Resale Price Maintenance – Exception for short-term promotions?

12 August 2018

  • Germany
  • Distribution

Who is responsible for the information on food products distributed on the online food market?

The same rules as in the offline food market apply.

The main applicable law is EU Regulation 1169/2011, also called “The EU Food Information Regulation“. According to its Art. 8 par. 1 the food business operator responsible for the food information shall be the operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed (the “Marketer”).

In case that the operator is not established in the Union, the responsible person is the importer into the Union market.

According to Art. 8 par. 2 of the said Regulation, the Marketer shall ensure the presence and accuracy of the food information in accordance with the applicable EU food information law and also with the requirements of relevant national provisions.

Who bears the main responsibility as food business operator?

The main responsibility for food information is assigned to the food business operator under whose name or business name the foodstuff is marketed.

This applies though only to such information concerning foodstuff which is made available to the final consumer by means of a label, other accompanying material, or any other means including modern technology tools or verbal communication.

Normally, the food business operator is the person, who keeps foodstuff for sale and therefore places such products on the market. According to the EU Food Information Regulation in order to determine the responsibility, it is of decisive importance under whose name the foodstuff is placed on the final consumer market.

Thereby the main responsibility is not any more with the final seller, with the consequence that the responsibility of the retailer is reduced.

A manufacturer who places a foodstuff on the market is therefore the responsible person.

A retailer is not per se a responsible person for the information on the foodstuff. In case the retailer sells food products under a private/own brand, then the responsible person is the one whose name is on the label of the product.

Importers are responsible for the information on the foodstuff if the food business operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed is not domiciliated in the EU.

In case of re-imported foodstuff, the responsible person is the one under whose name and address the foodstuff is offered to the consumer.

In case of a direct delivery of food from a third state (non-EU-state) to a consumer, as this is the case in the online retail, then the importer is the food business operator responsible for the food information.

Up to which extent is the marketer responsible for the information on the food?

The marketer is responsible for the accurateness and the lawfulness of the information on the food product and has to comply with all relevant German and EU laws and regulations.

This concerns not only the provisions of the EU Food Information Regulation, but also other EU regulations on information, such as information obligations which apply only to certain foodstuffs, as well as labelling obligations for additives and so on.

Information which are non-obligatory shall not be misleading, ambiguous or misunderstanding and have to rely on scientific data.

The operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed is responsible for meeting those provisions.

Retailers who are not the operator under whose name the food is marketed do only have to meet a reduced responsibility according to Art. 8 per. 3 to 5 of the EU Food Information Regulation (“The Regulation”).

Who else is responsible?

Food business operators who are not marketers have a reduced responsibility (Art. 8 par. 3 to 5 of the Regulation).

Under certain prerequisites they are responsible for

– known or presumed deficits in labelling (Art. 8 par. 3 of the Regulation)

– any changes they make to food information accompanying a food (Art. 8 par. 4 of the Regulation),

– ensuring compliance with the requirements of food information law and relevant national (in this case German) provisions which are relevant to their activities and verifying that such requirements are met (Art. 8 par. 5 of the Regulation).

Which specific characteristics apply to the upstream trade levels, meaning in B2B relations?

In case of non-prepacked food, the obligations to inform are quite limited. Non-prepacked food is usually intended for the final consumer or for supply to mass caterers.

There is only the obligation to inform about allergen ingredients. The EU Member States are free though to extent the obligation of informing regarding non-prepacked food according to Art. 44 par. 1 b) of the Regulation.

Germany made use of this option in its “Preliminary Regulation for the Addendum of EU Provisions Concerning the Information of Consumers about the Manner of Labelling Allergen Products in Non-Prepacked Food” of 28.11.2014 (Vorläufige Lebensmittelinformations- Ergänzungsverordnung).

When trading with non-prepacked food in the upstream trading levels the information about the food doesn’t have to be mandatory on the product itself. Instead, this information can be given in the accompanying papers of the food product.

The author of this post is Olga Dimopoulou

Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).

Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.

The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.

Practical tips

Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:

  • the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
  • however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.

Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.

  • in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
  • in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).

Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.

In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.

  1. Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by

There is no single piece of legislation setting out all the duties and obligations to which managing GmbH directors (“Geschaeftsfuehrer”) are subject. These duties are set out i.a. in the law on GmbHs (“GmbHG”), the Commercial Code (“HGB”), Insolvency Act (“InsO”), Civil Code (BGB), the Antitrust Law (GWB), environmental and tax laws. Furthermore, they are set out in the Articles of Association of the GmbH (“Gesellschaftsvertrag”), Shareholders’ resolutions, Internal rules for management and if applicable the Service agreements of the GmbH and the directors.

Directors will normally not be held accountable for acts and debts of the GmbH, for GmbHs are separate independent entities accountable in their own right. Directors will be held accountable for their own behaviour, however, and be required to pay money out of their own pockets by way of compensation for breach of duty or as a fine. They may be disqualified from holding office as director, or even imprisoned.

General Obligation of Diligent Management in Relation to the GmbH

Directors have a general obligation of diligent management, including in particular:

  • to use his / her best efforts to promote the purpose of the GmbH;
  • to control the company’s liquidity and financial position;
  • ensure the GmbH’s compliance with all applicable legal obligations;
  • not to compete with, or appropriate the business opportunities of the GmbH;
  • not to disclose confidential information belonging to the GmbH.

Directors must employ the diligence of an orderly businessperson. Pursuant to the “business judgment rule” the management is immunized from liability if and to the extent the management, making an entrepreneurial decision based on appropriate information, could reasonably assume to act in the best interest of the company.

Annual accounts

GmbH directors must ensure that the company keeps proper books and accounts showing clearly the financial position of the company. Failure to fulfil this obligation can lead to a fine or even a term of imprisonment of the director.

Contribution and Preservation of Share Capital

The GmbH must have a share capital of at least 25,000 EUR. Upon the formation of a GmbH or increase of its share capital, the director(s) must affirm to the commercial register that the subscriber(s) of the (increased) share capital paid in the amount of cash determined in the Articles of Association, i.e. that the full amounts due were fully paid in, not paid back and are entirely to the free disposition of the director(s). If incorrect statements were made, directors are liable to the company.

Section 30 para 1 GmbHG prohibits disbursing assets to shareholders without an adequate consideration, so-called unlawful repayments. For their determination, a “balance-sheet test” is decisive. This means, a payment is not unlawful, when:

  • the company’s counter-performance or restitution claim is fully-fledged and
  • the contract meets the cover imperative (payment of the market price).

If an unlawful repayment of share capital contributions has occurred, the other shareholders are proportionately liable for the refund owed to the company. The directors whose negligent or intentional acts caused the illegal repayment are in their turn liable to those shareholders required to refund the sum.

Duties in Relation to Shareholders

Each director is entitled to call shareholders’ meetings. Those are to be called – inter alia – if this appears to be required by the interest of the company.

Under German GmbH law, GmbH shareholders are entitled to instruct the director(s) of the company in detail through shareholders resolutions to act or not to act in a certain way. Directors must comply with those instructions unless they are illegal. A negligent or intentional violation of this obligation renders the directors liable to the GmbH for damages and may justify their dismissal for cause.

Obligations Arising From Insolvency, Over-Indebtedness and Loss

Insolvency and Over-Indebtedness

In case of over-indebtedness or insolvency, each director must file a petition for the institution of an insolvency petition without undue delay but no later than three weeks from the date on which the over-indebtedness was ascertained or the insolvency arose (Section 15a Insolvency Code). Directors negligently or intentionally failing to meet this obligation (in time or properly) commit a criminal offence punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment and are liable for damages to the company.

