insured, clauses must be «formal and limited», which means that the exclusion must be both clearly expressed and that it must be possible to determine its content perfectly.
For example, the Court of Cassation recently ruled that the use of the terms «such as» or «in particular» (“tells que” “en particulier”) in an exclusion clause led to confusion in the interpretation of the exclusion clause, rendering it invalid (Civ. 2e, 26 Nov. 2020, no. 19-16.435). There was also a debate on the validity of an exclusion clause relating to bodily injury caused by asbestos, a risk which at the time had not been identified by insurers, who subsequently excluded it from most policies (Cass. 2e civ., 21 Sept. 2023, nos. 21-19801 and 21-19776). Similarly, policies should clearly indicate whether cover is provided based on a harmful event or based on a claim (i.e “base dommage” or “base reclamation”, which indicates if the risk is covered, depending on if the damage happened during the policy was valid, or if it depends on the moment when the risk was notified by the insured during such period).
One thing is sure: the risks associated with PFAS and claims are only just beginning to emerge in Europe, where the conditions for group actions have recently been extended with EU Directive 2020/1828, which came into force on 25 June 2023 and is currently the subject of a draft law under discussion in the French Parliament with a view to its transposition.
Dealing with unpaid invoices can be challenging for any business. In Belgium, where judicial processes can seem daunting, understanding how to manage debt collection effectively is crucial. This article offers practical guidance derived from a comprehensive legal guide to help your company navigate Belgium’s judicial debt recovery landscape.
Understanding Your Options
Assess the Situation: Before taking legal action, evaluating the amount owed and the debtor’s financial status is essential. This assessment will guide you in choosing the appropriate legal avenue, as Belgium offers different courts and procedures based on the dispute’s value. For instance, for claims up to € 5,000, the local court or ‘justice de paix’, which is a court of first instance for minor civil cases, is typically used due to its cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
Send a Notice of Default: Under Belgian law, a notice of default is mandatory before initiating legal proceedings. This step adheres to legal requirements and gives the debtor one last chance to settle their dues without further legal complications.
Efficient Legal Procedures
Use Simplified Procedures for Small Amounts: A simplified legal procedure can be utilized for undisputed money debts up to €1,860, which expedites the payment request process significantly. This approach can be particularly advantageous for recovering smaller debts quickly.
Consider Direct Bailiff Intervention: For undisputed amounts, irrespective of their size, between companies, creditors can authorize a bailiff to recover the debt directly without a court judgment. This procedure reduces legal fees and speeds up the debt collection process.
Leveraging Legal and Financial Advice
Consult with a Belgian Attorney: Navigating the Belgian legal system can be complex. Consulting with a local attorney can provide insights into the most effective procedures tailored to your case. This is especially true for international debt collection, where regulations and guidelines vary significantly.
Prepare Necessary Documentation: Ensure you have all necessary documents, such as contracts, invoices, and payment records, organized. These documents are essential to support your claim, whether you are dealing with local or international debt recovery.
After Initiating Debt Recovery
Use Interim Measures: If immediate action is needed, interim measures like seizing bank accounts or assets may be applicable. These measures, which are temporary and can be requested even before legal proceedings, can ensure that the debtor’s assets are secured while the legal process unfolds.
Conclusion
Recovering debts through judicial means in Belgium requires understanding the legal landscape and an appropriate strategy based on the debt’s nature and amount. While this article provides practical guidance, it is important to note that each case is unique, and professional legal advice is recommended for complex debt recovery cases. Businesses can enhance their chances of successful debt recovery while maintaining financial stability by utilizing simplified procedures for smaller or undisputed debts and consulting with legal experts. This proactive approach ensures that your business can continue to thrive even in the face of financial adversity.
What do the mythical Vega Sicilia wines, El Cid Campeador and the abuse of rights have in common? If you read on, you will find out.
The Vega Sicilia Único was for many years considered the best, the most prestigious and the most expensive Spanish wine.
