Brazil – M&A checklist

1 8 月 2018

  • 巴西
  • 并购

In all M&A operations one of the issues that deserves special attention as regards its analysis, ascertainment and negotiation is the tax liabilities. Even though the parties could agree on the amount of such contingencies, to negotiate the possible guarantees that the seller should grant in order to protect the buyer from a possible claim by the tax authorities, the term during which the guarantees should be in force, and to agree on the communication mechanisms between the parties (buyer and seller) and the legal defense strategies if such claim from the tax authorities arises, requires substantial negotiation efforts.

When the acquisition operation is formalized not through the purchase of shares, but through the purchase of the assets that form a business unit, the Spanish General Tax Law (“Ley General Tributaria” or “LGT”) provides a mechanism which implies an exception to the general principle provided by article 42 of the same law. Article 42 of LGT establishes the joint liability of the purchaser of a business unit for the tax liabilities of the selling company (“tax liability derived from company’s succession”). That is, in principle, according to article 42 of the LGT “the persons or entities that continue by any mean in the ownership or exercise of economic activities (the buyers) will be jointly liable with the previous owner for the tax liabilities derived from the exercise of such economic activities incurred by such previous owner”.

However, the joint tax liability of the buyer could be limited through the application before the tax authorities of the tax certificate regulated by article 175.2 of the LGT. This certificate should be applied for by the prospective buyer, with the authorization of the present owner (the seller), and, once issued, the tax liability of the buyer becomes limited to the debts, penalties and liabilities mentioned in the certificate. If the certificate is issued without mentioning any amount, or if the tax authorities do not issue it within a three months term from the application’s date, the applicant (the buyer) will be released from any tax liability derived from company’s succession.

The tax certificate for succession purposes includes the main taxes, as Value Added Tax and Corporate Income Tax, and can include as well debts derived from the withholding taxes on employees’ payroll, which in case of companies with a big number of employees could be of an outstanding amount. However, the buyer’s joint liability for salaries, related payroll amounts and social security contributions cannot be limited by such certificate, and such liability will always be joint with the business unit seller’s liability.

The application for the tax certificate should be filed before the acquisition of the business unit is completed, even if the issuance of the certificate takes place later tan the closing date (but of course, it is wiser to not close the acquisition before having the certificate). The certificate’s validity lasts for one year, as regards periodical tax obligations (for example, Value Added Tax, Corporate Income Tax and withholding taxes on salaries) and for three months as regards non periodical tax obligations.

It is very important to apply for the right tax certificate (“certificate for succession purposes according to article 175.2 of LGT”), and to not make a mistake and apply, for example, for the certificate regarding having fulfilled all tax obligations (“certificado de estar al corriente de las obligaciones fiscales”). Case law is plenty of judgments where a buyer applied for the wrong certificate, which showed no liabilities, and later on such buyer has been sentenced to pay the tax liabilities incurred by the previous owner of the business unit.

When M&A transactions in Brazil are deemed not successful by the investor the main reason for underperformance is generally the existence of debts or fiscal/labor contingencies materialized higher than evaluated, or unexpected material adverse changes.

The reasons for overlooking the debts and fiscal/labor contingencies is often the rush to close the investment. Either for avoiding a competitor to acquire the target, or to keep the leading position of the market share, for certain cases, the buyers may have not paid proper attention to what their advisors had to say before closing the deal.

  1. Local legal advisors

The legal advisors may take, for the perception of the executives eager to complete an acquisition, a bit longer than expected to round up facts and properly report the risks found. The perception for this lower pace to reach out the conclusions may differ from the executives due to the delay of seller to provide documents or clarify questions raised.

Slowing down a bit to the benefit of certainty is a sound advice.

Experienced Brazilian advisors shall always be included among the teams. Their knowledge on facing subtle change of applicable laws, rules or predominant court decisions is certainly valuable for better understanding the status of the target and the ways to mitigate risks.

Certain facts may not seem at first as significant risk for first timers dealing with Brazilian matters. However, the advisors do have a reason to raise the point and should be properly heard. Examples such as absence of one single clear certificate issued by a government department or a missing report on disposal of solid residues, that may not seem a big issue, could turn into a risk of suspension of activities of a plant.

An audit company is usually hired to identify tax and labor contingencies, but the audit company does not evaluate nor assess the numbers, only the maximum exposure. The legal advisors are in charge of the risk assessment and determination of the estimate of the contingencies. It is up to the buyer to accept and negotiate the relevant coverage for such contingencies.

Seller may not give full details of all issues of the target at first. It is the role of the advisors to investigate, request further documents and clarification to bring matters that affect the business to buyer’s attention. In a good faith scenario, seller would be willing to discuss the matters, to avoid future disputes or frustrations to buyer.