Loss

If a balance sheet of the company shows a loss of one half or more of its share capital, the directors must call a shareholder meeting without undue delay. Directors failing to do so are liable to the company and subject to criminal penalties.

Duties in Relation to Taxes and Social Insurance Contributions

Apart from the obligation to file tax returns and pay corporate, trade and sales tax, the company must withhold some taxes (income tax, capital gains/settlement tax). The tax laws impose on directors a direct responsibility for tax payments. In case of violation by intention or gross negligence, they are liable personally (Section 69 German Fiscal Code) and subject to administrative sanctions or criminal penalties. Similar obligations apply to statutory social insurance contributions.

Duties in Relation to Employees and the Environment

Directors must observe special laws for the protection of employees (ArbSchG) and environment (USchG). If failing to do so, directors are personally responsible.

Duties in Relation to Third Parties

Directors’ Liability for an Appropriate Organisation of the Company

Directors have the duty and responsibility to organise the company such that the life, health, property, and similar rights of third parties are not violated.

Directors’ Liability for their Company’s Contracts, and its Acts or Omissions

Such a liability arises e.g., if a director agrees to personally guarantee a contract and the company fails to perform. A director may also be personally liable for torts (i.e. civil wrongs, incl. negligence) authorised by him/her, committed by the GmbH.

Antitrust Issues

A company and its directors commit an administrative offence, punishable by up to 1,000,000 EUR, if they violate Art. 101 s. EC Treaty or provisions of the GWB. This encompasses e.g. agreements, having as effect the restriction of competition.

Disqualification as a Director

A GmbH director will be disqualified from the position as director if he/she is convicted for the commission of particular criminal offences like fraudulent bankruptcy, violation of the duty to keep books or delaying insolvency proceedings.

“Rimowa owner terminates all distributor agreements in Europe” – headlined the leading German business newspaper “Handelsblatt” on 19 March 2018. The reason for termination is that Rimowa, the well-known manufacturer of high quality branded cases – after 2011 now again in 2018 – redesigns its distribution network: Rimowa aims at raising its quality selection criteria again, away from selling its products in the old-fashioned shop, to a modern shopping experience.

In principle, manufacturers can freely design and develop their distribution system according to their marketing strategy and any changing needs. Likewise, they are in principle free to choose the number and name of their sales intermediaries (distributors/dealers, franchisees, agents, etc.). They are in principle also free to switch to selective distribution, with the aim of aligning the distribution of their products with certain criteria (in particular: regarding the quality of distribution), thus possibly also reducing the number of distributors. However, as an exception, distributors may force the manufacturer to supply them anyway – namely if the manufacturer has a significant market power. In such a case, an obligation to contract with a distributor, resulting in an obligation to deliver may follow from the prohibition of discrimination (laid down in sec. 19 para. 1, 2 no. 1, 20 German Act against Restraints of Competition).

This issue becomes especially practically relevant if a manufacturer redesigns its distribution network – just like Rimowa did before and now does again. Rimowa switched to selective distribution in 2011/2012 (for the advantages of selective distribution and possible restrictions of distribution, see the Legalmondo article here). To redesign its distribution network, Rimowa terminated the former distributor agreements and offered to conclude new ones – according to which the distributors newly committed themselves to present the goods in a certain way and buy and use Rimowa’s shop-in-shop system. According to Rimowa, the appearance of a former distributor did not correspond to the new business concept and the new marketing strategy, which is why the parties could not agree on concluding a new agreement. Thereupon, the distributor filed an action, aiming at the conclusion of a new dealer contract and thus delivery of his shops.

The District Court of Munich denied the claim (decision of 09.09.2014, ref. no. 1 HKO 7249/13), the Higher Regional Court of Munich, however, affirmed such claim (decision of 17.09.2015, ref. no. U 3886/14 Kart) – arguing that the manufacturer had a leading position in the relevant “market for high-priced and high-quality suitcases” or, conversely, that the distributor had a dependency if and because the manufacturer’s suitcases could not be replaced by equivalent others. Such dependency would in particular be indicated through a high distribution rate (i.e. the manufacturer supplied a large number of comparable distributors) as well as the unique design and the associated high recognition value. Now, the Federal Court of Justice overturned the judgment and remanded for a new trial (decision of 12.12.2017, ref. no. KZR 50/15). Reason: the distributor’s assortment-related dependency (“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit” as special case of “Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”) on the manufacturer was not sufficiently proven. Although a high distribution rate was regularly decisive, it might be less meaningful in qualitative selective distribution systems as the present one. Decisive for redesigning distribution systems:

“If a supplier chooses to switch to a qualitative selective distribution system at a certain point in time, an assortment-related dependency is regularly indicated by a high distribution rate in the period before.” (Para. 19)

The manufacturer can especially bring forward two arguments against such alleged assortment-related dependency, namely that

(i) the number of distributors the manufacturer himself supplied with his products is much lower than the total number of distributors that offered his products (i.e. including those buying the products from other sources), and that

(ii) the distribution rate is to be determined on the basis of those distributors who are comparable to the distributor demanding access to the distribution system and delivery (para. 27) – as the German Federal Court previously stated in terms of designer upholstery (decision of 09.05.2000, ref. no. KZR 28/98, p. 12 et seq.).

Practical conclusions

  1. “There is nothing more constant than change”: When redesigning the distribution system, carefully consider if you want / need transitional arrangements – or better leave them out. One very good reason to leave them out: they might make it more difficult to exclude unwanted distributors. Thus, in the Rimowa case, the Higher Regional Court Munich rejected the manufacturer’s objection that the distributor’s business model “aimed at bargain hunters” – arguing that the manufacturer gave other distributors time of “12 months after conclusion of the agreement” to fulfil the new qualitative criteria.
  2. For qualitative criteria (also: requirements / specifications) in Internet sales, please see the other articles on Legalmondo, especially on platform bans and price comparison bans.

It is not only since the days of the Internet that brand manufacturers have had to contend with the fact that original products are offered outside of their authorized sales channels. The problem has since been significantly exacerbated, however. The relevant products are also referred to as gray market products.

The internal market of the European Economic Area makes it possible to exploit certain price advantages – that is, purchasing in one Member State at a price that is lower than in other Member States and selling to the end customer while passing on (or not passing on) the purchasing advantage. This is made possible by the “exhaustion regime”, according to which the sale of products, which at one time were made available in the European Economic Area with the copyright holder’s consent, cannot be prohibited.

Brand manufacturers’ attempts to counter this issue by means of distribution systems may be an effective instrument, but only if all distribution partners adhere to it. If a distribution partner pulls out, trademark owners (at least in Germany) are initially required to contact their distribution partner who is acting contrary to the contract. That is difficult when the distribution channel of the products in question cannot be traced by security systems (such as SKU numbers) beyond any doubt. A right to information against a third party generally does not exist. Thus, neither the distribution system itself nor the suspicion that the products are not of EU origin may be used easily to justify a right to information in selective or exclusive distribution. The Federal Court of Justice, for example, sees no reason to deviate from the exhaustion doctrine when implementing a selective distribution system (Federal Court of Justice, 1 ZR 63/04). In the case of a selective or exclusive distribution system (Federal Court of Justice, I AR 52/10), the burden of proof is reversed. Accordingly, it is initially the brand manufacturer itself that is responsible for providing evidence for its allegation of a non-EU product.