The abuse of rights is a legal institute that allows the defense of situations in which the opponent acts with (apparent and formal) subjection to the law, but making a spurious use of the law with the intention of harming the injured party.
Last October, the Supreme Court handed down a judgment declaring certain agreements adopted by Bodegas Vega Sicilia S.A., producer of Vega Sicilia Único wine, to be null and void based on the principle of abuse of rights.
The judgment in question is doubly interesting.
Firstly, because it highlights the endemic evil of Spanish justice: it declares the nullity of resolutions adopted at a meeting held in March 2013, which were the subject of a lawsuit in February 2014, with a first instance ruling that same year, appealed to the Provincial Court of Valladolid who issued its judgement on 2019 and four years later the Supreme Court has put an end to the lawsuit: nine years after the shareholders meeting whose resolutions were the subject of the challenge.
As the Constitutional Court very recently reiterated in its ruling dated last October, «judicial slowness has no place in the Magna Carta». But, although it has no place, or should not have a place, our courts continue to insist that it does and, as an example, this case that we are commenting on is, unfortunately, no exception.
Beyond the barbarity of a litigant having to wait for nine years to find a final solution to his claim, the judgment we are commenting on is of interest for other reasons.
The plaintiffs sought the nullity of certain resolutions adopted at a shareholders’ meeting, basing their claim on the fact that these resolutions constituted an abuse of rights since, through them, the shareholders of Bodegas Vega Sicilia S.A. sought to take control of Bodegas Vega Sicilia away from the company of which the plaintiffs were in turn shareholders.
The legislation in force at the time the meeting was held (prior to the 2014 reform) established that «resolutions that are contrary to the law, oppose the articles of association or harm the corporate interest to the benefit of one or more shareholders or third parties» could be challenged, adding that those contrary to the law would be null and void and the remaining resolutions could be annulled.
Following the 2014 reform, article 204 considers that «corporate resolutions that are contrary to the law, are contrary to the articles of association or the regulations of the company meeting or harm the corporate interest to the benefit of one or more shareholders or third parties» can be challenged and no longer distinguishes between null and voidable resolutions; although it partially recovers the concept of radical nullity in the case of resolutions contrary to public order by establishing that in such cases the action does not have a statute of limitations or lapse.
But both with the regulations prior to the reform and with those currently in force, the controversy resolved by the ruling we are commenting on is the same: when the legislator requires the agreement to be contrary to «law» in order to be able to challenge it, does he mean that it contravenes a precept of the Capital Companies Act (LSC), or can it be considered a requirement for challengeability if it contravenes any other positive precept of any other legal text? And finally, if the resolution in question is classified as constituting an «abuse of rights», can such a situation be considered as «contrary to law» for the purposes of the application of article 204 LSC?
The Chamber reminds us of the requirements for the concurrence of abuse of rights in corporate matters:
- formal or outwardly correct use of a right
- causing damage to an interest not protected by a specific legal prerogative, and
- the immorality or antisociality (sic) of that conduct manifested subjectively (intention to damage or absence of legitimate interest) or objectively (abnormal exercise of the right contrary to the economic and social purposes of the same).
And it then refers to the numerous occasions on which its case law has reiterated that, although the regulation on challenging corporate resolutions does not expressly mention abuse of rights, this is no obstacle to annulling resolutions in such cases, since according to article 7 of the Civil Code (which prohibits abuse of rights), they must be deemed as contrary to the law.
The interest and peculiarity of this case lies in the fact that the contested resolutions were neither adopted in the interests of the company nor did they cause any harm to it, since the alleged harm was caused to a third party formally outside the company.
And on these premises, the Supreme Court reiterates and insists that the expression «contrary to the law» in article 204 LSC must be understood as «contrary to the legal system», which includes those agreements adopted in fraud of the law, in bad faith or with abuse of rights, all of which are included and regulated in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. For these reasons, the judgment of the Provincial Court upholds the claim and declares the nullity of the contested agreements.