  1. Debt

Charges, penalties, interests and other compensations in financial operations turns these contracts full of minor details and very complex in anywhere in the world. Brazilian contracts are not exception. That is the reason why a proper assessment of the financial operations and obtain the real picture of the debt and related costs.

As usual, attention to change of control provisions are also relevant to mitigate risks – absence of consent or non-compliance of the required steps prior to closing the operation can cause acceleration of the financial operation and trigger cross-default provisions in other contracts that can also lead to acceleration of the financial operations.

  1. Tax/labor contingencies

Calculation and estimate of tax contingencies are specific for each tax and requires knowledge and a sound judgment to estimate exposure and appoint measures to cover the risks. Same level of care applies to labor-related contingencies.

Tax and labor matters are usually the most relevant risks to be observed in a Brazilian target. Complexity of regulation and the amount of obligations to fulfill makes these points significant.

  1. Material adverse change

Material adverse change clauses – “MAC Clauses” – are contractual provisions to mitigate negative effects or a substantial change to the parties. These provisions are admitted in Brazilian law, in view the M&A transaction documents are executed in good faith and respecting the parties’ freedom to commit to certain obligations.

Needless to say, the MAC Clauses should contain crystal clear language, with objective description of the facts, well defined applicable time period, cause and consequences duly described for proper and easy execution. If not, determination of MAC Clause event shall end on a dispute.

In the absence of MAC Clauses, Brazilian Civil Code contemplates the ability to any party in a continuous contractual relation to seek for the termination of the contract, by virtue of extraordinary and unpredictable facts, in the event such party is affected with excessive onus and generates extreme advantage to another party. Determination whether the parties were subject to extraordinary and unpredictable facts would depend nevertheless on ruling by a judge or arbitrator, as provided in the acquisition documents.

  1. Guarantees and Indemnification

For avoidance of future problems, the buyer should obtain strong and prompt executable guarantees. The (a) ability to withhold payments, (b) deposit of part of the purchase price in escrow account with clear rules for withdrawing the escrow amount are most likely measures to ensure a prompt indemnification. From previous experiences, other guarantees like pledge of shares, personal guarantee, lien or even chattel mortgage over real property are harder to execute and indemnify the prejudiced party.

De minimis clauses (minimum amount for a party to be indemnified – if not reached, the prejudiced party is not going to receive any indemnification) or basket (limitation of indemnifiable amount) are additions to the provisions for guarantees also acceptable for Brazilian M&A transactions.

The experienced advisors will make a difference to assist on the drafting of these provisions and to reflect what the parties discussed and agreed on the table.

  1. Break-up Fees

A conscious buyer will certainly avoid the risk of incurring in heavy break-up fees, with proper assessment provided by competent advisors of what may happen until closing. Nevertheless, in certain cases, even after signing a binding document, it might make sense paying a break-up fee even if substantial rather than entering into a risky transaction.

Recent Brazilian M&A transactions have included break-up fees, applicable in case of the regulatory restrictions are too high or in case the buyer gives up the acquisition. The highest break-up fee known was included in an offer made by Paper Excellence (member of Asia Pulp and Paper, based in Indonesia) was BRL 4 billion (over USD 1 billion or around EUR 900 million). The deal was not closed as another bidder had better credit check (even proposing lower break-up fees).

In 2015, Ânima paid BRL 46 million (around USD 12.5 million or EUR 10.6 million) of break-up fees to Whitney do Brasil – education sector – for giving up the acquisition due to changes on students’ public financing rules. In 2018, Ultragaz paid BRL 280 million (around USD 75 million or EUR 64 million) in break-up fees to Liquigás, due to the veto by the Brazilian antitrust authority for the operation.

  1. Recommendations

In this regard, the recommendations to avoid the referred reasons for a not satisfactory failure in M&A transactions in Brazil are:

  • Rely on local advisors: make sure that local Brazilian experts are included in the advisory team – the proper Brazilian legal, accountancy, tax and business experts can provide you with the necessary and valuable information for the proper decision-making process;
  • Listen to what the local advisors have to say: some matters raised may not seem to harm the deal, but it is important to let your advisor give you the full explanation and the reasons why the advisor is concerned about the topic. The advisor has a reason to bring the matters to discussion;
  • On the buy-side, ensure the existence of proper guarantees – feasible and enforceable – for prompt reimbursement of the losses, instead of discussions or long disputes;
  • Be very attentive in the preparation and discussion of the indemnification, procedure for indemnifying a prejudiced party, accommodating the business negotiation and the coverage to the risks explained by the advisors;
  • MAC Clauses shall be clear, precise and objective; and
  • However hard may be, it might make sense paying a break-up fee instead of completing a risky transaction.