Exceptions are only made where, for example, the SKU numbers were modified, since this makes clarification difficult. In such cases, trademark infringement and at the same time breach of competition law are given by way of exception and it is not possible for the dealer to invoke exhaustion (Federal Court of Justice I ZR 1/98). The deliberate misleading of the authorized dealer by a third party to breach the contract is also recognized as an exception (Federal Court of Justice I ZR 96/04), which regularly is not verifiable, however.

By the way, the sensational December 2017 Coty decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU C-230/16) (here you can find more: https://www.legalmondo.com/2017/12/eu-court-justice-allows-online-sales-restrictions-coty-case/) has not changed this basic presumption, either. In its Coty decision, the CJEU in the end confirms the exhaustion priority also and particularly for luxury products by referring to existing case law (specifically ECJ C-59/08).

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There are, however, more options available. As confirmed by the ECJ (ECJ, C-337/95), an exemption from the exhaustion principle already applies when the type of sale may be designed to damage the reputation of the trademark. In the Court’s opinion, this applies to the sale of products at discounters, if such a sale damages the reputation of the products to an extent that their luxurious image and quality is called into question (ECJ, C-59/08). This applies, on the one hand, if other products are sold in the immediate “neighborhood” to the branded product, without meeting the same quality requirements (ECJ, C-337/95) or if the advertising methods are unsuitable (ECJ, C-63/97). Hamburg Regional Court, for example, found that the use of photographs that are unsuitable and detrimental to the luxury image of a brand justifies a prohibition claim (at least with respect to use of the photos) (Hamburg Regional Court, 315 O 339/13). The Federal Court of Justice saw improper handling of the brand in an erroneous and negligent labeling of products (Federal Court of Justice, I ZR 72/11).

Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court has now also followed these CJEU guidelines by prohibiting the sale of high-priced cosmetic products, which are distributed in the framework of a strictly regulated selective distribution system, at a discounter (Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, I-20 U 113/17). The Court explicitly referenced the CJEU, by repeating its principles and then applying them in the case of the discounter:

“The permanent and extensive sale of the cosmetic products at issue on the online platform www…de is suitable to significantly impair the image of the application brands. The way in which the products are presented there draws the application brands into the mundane and ordinary. As the relevant public is used to from the multitude of Respondent’s conventional self-service department stores, the offering on www…de of everyday products is frequently dominated in the form of particularly low priced own labels, such as Z.’s own label “O.” Respondent’s motto applies here as well. The assortment ranges from food to electronics, household goods, clothing to cosmetics. Since Respondent’s online presence was merged with that of the company “B” that it had acquired, it is moreover not only Respondent that offers its goods for sale on the platform, but also third parties may market goods via the online platform. The portal is designed to be functional and oriented toward products that are on sale. Customers are able to collect PAYBACK points with each purchase and may make use of financing. In some cases, goods are advertised at “instead of prices” and red letters indicate in attention-getting manner what percentage customers will save compared to the original prices. Product consultation does not take place.”

By offering luxury products at random alongside every-day and mass products without any kind of prominent presentation and becoming affordable through financing options, the products would be placed on a level with the other items offered, thereby significantly affecting the prestige value of the products. For this reason, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court pronounced a complete ban on distribution for the online platform and the department stores.

Conclusion:

Even if the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court’s decision is not to be considered revolutionary in light of existing CJEU case law, it certainly ensures some impetus in proceeding against gray market dealers, since national courts are now no longer facing the “uncomfortable” hurdle of applying CJEU case law, but rather in the customary fairway of national case law. In principle, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court case law may not be understood as a blank check, however. Even Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court did not allow a general ban, but rather weighed individually whether the distribution in its concrete form could be prohibited. In the future, it will also be important to work out what in particular will determine the extent of the ban.

The author of this post is Ilja Czernik.

10 practical aspects to consider for an adequate timing

Meanwhile similar legal standards apply in most industrialized countries if an employment relationship shall be terminated; however, in every jurisdiction some specifics still need to be considered. The following ten aspects may be a first general guideline for the termination of an employment contract in Germany, in particular regarding its timing.

  1. In some cases notice needs to be given within a two-week period

In case of gross misconduct an employer may be entitled to terminate an employment relationship forthwith. However, if notice of termination is not served to the employee within two weeks after acknowledgement of the respective facts, this right is forfeited.

  1. Notice has to be given in writing

The notice has to be signed by the legal representative of the employer and delivered to the employee. Neither a transmission by facsimile nor an email with a scanned copy is sufficient. If the representative is not on site, timing may become an essential aspect of the termination process.

  1. Ordinary dismissal may be prohibited by a collective bargaining agreement

Collective bargaining agreements often provide a ban on ordinary dismissal under certain circumstances (e.g. based on the age of the employee). A careful assessment of all applicable collective bargaining agreements before a termination is therefore indispensable.

  1. Insufficient information of the works councils may lead to an invalid termination

The establishment of a works council is not mandatory in Germany. However, if it is established, it needs to be notified and heard before every termination of an employment contract. The notification must contain a sufficient description of the grounds for the termination, otherwise the termination may be deemed invalid. Having been notified, the works council has one week (in some cases: three days) to object. Any termination before such term without consent of the works council would be deemed invalid as well. Timing may therefore become again an essential aspect of the termination process.

  1. General dismissal protection is related to seniority and size of the establishment

General dismissal protection is basically applicable in establishments with more than 10 employees. Exceptions may apply in favour of those employees whose employment relationships commenced already before 1st January 2004. In addition, the respective employee needs to have at least a seniority of six month. If these criteria are met, the termination has to be justified by operational reasons, misconduct or personal incapacity as set out in the Dismissal Protection Act.

  1. Some terminations may need prior permission

Irrespective of the application of the afore mentioned Dismissal Protection Act some kind of terminations (e.g. employees on parental leave) may need a special permission of the works council, the Labour Court or the respective public authority as applicable. These procedures may last from some days up to two years.

  1. There is no general claim for severance payment in case of an unfair dismissal

Aside from those agreed in termination agreements there is no general claim for severance payment in case of an unfair dismissal. In general, the statutory remedy will only be reinstatement and back pay. Only under certain circumstances each party may apply for the termination of the employment relationship and a severance payment in front of the Labour Court. However, in most of the cases parties end up in a voluntary termination agreement.

  1. Non-competes may lead to extensive payments and cannot be withdrawn forthwith unilaterally without cause

A binding covenant to non-compete leads to a compensation payment of at least 50 % of the former salary for every month of its duration. Even in case of a justified termination it may only be terminated with a notice period of one year. However, both parties may agree upon its immediate suspension in a termination agreement.

  1. Any termination agreement has to be in written form as well

Also a termination agreement needs to fulfil the same formal requirements as set out already above under point 2. Again, if the representative is not on site, timing may become an essential aspect of the bargaining process.

  1. The forfeiture clause of a termination agreement may not cover all claims 

Termination agreements often contain general forfeiture clauses at their end, covering also those potential claims which have not been explicitly mentioned or identified by the parties. However, some claims (e.g. pension claims) may not be covered by such a (general) forfeiture clause.

Please note that these ten aspects contain general information only. Further details as well as possible exceptions therefore need to be checked on a case-by-case basis by a professional advisor.