And what has El Cid got to do with all this? Is it a typo? No, not at all. Legend has it (invented, it seems, by a monk of the monastery of San Pedro de Cardeña to attract visitors) that Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar won a battle on the walls of Valencia against the Almoravids, after his death, saddling his corpse on his legendary horse Babieca.
It turns out that his almost fellow countryman, David Alvarez, buyer of the winery in the 1980s, the latter from León, the former from Burgos, but both old Castilians, also won his last battle after his death; David Alvarez was, together with one of his daughters, a plaintiff against the agreements of Bodegas Vega Sicilia and died in 2015; seven years later the Supreme Court has given him the right against the Almogavars, in this case, his own children.
And two lessons: first, justice is not justice if it is slow, a phrase apocryphally attributed to Seneca; it was not in this case for David Alvarez. Secondly, the abuse of rights is not only an «in extremis» recourse when one does not find frank legal support for one’s claims; on the contrary, it is, on many occasions, the solution.
Every employer should manage the risk of employee lawsuits. Many companies believe that they treat their workers well and that their employees are happy. As a result, they believe that they are not at risk of a lawsuit. But in my work, I frequently see employment relationships sour and employees surprise management by retaining a lawyer.
Employers should proactively manage this risk instead of hoping lawsuits never come. Defending a business against litigation by a current or former employee takes a lot of time and can be very expensive. It can also be incredibly frustrating to see an employee the company once trusted making false and damaging allegations. But employers can take steps before a dispute arises to reduce the impact of a lawsuit. I discuss eight such steps below.
First, employers should consider purchasing insurance that may cover employee claims. In the United States, this insurance is called Employment Practices Liability (“EPLI”) Insurance. These kinds of insurance policies may pay for a lawyer to defend the company in the event of a lawsuit. They may also pay the employee the amount he or she demands or that a court awards. Although insurance costs money, many companies prefer to pay regular and foreseeable premiums than sudden, steep, and unpredictable legal fees and employee payouts.
Second, employers should implement and enforce sexual harassment policies. Policies like these discourage the type of behavior that can subject a company to liability. But in many jurisdictions, they may also provide a defense to a company in the event an employee sues the company for allowing the harassment to take place.
Third, employers should seriously examine disparities in pay and job roles. If the highest paid employees at a company are largely male and the lowest paid employees are largely female, then an employee may claim that the employer engages in sex discrimination. Similarly, if the executives of a company are largely white but its blue-collar workers are largely people of color, an employee may allege that the company engages in racial discrimination. Rather than litigate these issues, a company should investigate whether those disparities exist in its own workplace and address them if they do.
Fourth, employers should consider whether they want employment disputes to go to arbitration instead of to court. Employers can largely determine this by including an arbitration clause in the offer letters they send to employees upon hiring them. Arbitration has some advantages: it tends to move quicker, it is private, it has the reputation for being a friendly forum for employers, and it tends to cost less. But it also has some downsides: it does not permit appeals on the merits of the dispute and it can cost more than litigation depending on the kind of case.
Fifth, any time an employee discloses that he or she has a health issue, the company should immediately consider how to accommodate that issue. Many employers may disregard the disclosure of a health issue if it does not seem important to the employee’s job. But if the employee later believes that the employer penalized him or her because of the health issue, the employee may claim discrimination. Before that happens, an employer should work with an employee to make sure the health issue does not impede job performance.
Sixth, employers should ensure they make consistent decisions. If an employer allows one employee to work from home, other employees may want the same treatment. And if an employer lays one employee off, she may wonder why another employee did not meet the same fate. Employers may reduce the risk of a lawsuit by setting firm policies and abiding by them.
Seventh, employers should frequently consult a lawyer they trust when employment issues arise. Spending a few hundred dollars to speaking to a lawyer for an hour before firing an employee or before responding to an employee complaint can help an employer avoid a lawsuit that may cost tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars.