The author of this article is Paulo Yamaguchi

当银行控股权或投票权达到至少10%或其他相关比例（20%、30%或50%）时，银行参股可被描述为“合格控股”。另外，获得（多数）管理委员会成员的任命权利，或对银行管理产生重大影响的手段，也都属于“合格控股”的范畴。

作为欧洲银行监事，欧洲中央银行（以下简称“欧洲央行”）负责批准对所有成员国银行合格控股的拟议收购。

为何收购合格控股需要获得提前批准？

审批程序旨在确保只有通过审核的合格股东可进入银行系统，以防止任何破坏银行系统运作的行为。

评估尤其旨在确保拟收购方拥有良好的信誉、具有必要的财务稳健性，并确保目标银行必须一直在其要求范围内，同时保证所使用的资金并不来源于犯罪活动。

谁可以获得合格控股？

通常来讲，所有符合评估标准的自然人或法人都可获得银行的合格控股。

评估标准有哪些？

评估标准统一按照欧洲标准。CRD IV列出了五点针对拟议收购的评估要求：

 

拟议收购方的声誉

拟议收购方是否诚实守信，比如，无犯罪记录或法庭诉讼？

另一方面则是收购方的专业能力，即他们在金融行业的管理、投资成绩。

拟议的新管理人员

的信誉和经验

收购方是否打算对银行的管理机构进行变更？

如果是，则必须对新董事会成员做出适当的评估。

收购方财务稳健

拟议收购方能否为该拟议收购提供资金，并且在可预见的未来保持良好的财务状态？

以确认谁将负责为目标银行的资本附加提供资金。

对银行的影响

银行是否依旧必须遵守审慎要求？

例如，银行不应该被置于压力之下，因为部分收购资金是通过债务融资。

另外，收购方的结构也不应过于复杂，否则会妨碍监管机构有效监督银行。

涉及洗钱或

恐怖主义融资的风险

是否可以证实所涉及资金与犯罪活动或恐怖主义无关？

审查还会评估该收购是否可能涉及或增加潜在的洗钱或恐怖主义融资的风险。


如何作出决定？

拟议收购方向目标银行的国家银行监管机构发出其希望获得合格控股的意向的通知。国家监管机构进行初步评估之后向欧洲央行提供一份提案草案。欧洲央行与国家监管机构合作，做出自己的评估。并将结果通知拟议收购方及参与评估的国家监管机构。

评估不应超过60个工作日。若需要其他信息，在某些情况下评估期限可延长20至30个工作日。

如果在同一时间，两个或以上收购方希望收购同一家银行会如何？

若欧洲央行同时收到多个合格控股意向通知，则必须平等对待。欧洲央行无权就倾向于哪个拟议收购方收购目标银行作出决定。欧洲央行的任务是确保所有拟议购方符合上述五个标准。若多个拟议收购方符合上述标准，那么关于谁将收购目标银行的最终决定将由银行所有者做出。

申请期间，欧洲央行可以提出其他要求吗？

是的，额外要求或是在各国监管当局的提议下或是欧洲央行自己认为有必要提出。然而，对拟议收购方提出的所有要求都必须与上述五条标准有关。若提出的要求会对拟议收购方产生不利影响，则须举行听证会，使拟议收购方有机会做出反应。

若申请人收到不乐观结果怎么办？

若拟议收购被拒绝或拟议收购方认为该收购决定并不乐观，拟议收购方可就该决定向欧洲央行行政审议委员会提出异议。若该程序结果不令人满意，则拟议收购方也可向欧盟法院提出上诉。

若两家银行合并将会如何？会引发合格控股评估吗？

是的，若合并导致一家银行在另一家银行持有10%以上，或CRD IV中规定的其他相关比例（20%、30% 或50%）股份或投票权，则会引发合格控股评估。但是，若合并不意味着收购合格控股权，则适用制度取决于该国家法律。部分欧盟成员国规定必须在合并前批准，而部分成员国并未做出该规定。

 

目标公司董事会须公布讨论内容吗？

目标公司董事会无披露任何谈判及讨论的内容的义务，则须保密直至保密义务结束或要约收购完成。若泄密或目标公司股票价格有异常变动，则须发布公告。

目标公司可如何抵制管控的变化？

 

原则上，目标公司可以尝试实施若干防御措施以抵制恶意收购（例如执行“皇冠之珠”、回购、库存股票转让、免费发行认股权证、寻找“白衣骑士”等）。然而，被动规则通常适用于有价证券涉及要约收购的意大利上市公司，因此自公布之日起至收购结束或到期期间，目标公司通常应该避免采取任何可能妨碍要约收购成功的行动，但目标公司董事会批准此类防御行动的除外。