 

Tha author of this post is Alexander Lentz

According to the EU E-commerce sector inquiry, over 50% of Internet marketplaces and 36% of retailers supply data-feeds to price search engines such as Idealo, Google Shopping, or Shopzilla. By contrast, around 10% of dealers are subject to price comparison engine bans (see Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 154 final, S. 32 Figure B. 4 and p. 37 European Commission, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, p. 10).

However, the Federal Court of Justice recently confirmed a price comparison engine ban as anti-competitive and void. In the concrete case, Asics generally banned retailers in Germany from supporting price search engines in online distribution:

“In addition, the authorized … dealer shall not … support the functionality of price comparison engines by providing application-specific interfaces (“APIs”) for these price comparison engines.”

In addition, the agreement contained an extensive ban on advertising on third-party platforms: Asics prohibited its authorized dealers from allowing third parties to use Asics’ trademarks in any form on the third party’s website to direct customers to the authorised Asics dealer’s website.

Asics’ distribution agreement was first investigated by the German competition authority Bundeskartellamt as a pilot case (another pilot case was started against Adidas because many sports retailers complained about the Internet resale restrictions of sports equipment manufacturers). In 2015, the Bundeskartellamt decided that Asics’ ban on price comparison engines was contrary to antitrust law, as it would infringe Article 101 (1) TFEU, sec. 1 Act against Restraints on Competition. Reason given was that such ban would primarily aim at controlling and limiting price competition at the expense of consumers. This decision was first confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (decision of 5 April 2017, case no. VI-Kart 13/15 (V), see the Legalmondo article here).

Now, the decision has been reconfirmed by the Federal Court of Justice (decision of 12 December 2017, case no. KVZ 41/17). This Asics ruling is particularly noteworthy because it is the first German court ruling following the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Coty ruling on platform bans (see the Legalmondo article here). It is therefore a first indication of how the courts will deal with Internet resale restrictions in the future.

Thus, the Federal Court of Justice states that the general ban on price search engines “at least” restricted passive sales to end consumers (para. 23, 25) – such a restriction would even be the intended purpose of such ban. According to the court, the admissibility of general platform bans pursuant to the Coty judgment (see here) would not imply the admissibility of general price comparison bans (para. 28 et seq.). In particular, the “combination of restrictions” – i.e. ban of price comparison engines and advertising on third-party platforms – would make the difference. For it did not ensure that prospective customers got “practically substantial access” to the dealer website (para. 30) – whereby the Federal Supreme Court leaves open what is sufficient or necessary to provide such “substantial access”; in such case, general price comparison engine bans could continue to be permissible.

Practical Tips:

  1. At EU level, neither the Court of Justice nor the European Commission have taken a position on the validity of general bans on price comparison engines. In the United Kingdom, however, the Competition and Markets Authority takes a similarly critical view of price search engine bans (“BMW changes policy on car comparison sites following CMA action“) as German administrative practice and jurisdiction.
  2. In practice, the following differentiation, already indicated by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Asics) and the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (Deuter), is thus likely to apply according to the Federal Supreme Court:
  • General price comparison engine bans are – according to the Federal Court of Justice – anti-competitive and therefore generally void – although they may still be permissible if they are not combined with a broad advertising ban, so that prospective customers are guaranteed access to the dealer website.
  • Individual price comparison engine bans and other milder restrictions / criteria for the use of price comparison portals are permissible, for example with regard to product illustrations or descriptions and the product environment (such as the requirement that dealers may only offer new products).

Further details: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.

  1. Moreover, manufacturers may – within an exclusive distribution network – prohibit their distributors active online advertising to customers reserved to the manufacturer or allocated by the manufacturer to another distributor and specify the languages used. In principle, all other conceivable quality criteria are also permissible, provided that they are equivalent to the criteria for offline distribution (because “the Commission considers any obligations which dissuade appointed dealers from using the internet to reach a greater number and variety of customers by imposing criteria for online sales which are not overall equivalent to the criteria imposed for the sales from the brick and mortar shop as a hardcore restriction”, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 56).

For more information, see

  • the overview of the current state of practice including model contract clauses: Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 as well as
  • especially on platform bans and the possible drafting of distribution agreements: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
  1. For the permissibility of the use of trademarks and company logos within a search function embedded in an Internet sales platform, see the press release of the Federal Court of Justice on its two very recent decisions of 15.02.2018 (case no. I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” and case no. I ZR 201/16 re “gofit“).

Talking to clients five years ago the trend was clear, application was to be filed for the EU Trademark only, as it was faster, broader, in relation to the geographical scope cheaper and easier to handle. However as we experience now the EU trade mark has some downsides for which reason it is advisable to apply for a national trademark alongside the EU trade mark. And these are the reasons why:

Genuine Use

One of the main risks with trade marks is the fact that they must be used five years after registration. That use however must be genuine. According to the ECJ (C 149/11) “there is ‘genuine use’ of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark in the course of trade, particularly the usages regarded as warranted in the economic sector concerned as a means of maintaining or creating market share for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark.“

The problem which occurs from time to time is whether a trade mark used only in one member state or in a specific part of that member state is to be regarded as genuine use in the meaning of these ECJ findings. Whilst the ECJ (C 149/11) has not denied genuine use because of a territorial restricted use within one member state per se it still has not excluded that possibility and what is more has even given the national courts the decision making authority to assess “whether the mark in question is used in accordance with its essential function and for the purpose of creating or maintaining market share for the goods or services protected.“ Consequently a French court could decide that a use of a mark in Germany is insufficient for upholding a EU trade mark and thereby decide that the mark has to be deregistered. This reason alone provides for the necessity to have a national trade mark as plan B.

Counterclaim

When the plaintiff’s trade mark is a German trade mark, there is no possibility for the defendant to raise a counterclaim calling for a revocation of that plaintiff’s trade mark. The defendant has to file for an additional cancellation order before the German Patent and Trademark office. That additional cancellation proceeding however in general does not even bar the violation proceedings. So these will often be decided long before the cancellation proceedings in the last instance.

That is different when it comes to the EU trade mark. The EU trade mark can be declared void during (!) the violation proceedings by filing a counterclaim. Alternatively, the EU trade mark court hearing a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity may stay the proceedings on application by the proprietor of the EU trade mark and after hearing the other parties and may request the defendant to submit an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity to the Office. With the consequences that the violation proceeding is dead for ten years which it takes to pursue the cancellation proceedings through all instances.

Place of jurisdiction

The place of jurisdiction of a EU trade mark is limited to the place where the event which gave rise to the harm occurred (“Handlungsort”). The German trade mark however also provides for the place where the harm arose (‘Erfolgsort’) as place of jurisdiction. That however gives the plaintiff much more possibility to forum shop.

Statute of limitation

The EU trade mark does not provide a uniform statute of limitation. The ECJ (C 479/12) has decided that claims for injunctive reliefs become time-bared under the regulations of the national law. However in some case it can be very unclear which national law applies and therefore the same case can be seen differently in the different countries. When the plaintiff’s trade mark is a national trade mark the scope of application of the national statutes of limitation is clear and there are no further insecurities which are never to relish when have court proceedings.

The author of this post is Ilja Czernik.

Benedikt Rohrssen

Practice areas

  • Agency
  • Distribution
  • e-commerce
  • Franchising
  • Investments
Contact Benedikt

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    Germany – Duties of the GmbH Managing Directors

    24 July 2018

    • Germany
    • Corporate

    Who is responsible for the information on food products distributed on the online food market?

    The same rules as in the offline food market apply.