And finally, employers should consider settling disputes with employees, even if they are meritless. No company wants an employee to take advantage of them. But lawsuits are often more expensive and a hassle than the cost of a settlement. Spending a lot of money on defense, even if successful, may be more expensive than just compromising and paying the employee a fraction of what they demand.
Summary
Courts around the world issue judgments against defendants who hold assets in the United States. For example, some judgments may be against American corporations that do business abroad or local citizens who maintain bank accounts with American banks. Once a plaintiff prevails in the foreign lawsuit, she may have to initiate a proceeding in the United States to use that judgment to actually collect the defendant’s American assets. But this process, which is called domestication, has some specific rules that may be helpful to know before moving forward.
Why should you read this post about issues that may arise in domesticating foreign judgments in the United States?
- You already read my post about enforcing judgments issued by one court in the United States in a different court elsewhere in the country, but you want more judgment enforcement content.
- Cross-border disputes feel more exotic and fancy than local people who are mad at each other.
- The word domesticating makes you think that lawyers can take a wild judgment and teach it to live in a house with people.
Is the Judgment Debtor Subject to Personal Jurisdiction?
Pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, American courts may seek proof that a foreign judgment is legitimate before enforcing it. One issue courts often examine is whether the judgment debtor was subject to personal jurisdiction in the foreign country. If the court holds that the defendant was not subject to jurisdiction abroad, the court may not enforce the judgment in the United States. To determine whether personal jurisdiction existed abroad, courts may examine both the foreign jurisdiction’s law and American law, as the court did in this case.
Additionally, American courts may also require that the judgment debtor also be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States. Following a New York appellate court decision, some lawyers argued that the process of domesticating a judgment in the United States was a merely “ministerial function” and not a full lawsuit that required personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. But the New York appellate court clarified in another decision that personal jurisdiction is required over judgment debtors when domesticating foreign judgments.
The Separate Entity Rule
Litigants frequently seek to domesticate foreign judgments in the United States because defendants often have accounts at American banks. The United States may also seem like an attractive place to domesticate a judgment because nearly every major bank in the world has an office or does business in the United States. But just because a bank is subject to jurisdiction in the United States does not mean that courts will definitely enforce foreign judgments against the assets they hold.
Instead, jurisdictions like New York apply the “Separate Entity Rule.” This rule treats each branch of a financial institution as if it were a separate entity. This means that, for example, a New York judgment can only be used to collect assets from a Swiss bank that are held at a New York branch of that bank. The judgment cannot, however, be used to collect assets held at Swiss branches.
According to New York’s highest court, the purpose of the Separate Entity Rule is to encourage banks to do business in a jurisdiction without fear that they are subjecting all of their international assets to local judgments. And it is to prevent other jurisdictions from exposing American banks to foreign judgments in return. It also makes it easier for bank branches to comply with only one country’s laws, avoiding conflicts between different countries’ laws or judgments, and to perform searches of only local assets and not assets worldwide.
Because of this rule, judgment creditors from outside of the United States should only domesticate judgments in the same place where the judgment debtors’ assets are, not just where their banks are located.
Bringing Assets into the Jurisdiction
Although litigants often need to domesticate a judgment to collect assets in another jurisdiction, there are some instances where a court can order a party to move assets into the jurisdiction.
This issue arose in a prominent case in New York. In that case, the court held that a defendant that is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York can be ordered to bring physical property it possesses into New York to satisfy a judgment. It held in a later case that this does not conflict with the Separate Entity Rule because that rule only applies to bank accounts at bank branches.
This principle may be helpful for litigants who want to domesticate a judgment against a defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States, but who has physical property outside of the country. This may provide the American legal system’s procedures for judgment collection while also enabling the judgment creditor to collect foreign property.