    The main applicable law is EU Regulation 1169/2011, also called “The EU Food Information Regulation“. According to its Art. 8 par. 1 the food business operator responsible for the food information shall be the operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed (the “Marketer”).

    In case that the operator is not established in the Union, the responsible person is the importer into the Union market.

    According to Art. 8 par. 2 of the said Regulation, the Marketer shall ensure the presence and accuracy of the food information in accordance with the applicable EU food information law and also with the requirements of relevant national provisions.

    Who bears the main responsibility as food business operator?

    The main responsibility for food information is assigned to the food business operator under whose name or business name the foodstuff is marketed.

    This applies though only to such information concerning foodstuff which is made available to the final consumer by means of a label, other accompanying material, or any other means including modern technology tools or verbal communication.

    Normally, the food business operator is the person, who keeps foodstuff for sale and therefore places such products on the market. According to the EU Food Information Regulation in order to determine the responsibility, it is of decisive importance under whose name the foodstuff is placed on the final consumer market.

    Thereby the main responsibility is not any more with the final seller, with the consequence that the responsibility of the retailer is reduced.

    A manufacturer who places a foodstuff on the market is therefore the responsible person.

    A retailer is not per se a responsible person for the information on the foodstuff. In case the retailer sells food products under a private/own brand, then the responsible person is the one whose name is on the label of the product.

    Importers are responsible for the information on the foodstuff if the food business operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed is not domiciliated in the EU.

    In case of re-imported foodstuff, the responsible person is the one under whose name and address the foodstuff is offered to the consumer.

    In case of a direct delivery of food from a third state (non-EU-state) to a consumer, as this is the case in the online retail, then the importer is the food business operator responsible for the food information.

    Up to which extent is the marketer responsible for the information on the food?

    The marketer is responsible for the accurateness and the lawfulness of the information on the food product and has to comply with all relevant German and EU laws and regulations.

    This concerns not only the provisions of the EU Food Information Regulation, but also other EU regulations on information, such as information obligations which apply only to certain foodstuffs, as well as labelling obligations for additives and so on.

    Information which are non-obligatory shall not be misleading, ambiguous or misunderstanding and have to rely on scientific data.

    The operator under whose name or business name the food is marketed is responsible for meeting those provisions.

    Retailers who are not the operator under whose name the food is marketed do only have to meet a reduced responsibility according to Art. 8 per. 3 to 5 of the EU Food Information Regulation (“The Regulation”).

    Who else is responsible?

    Food business operators who are not marketers have a reduced responsibility (Art. 8 par. 3 to 5 of the Regulation).

    Under certain prerequisites they are responsible for

    – known or presumed deficits in labelling (Art. 8 par. 3 of the Regulation)

    – any changes they make to food information accompanying a food (Art. 8 par. 4 of the Regulation),

    – ensuring compliance with the requirements of food information law and relevant national (in this case German) provisions which are relevant to their activities and verifying that such requirements are met (Art. 8 par. 5 of the Regulation).

    Which specific characteristics apply to the upstream trade levels, meaning in B2B relations?

    In case of non-prepacked food, the obligations to inform are quite limited. Non-prepacked food is usually intended for the final consumer or for supply to mass caterers.

    There is only the obligation to inform about allergen ingredients. The EU Member States are free though to extent the obligation of informing regarding non-prepacked food according to Art. 44 par. 1 b) of the Regulation.

    Germany made use of this option in its “Preliminary Regulation for the Addendum of EU Provisions Concerning the Information of Consumers about the Manner of Labelling Allergen Products in Non-Prepacked Food” of 28.11.2014 (Vorläufige Lebensmittelinformations- Ergänzungsverordnung).

    When trading with non-prepacked food in the upstream trading levels the information about the food doesn’t have to be mandatory on the product itself. Instead, this information can be given in the accompanying papers of the food product.

    The author of this post is Olga Dimopoulou

    Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).

    Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.

    The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.

    Practical tips

    Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:

    • the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
    • however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.

    Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.

    • in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
    • in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).

    Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.

    In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.

    1. Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by

    There is no single piece of legislation setting out all the duties and obligations to which managing GmbH directors (“Geschaeftsfuehrer”) are subject. These duties are set out i.a. in the law on GmbHs (“GmbHG”), the Commercial Code (“HGB”), Insolvency Act (“InsO”), Civil Code (BGB), the Antitrust Law (GWB), environmental and tax laws. Furthermore, they are set out in the Articles of Association of the GmbH (“Gesellschaftsvertrag”), Shareholders’ resolutions, Internal rules for management and if applicable the Service agreements of the GmbH and the directors.

    Directors will normally not be held accountable for acts and debts of the GmbH, for GmbHs are separate independent entities accountable in their own right. Directors will be held accountable for their own behaviour, however, and be required to pay money out of their own pockets by way of compensation for breach of duty or as a fine. They may be disqualified from holding office as director, or even imprisoned.

    General Obligation of Diligent Management in Relation to the GmbH

    Directors have a general obligation of diligent management, including in particular:

    • to use his / her best efforts to promote the purpose of the GmbH;
    • to control the company’s liquidity and financial position;
    • ensure the GmbH’s compliance with all applicable legal obligations;
    • not to compete with, or appropriate the business opportunities of the GmbH;
    • not to disclose confidential information belonging to the GmbH.

    Directors must employ the diligence of an orderly businessperson. Pursuant to the “business judgment rule” the management is immunized from liability if and to the extent the management, making an entrepreneurial decision based on appropriate information, could reasonably assume to act in the best interest of the company.

    Annual accounts

    GmbH directors must ensure that the company keeps proper books and accounts showing clearly the financial position of the company. Failure to fulfil this obligation can lead to a fine or even a term of imprisonment of the director.

    Contribution and Preservation of Share Capital

    The GmbH must have a share capital of at least 25,000 EUR. Upon the formation of a GmbH or increase of its share capital, the director(s) must affirm to the commercial register that the subscriber(s) of the (increased) share capital paid in the amount of cash determined in the Articles of Association, i.e. that the full amounts due were fully paid in, not paid back and are entirely to the free disposition of the director(s). If incorrect statements were made, directors are liable to the company.

    Section 30 para 1 GmbHG prohibits disbursing assets to shareholders without an adequate consideration, so-called unlawful repayments. For their determination, a “balance-sheet test” is decisive. This means, a payment is not unlawful, when:

    • the company’s counter-performance or restitution claim is fully-fledged and
    • the contract meets the cover imperative (payment of the market price).

    If an unlawful repayment of share capital contributions has occurred, the other shareholders are proportionately liable for the refund owed to the company. The directors whose negligent or intentional acts caused the illegal repayment are in their turn liable to those shareholders required to refund the sum.

    Duties in Relation to Shareholders

    Each director is entitled to call shareholders’ meetings. Those are to be called – inter alia – if this appears to be required by the interest of the company.

    Under German GmbH law, GmbH shareholders are entitled to instruct the director(s) of the company in detail through shareholders resolutions to act or not to act in a certain way. Directors must comply with those instructions unless they are illegal. A negligent or intentional violation of this obligation renders the directors liable to the GmbH for damages and may justify their dismissal for cause.

    Obligations Arising From Insolvency, Over-Indebtedness and Loss

    Insolvency and Over-Indebtedness

    In case of over-indebtedness or insolvency, each director must file a petition for the institution of an insolvency petition without undue delay but no later than three weeks from the date on which the over-indebtedness was ascertained or the insolvency arose (Section 15a Insolvency Code). Directors negligently or intentionally failing to meet this obligation (in time or properly) commit a criminal offence punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment and are liable for damages to the company.

    Loss

    If a balance sheet of the company shows a loss of one half or more of its share capital, the directors must call a shareholder meeting without undue delay. Directors failing to do so are liable to the company and subject to criminal penalties.

    Duties in Relation to Taxes and Social Insurance Contributions

    Apart from the obligation to file tax returns and pay corporate, trade and sales tax, the company must withhold some taxes (income tax, capital gains/settlement tax). The tax laws impose on directors a direct responsibility for tax payments. In case of violation by intention or gross negligence, they are liable personally (Section 69 German Fiscal Code) and subject to administrative sanctions or criminal penalties. Similar obligations apply to statutory social insurance contributions.

    Duties in Relation to Employees and the Environment

    Directors must observe special laws for the protection of employees (ArbSchG) and environment (USchG). If failing to do so, directors are personally responsible.

    Duties in Relation to Third Parties

    Directors’ Liability for an Appropriate Organisation of the Company

    Directors have the duty and responsibility to organise the company such that the life, health, property, and similar rights of third parties are not violated.

    Directors’ Liability for their Company’s Contracts, and its Acts or Omissions

    Such a liability arises e.g., if a director agrees to personally guarantee a contract and the company fails to perform. A director may also be personally liable for torts (i.e. civil wrongs, incl. negligence) authorised by him/her, committed by the GmbH.

    Antitrust Issues

    A company and its directors commit an administrative offence, punishable by up to 1,000,000 EUR, if they violate Art. 101 s. EC Treaty or provisions of the GWB. This encompasses e.g. agreements, having as effect the restriction of competition.

    Disqualification as a Director

    A GmbH director will be disqualified from the position as director if he/she is convicted for the commission of particular criminal offences like fraudulent bankruptcy, violation of the duty to keep books or delaying insolvency proceedings.

    “Rimowa owner terminates all distributor agreements in Europe” – headlined the leading German business newspaper “Handelsblatt” on 19 March 2018. The reason for termination is that Rimowa, the well-known manufacturer of high quality branded cases – after 2011 now again in 2018 – redesigns its distribution network: Rimowa aims at raising its quality selection criteria again, away from selling its products in the old-fashioned shop, to a modern shopping experience.

    In principle, manufacturers can freely design and develop their distribution system according to their marketing strategy and any changing needs. Likewise, they are in principle free to choose the number and name of their sales intermediaries (distributors/dealers, franchisees, agents, etc.). They are in principle also free to switch to selective distribution, with the aim of aligning the distribution of their products with certain criteria (in particular: regarding the quality of distribution), thus possibly also reducing the number of distributors. However, as an exception, distributors may force the manufacturer to supply them anyway – namely if the manufacturer has a significant market power. In such a case, an obligation to contract with a distributor, resulting in an obligation to deliver may follow from the prohibition of discrimination (laid down in sec. 19 para. 1, 2 no. 1, 20 German Act against Restraints of Competition).

    This issue becomes especially practically relevant if a manufacturer redesigns its distribution network – just like Rimowa did before and now does again. Rimowa switched to selective distribution in 2011/2012 (for the advantages of selective distribution and possible restrictions of distribution, see the Legalmondo article here). To redesign its distribution network, Rimowa terminated the former distributor agreements and offered to conclude new ones – according to which the distributors newly committed themselves to present the goods in a certain way and buy and use Rimowa’s shop-in-shop system. According to Rimowa, the appearance of a former distributor did not correspond to the new business concept and the new marketing strategy, which is why the parties could not agree on concluding a new agreement. Thereupon, the distributor filed an action, aiming at the conclusion of a new dealer contract and thus delivery of his shops.

    The District Court of Munich denied the claim (decision of 09.09.2014, ref. no. 1 HKO 7249/13), the Higher Regional Court of Munich, however, affirmed such claim (decision of 17.09.2015, ref. no. U 3886/14 Kart) – arguing that the manufacturer had a leading position in the relevant “market for high-priced and high-quality suitcases” or, conversely, that the distributor had a dependency if and because the manufacturer’s suitcases could not be replaced by equivalent others. Such dependency would in particular be indicated through a high distribution rate (i.e. the manufacturer supplied a large number of comparable distributors) as well as the unique design and the associated high recognition value. Now, the Federal Court of Justice overturned the judgment and remanded for a new trial (decision of 12.12.2017, ref. no. KZR 50/15). Reason: the distributor’s assortment-related dependency (“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit” as special case of “Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”) on the manufacturer was not sufficiently proven. Although a high distribution rate was regularly decisive, it might be less meaningful in qualitative selective distribution systems as the present one. Decisive for redesigning distribution systems:

    “If a supplier chooses to switch to a qualitative selective distribution system at a certain point in time, an assortment-related dependency is regularly indicated by a high distribution rate in the period before.” (Para. 19)

    The manufacturer can especially bring forward two arguments against such alleged assortment-related dependency, namely that

    (i) the number of distributors the manufacturer himself supplied with his products is much lower than the total number of distributors that offered his products (i.e. including those buying the products from other sources), and that

    (ii) the distribution rate is to be determined on the basis of those distributors who are comparable to the distributor demanding access to the distribution system and delivery (para. 27) – as the German Federal Court previously stated in terms of designer upholstery (decision of 09.05.2000, ref. no. KZR 28/98, p. 12 et seq.).

    Practical conclusions

    1. “There is nothing more constant than change”: When redesigning the distribution system, carefully consider if you want / need transitional arrangements – or better leave them out. One very good reason to leave them out: they might make it more difficult to exclude unwanted distributors. Thus, in the Rimowa case, the Higher Regional Court Munich rejected the manufacturer’s objection that the distributor’s business model “aimed at bargain hunters” – arguing that the manufacturer gave other distributors time of “12 months after conclusion of the agreement” to fulfil the new qualitative criteria.
    2. For qualitative criteria (also: requirements / specifications) in Internet sales, please see the other articles on Legalmondo, especially on platform bans and price comparison bans.

    It is not only since the days of the Internet that brand manufacturers have had to contend with the fact that original products are offered outside of their authorized sales channels. The problem has since been significantly exacerbated, however. The relevant products are also referred to as gray market products.

    The internal market of the European Economic Area makes it possible to exploit certain price advantages – that is, purchasing in one Member State at a price that is lower than in other Member States and selling to the end customer while passing on (or not passing on) the purchasing advantage. This is made possible by the “exhaustion regime”, according to which the sale of products, which at one time were made available in the European Economic Area with the copyright holder’s consent, cannot be prohibited.

    Brand manufacturers’ attempts to counter this issue by means of distribution systems may be an effective instrument, but only if all distribution partners adhere to it. If a distribution partner pulls out, trademark owners (at least in Germany) are initially required to contact their distribution partner who is acting contrary to the contract. That is difficult when the distribution channel of the products in question cannot be traced by security systems (such as SKU numbers) beyond any doubt. A right to information against a third party generally does not exist. Thus, neither the distribution system itself nor the suspicion that the products are not of EU origin may be used easily to justify a right to information in selective or exclusive distribution. The Federal Court of Justice, for example, sees no reason to deviate from the exhaustion doctrine when implementing a selective distribution system (Federal Court of Justice, 1 ZR 63/04). In the case of a selective or exclusive distribution system (Federal Court of Justice, I AR 52/10), the burden of proof is reversed. Accordingly, it is initially the brand manufacturer itself that is responsible for providing evidence for its allegation of a non-EU product.