Takeways:
- plaintiffs should ensure that they have personal jurisdiction over defendants not just under the laws of the jurisdiction where they bring suit, but also under the laws of the jurisdiction where they intend on enforcing judgments;
- plaintiffs should ensure that the jurisdictions in which they enforce judgments have the power to actually collect defendants’ assets, since some may not do so under rules like the Separate Entity Rule.
On 6 January 2022 Ukraine finally cancelled almost a two-year long moratorium for the creditor-trigged insolvencies. The moratorium was imposed in the late spring 2020 as a part of the nation’ response to first wave of COVID pandemic.
In a nutshell, the moratorium prohibited creditors from requesting insolvency action against those debtors whose obligations matured after 12 March 2020. A separate set of measures also lifted an early warning duty obliging directors of the companies in distress to file for insolvency within one month from a moment when the distress appeared.
The moratorium was heavily criticized by both domestic and international creditors, who legitimately blamed it for a non-selective approach.
As further 2021 statistic shown, the moratorium never seemed to reach a goal proclaimed by it authors and made no increase for insolvency relief requests by the debtor companies.
Instead, the country has been facing a steady increase in “zombie” companies having little to none liquidation value — and their owners clearly intending to get away with no creditor repayment.
With the moratorium being lifted off the creditors do expect to show no mercy to their Ukrainian debtors. This particularly worries those debtors potentially involved in wrongful trade or fraudulent action. Even with the moratorium in place in 2021 Ukrainian courts confirmed more than UAH 150 mln in creditors loss to be paid by the insolvent companies’ management and owners themselves. This number is expected to triple in 2022 – and there already were Supreme Court’s 2021 judgements confirming liability of the real owners standing behind opaque shareholder company and nominal directors.
As the creditors’ agitation grows, so do the debtor company owners’ concerns. As the owners\management liability process is extremely bespoke and often requires swift action, it is of crucial importance to get a throughout legal advise on either side – and much better to do that before the actual claim has been brought.
In an important and very reasoned judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation of France on September 30, 2020, relating to the enforceability of arbitration clauses in international consumer contracts, the Supreme Court judged that these clauses must be considered unfair and cannot be opposed to consumers.
The Supreme Court traditionally insisted on the priority given to the arbitrator to decide on his own jurisdiction, laid down in Article 1448 of the Code of Civil Procedure (principle known as «competence-competence», Jaguar, Civ. 1re, May 21, 1997, nos. 95-11.429 and 95-11.427).
The ECJ expressed its hostility towards such clauses when they are opposed to consumers. In Mostaza Claro (C-168/05), it referred to the internal laws of member states, while considering that the procedural modalities offered by states should not “make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by public order to consumers (“Directive 93/13, concerning unfair terms in consumer contracts, must be interpreted as meaning that a national court seized of an action for annulment of an arbitration award must determine whether the arbitration agreement is void and annul that award where that agreement contains an unfair term, even though the consumer has not pleaded that invalidity in the course of the arbitration proceedings, but only in that of the action for annulment”).
It therefore referred to the national judge the right to implement its legislation on unfair terms, and therefore to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the arbitration clause should be considered unfair. This is what the Court of Cassation decided, ruling out the case-by-case method, and considering that in any event such a clause must be excluded in relations with consumers.
The Court of Cassation adopted the same solution in international employment contracts, where it traditionally considers that arbitration clauses contained in international employment contracts are enforceable against employee (Soc. 16 Feb. 1999, n ° 96-40.643).
The Supreme Court, although traditionally very favourable to arbitration, gradually builds up a set of specific exceptions to ensure the protection of the «weak» party.
Summary
The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.
Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.
The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.
Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause
If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.
Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.
On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory — or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.
Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?
What happened?
The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.
So where do we look for law on those matters?
We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.
Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.
The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.
The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention
The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.
While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.
Where are we now?
If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.
If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.
The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:
- The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
- There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
- The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.
There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.
If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.
The Norwegian exception
The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.
How should your business act now?
The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.