    Exceptions are only made where, for example, the SKU numbers were modified, since this makes clarification difficult. In such cases, trademark infringement and at the same time breach of competition law are given by way of exception and it is not possible for the dealer to invoke exhaustion (Federal Court of Justice I ZR 1/98). The deliberate misleading of the authorized dealer by a third party to breach the contract is also recognized as an exception (Federal Court of Justice I ZR 96/04), which regularly is not verifiable, however.

    By the way, the sensational December 2017 Coty decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU C-230/16) (here you can find more: https://www.legalmondo.com/2017/12/eu-court-justice-allows-online-sales-restrictions-coty-case/) has not changed this basic presumption, either. In its Coty decision, the CJEU in the end confirms the exhaustion priority also and particularly for luxury products by referring to existing case law (specifically ECJ C-59/08).

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    There are, however, more options available. As confirmed by the ECJ (ECJ, C-337/95), an exemption from the exhaustion principle already applies when the type of sale may be designed to damage the reputation of the trademark. In the Court’s opinion, this applies to the sale of products at discounters, if such a sale damages the reputation of the products to an extent that their luxurious image and quality is called into question (ECJ, C-59/08). This applies, on the one hand, if other products are sold in the immediate “neighborhood” to the branded product, without meeting the same quality requirements (ECJ, C-337/95) or if the advertising methods are unsuitable (ECJ, C-63/97). Hamburg Regional Court, for example, found that the use of photographs that are unsuitable and detrimental to the luxury image of a brand justifies a prohibition claim (at least with respect to use of the photos) (Hamburg Regional Court, 315 O 339/13). The Federal Court of Justice saw improper handling of the brand in an erroneous and negligent labeling of products (Federal Court of Justice, I ZR 72/11).

    Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court has now also followed these CJEU guidelines by prohibiting the sale of high-priced cosmetic products, which are distributed in the framework of a strictly regulated selective distribution system, at a discounter (Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, I-20 U 113/17). The Court explicitly referenced the CJEU, by repeating its principles and then applying them in the case of the discounter:

    “The permanent and extensive sale of the cosmetic products at issue on the online platform www…de is suitable to significantly impair the image of the application brands. The way in which the products are presented there draws the application brands into the mundane and ordinary. As the relevant public is used to from the multitude of Respondent’s conventional self-service department stores, the offering on www…de of everyday products is frequently dominated in the form of particularly low priced own labels, such as Z.’s own label “O.” Respondent’s motto applies here as well. The assortment ranges from food to electronics, household goods, clothing to cosmetics. Since Respondent’s online presence was merged with that of the company “B” that it had acquired, it is moreover not only Respondent that offers its goods for sale on the platform, but also third parties may market goods via the online platform. The portal is designed to be functional and oriented toward products that are on sale. Customers are able to collect PAYBACK points with each purchase and may make use of financing. In some cases, goods are advertised at “instead of prices” and red letters indicate in attention-getting manner what percentage customers will save compared to the original prices. Product consultation does not take place.”

    By offering luxury products at random alongside every-day and mass products without any kind of prominent presentation and becoming affordable through financing options, the products would be placed on a level with the other items offered, thereby significantly affecting the prestige value of the products. For this reason, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court pronounced a complete ban on distribution for the online platform and the department stores.

    Conclusion:

    Even if the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court’s decision is not to be considered revolutionary in light of existing CJEU case law, it certainly ensures some impetus in proceeding against gray market dealers, since national courts are now no longer facing the “uncomfortable” hurdle of applying CJEU case law, but rather in the customary fairway of national case law. In principle, Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court case law may not be understood as a blank check, however. Even Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court did not allow a general ban, but rather weighed individually whether the distribution in its concrete form could be prohibited. In the future, it will also be important to work out what in particular will determine the extent of the ban.

    The author of this post is Ilja Czernik.

    10 practical aspects to consider for an adequate timing

    Meanwhile similar legal standards apply in most industrialized countries if an employment relationship shall be terminated; however, in every jurisdiction some specifics still need to be considered. The following ten aspects may be a first general guideline for the termination of an employment contract in Germany, in particular regarding its timing.

    1. In some cases notice needs to be given within a two-week period

    In case of gross misconduct an employer may be entitled to terminate an employment relationship forthwith. However, if notice of termination is not served to the employee within two weeks after acknowledgement of the respective facts, this right is forfeited.

    1. Notice has to be given in writing

    The notice has to be signed by the legal representative of the employer and delivered to the employee. Neither a transmission by facsimile nor an email with a scanned copy is sufficient. If the representative is not on site, timing may become an essential aspect of the termination process.

    1. Ordinary dismissal may be prohibited by a collective bargaining agreement

    Collective bargaining agreements often provide a ban on ordinary dismissal under certain circumstances (e.g. based on the age of the employee). A careful assessment of all applicable collective bargaining agreements before a termination is therefore indispensable.

    1. Insufficient information of the works councils may lead to an invalid termination

    The establishment of a works council is not mandatory in Germany. However, if it is established, it needs to be notified and heard before every termination of an employment contract. The notification must contain a sufficient description of the grounds for the termination, otherwise the termination may be deemed invalid. Having been notified, the works council has one week (in some cases: three days) to object. Any termination before such term without consent of the works council would be deemed invalid as well. Timing may therefore become again an essential aspect of the termination process.

    1. General dismissal protection is related to seniority and size of the establishment

    General dismissal protection is basically applicable in establishments with more than 10 employees. Exceptions may apply in favour of those employees whose employment relationships commenced already before 1st January 2004. In addition, the respective employee needs to have at least a seniority of six month. If these criteria are met, the termination has to be justified by operational reasons, misconduct or personal incapacity as set out in the Dismissal Protection Act.

    1. Some terminations may need prior permission

    Irrespective of the application of the afore mentioned Dismissal Protection Act some kind of terminations (e.g. employees on parental leave) may need a special permission of the works council, the Labour Court or the respective public authority as applicable. These procedures may last from some days up to two years.

    1. There is no general claim for severance payment in case of an unfair dismissal

    Aside from those agreed in termination agreements there is no general claim for severance payment in case of an unfair dismissal. In general, the statutory remedy will only be reinstatement and back pay. Only under certain circumstances each party may apply for the termination of the employment relationship and a severance payment in front of the Labour Court. However, in most of the cases parties end up in a voluntary termination agreement.

    1. Non-competes may lead to extensive payments and cannot be withdrawn forthwith unilaterally without cause

    A binding covenant to non-compete leads to a compensation payment of at least 50 % of the former salary for every month of its duration. Even in case of a justified termination it may only be terminated with a notice period of one year. However, both parties may agree upon its immediate suspension in a termination agreement.

    1. Any termination agreement has to be in written form as well

    Also a termination agreement needs to fulfil the same formal requirements as set out already above under point 2. Again, if the representative is not on site, timing may become an essential aspect of the bargaining process.

    1. The forfeiture clause of a termination agreement may not cover all claims 

    Termination agreements often contain general forfeiture clauses at their end, covering also those potential claims which have not been explicitly mentioned or identified by the parties. However, some claims (e.g. pension claims) may not be covered by such a (general) forfeiture clause.

    Please note that these ten aspects contain general information only. Further details as well as possible exceptions therefore need to be checked on a case-by-case basis by a professional advisor.

     

    Tha author of this post is Alexander Lentz

    According to the EU E-commerce sector inquiry, over 50% of Internet marketplaces and 36% of retailers supply data-feeds to price search engines such as Idealo, Google Shopping, or Shopzilla. By contrast, around 10% of dealers are subject to price comparison engine bans (see Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2017) 154 final, S. 32 Figure B. 4 and p. 37 European Commission, Final report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, p. 10).

    However, the Federal Court of Justice recently confirmed a price comparison engine ban as anti-competitive and void. In the concrete case, Asics generally banned retailers in Germany from supporting price search engines in online distribution:

    “In addition, the authorized … dealer shall not … support the functionality of price comparison engines by providing application-specific interfaces (“APIs”) for these price comparison engines.”

    In addition, the agreement contained an extensive ban on advertising on third-party platforms: Asics prohibited its authorized dealers from allowing third parties to use Asics’ trademarks in any form on the third party’s website to direct customers to the authorised Asics dealer’s website.

    Asics’ distribution agreement was first investigated by the German competition authority Bundeskartellamt as a pilot case (another pilot case was started against Adidas because many sports retailers complained about the Internet resale restrictions of sports equipment manufacturers). In 2015, the Bundeskartellamt decided that Asics’ ban on price comparison engines was contrary to antitrust law, as it would infringe Article 101 (1) TFEU, sec. 1 Act against Restraints on Competition. Reason given was that such ban would primarily aim at controlling and limiting price competition at the expense of consumers. This decision was first confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (decision of 5 April 2017, case no. VI-Kart 13/15 (V), see the Legalmondo article here).

    Now, the decision has been reconfirmed by the Federal Court of Justice (decision of 12 December 2017, case no. KVZ 41/17). This Asics ruling is particularly noteworthy because it is the first German court ruling following the Court of Justice of the European Union’s Coty ruling on platform bans (see the Legalmondo article here). It is therefore a first indication of how the courts will deal with Internet resale restrictions in the future.

    Thus, the Federal Court of Justice states that the general ban on price search engines “at least” restricted passive sales to end consumers (para. 23, 25) – such a restriction would even be the intended purpose of such ban. According to the court, the admissibility of general platform bans pursuant to the Coty judgment (see here) would not imply the admissibility of general price comparison bans (para. 28 et seq.). In particular, the “combination of restrictions” – i.e. ban of price comparison engines and advertising on third-party platforms – would make the difference. For it did not ensure that prospective customers got “practically substantial access” to the dealer website (para. 30) – whereby the Federal Supreme Court leaves open what is sufficient or necessary to provide such “substantial access”; in such case, general price comparison engine bans could continue to be permissible.

    Practical Tips:

    1. At EU level, neither the Court of Justice nor the European Commission have taken a position on the validity of general bans on price comparison engines. In the United Kingdom, however, the Competition and Markets Authority takes a similarly critical view of price search engine bans (“BMW changes policy on car comparison sites following CMA action“) as German administrative practice and jurisdiction.
    2. In practice, the following differentiation, already indicated by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Asics) and the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (Deuter), is thus likely to apply according to the Federal Supreme Court:
    • General price comparison engine bans are – according to the Federal Court of Justice – anti-competitive and therefore generally void – although they may still be permissible if they are not combined with a broad advertising ban, so that prospective customers are guaranteed access to the dealer website.
    • Individual price comparison engine bans and other milder restrictions / criteria for the use of price comparison portals are permissible, for example with regard to product illustrations or descriptions and the product environment (such as the requirement that dealers may only offer new products).

    Further details: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.

    1. Moreover, manufacturers may – within an exclusive distribution network – prohibit their distributors active online advertising to customers reserved to the manufacturer or allocated by the manufacturer to another distributor and specify the languages used. In principle, all other conceivable quality criteria are also permissible, provided that they are equivalent to the criteria for offline distribution (because “the Commission considers any obligations which dissuade appointed dealers from using the internet to reach a greater number and variety of customers by imposing criteria for online sales which are not overall equivalent to the criteria imposed for the sales from the brick and mortar shop as a hardcore restriction”, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 56).

    For more information, see

    • the overview of the current state of practice including model contract clauses: Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 as well as
    • especially on platform bans and the possible drafting of distribution agreements: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
    1. For the permissibility of the use of trademarks and company logos within a search function embedded in an Internet sales platform, see the press release of the Federal Court of Justice on its two very recent decisions of 15.02.2018 (case no. I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” and case no. I ZR 201/16 re “gofit“).

    Talking to clients five years ago the trend was clear, application was to be filed for the EU Trademark only, as it was faster, broader, in relation to the geographical scope cheaper and easier to handle. However as we experience now the EU trade mark has some downsides for which reason it is advisable to apply for a national trademark alongside the EU trade mark. And these are the reasons why:

    Genuine Use

    One of the main risks with trade marks is the fact that they must be used five years after registration. That use however must be genuine. According to the ECJ (C 149/11) “there is ‘genuine use’ of a trade mark where the mark is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establishing whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark in the course of trade, particularly the usages regarded as warranted in the economic sector concerned as a means of maintaining or creating market share for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of use of the mark.“

    The problem which occurs from time to time is whether a trade mark used only in one member state or in a specific part of that member state is to be regarded as genuine use in the meaning of these ECJ findings. Whilst the ECJ (C 149/11) has not denied genuine use because of a territorial restricted use within one member state per se it still has not excluded that possibility and what is more has even given the national courts the decision making authority to assess “whether the mark in question is used in accordance with its essential function and for the purpose of creating or maintaining market share for the goods or services protected.“ Consequently a French court could decide that a use of a mark in Germany is insufficient for upholding a EU trade mark and thereby decide that the mark has to be deregistered. This reason alone provides for the necessity to have a national trade mark as plan B.

    Counterclaim

    When the plaintiff’s trade mark is a German trade mark, there is no possibility for the defendant to raise a counterclaim calling for a revocation of that plaintiff’s trade mark. The defendant has to file for an additional cancellation order before the German Patent and Trademark office. That additional cancellation proceeding however in general does not even bar the violation proceedings. So these will often be decided long before the cancellation proceedings in the last instance.

    That is different when it comes to the EU trade mark. The EU trade mark can be declared void during (!) the violation proceedings by filing a counterclaim. Alternatively, the EU trade mark court hearing a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity may stay the proceedings on application by the proprietor of the EU trade mark and after hearing the other parties and may request the defendant to submit an application for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity to the Office. With the consequences that the violation proceeding is dead for ten years which it takes to pursue the cancellation proceedings through all instances.

    Place of jurisdiction

    The place of jurisdiction of a EU trade mark is limited to the place where the event which gave rise to the harm occurred (“Handlungsort”). The German trade mark however also provides for the place where the harm arose (‘Erfolgsort’) as place of jurisdiction. That however gives the plaintiff much more possibility to forum shop.

    Statute of limitation

    The EU trade mark does not provide a uniform statute of limitation. The ECJ (C 479/12) has decided that claims for injunctive reliefs become time-bared under the regulations of the national law. However in some case it can be very unclear which national law applies and therefore the same case can be seen differently in the different countries. When the plaintiff’s trade mark is a national trade mark the scope of application of the national statutes of limitation is clear and there are no further insecurities which are never to relish when have court proceedings.

    The author of this post is Ilja Czernik.

    Stephan Dittl

    Practice areas

    • Intellectual property
    • Litigation
    • Trademarks and patents
    Contact Stephan