目标公司必须向监管委员会和其股票上市所在国的收购监管机构报告其放弃被动规则的所有决议。

对于外国收购者，若强制放弃所有可能干扰收购完成的行动的被动规则，或目标公司章程可能包含的突破性规定，不适用于由不受该等规定或收购方证券上市国家的同等规定约束的实体启动的要约收购或交换股权收购。

是一场公平的战斗吗？

最终，这主要取决于目标公司股东做出的决定。目标公司的董事会可能会因认为收购不符合公司最大利益而抵制收购。但董事会采取任何防御措施前，都须获得大多数股东的同意。

被允许的交易条件是哪些？有什么限制？

作为一般规则，要约收购的成功不可受限于收购方单方面提出的条件。

但是，自愿的现金或股权互换要约收购可以受限于某些前述条件。其中可能被允许的最常见的条件有：

  • 进行投标最低持股数量的要求；
  • 获得相关机构所有必要的核准；
  • 目标公司缺乏某些可能对收购产生负面影响，或决定中止收购的防御行为。

收购方的上述先决条件必须在以下文件中标明：（i）需向监管委员会备案的披露收购方收购意向的通讯记录；（ii）招募备忘录；（iii）收购的相关表格文件。

在强制收购的情况下，根据定义，强制收购不得受制于任何条件。

在收购过程中收购方可如何控制目标公司？

收购方在收购过程中仅可行使较少的控制权并对目标公司施加有限的影响；另一方面，目标公司董事在采取所有阻挠收购的行动前，须获得股东批准。

收购方何时开始管控公司？

一旦要约收购完成并支付收购价款后，目标公司的有价证券将被转移给收购方。届时，收购方必须召开目标公司股东大会以任命新一届董事会。为使收购方获得目标公司的控制权，在收购方无论何时通过要约收购获得目标公司至少75%的拥有普通股东会议投票权的证券后，根据《统一财政法案》的规定，在第一次为罢免或任命董事，或修改目标公司章程而召开的股东大会上，不可强制执行以下内容：

  • 对目标公司投票权进行任何法定或合同限制；或
  • 目标公司章程规定的关于董事任免的任何特别权利，以及确定额外“增加”的投票权的章程规定。

收购方如何获得100%控制权？

在强制排除程序中，若收购方已通过要约收购认购目标公司不少于95%有投票权的有价证券，则收购方可认购目标公司所有有投票权的有价证券。在该情形下，若强制排除少数股东的意图已在收购文件中进行声明，在收购完成后的90日内，收购方有权从其他股东处认购剩余的有价证券。

是否有解约金？

在兼并案中解约金是常见的，通常由收购方和某些股东在协议中签订。

在收购案中解约金不常见，一般目标公司将承诺在收购不成功时向收购方支付解约金。在该情形下，鉴于要约收购在原则上须被告知目标公司股东，且可无须与目标公司本身的公司权益一致，因此前述条款的强制性可能会受到质疑。最终，任何解约金的金额不会妨碍对目标公司进行的任何潜在竞争收购。

目标公司可以同意不出售公司或其资产吗？

在提交公开竞标之前，如果目标公司的董事会认为收购方的收购符合目标公司的最佳利益，目标公司可与潜在收购方进行排他性的协商，或承诺不出售公司或其资产。收购方也可以将某些条件（如要求目标公司董事会或股东必须避免采取可能会对收购的成功产生负面影响的行动的条件）列入要约收购文件中。

目标公司可以同意发行股票或出售资产吗？

目标公司可能已在其章程中规定了抵制恶意收购的防御手段。但是，一旦启动要约收购，并且如果被动规则适用，则未经其股东的事先批准，目标公司必须避免采取可能对要约收购的成功产生负面影响的行动，例如发行新股票或出售其资产。

达成交易需要哪些承诺？

从目标公司的主要股东处得到其将出售股份的承诺，对交易的达成有很大助益。或者，收购方可以尝试，单独或与其一致行动人，收购目标公司超过30%的股份，进而触发发起强制要约收购的义务。否则，收购方可以在要约收购文件中添加要求最低持股数量的条款。

可以通过要约收购外的其他程序认购股份吗？

收购方可在要约收购外，自由认购目标公司的有价证券。但是，如果在收购期间，收购方以高于要约收购中定价的价格认购目标公司的有价证券的，根据条例规定，要约收购的价格必须相应增长。

可以在收购过程外购买其他金融衍生品吗？

购买潜在资产，即以有价证券作为提供对象的金融衍生品（例如期权、远期、期货、掉期交易等）时，条例同样适用。因此，若在收购期间，收购方以收购对象的有价证券作为标的资产作多头交易（即在收购方对呈积极趋势的基础资产感兴趣的情况下，收购金融衍生品），并且认购价格高于收购定价，那么要约定价必须相应增长。在这种情况下，价格被考虑为：基础证券的合约价，加上收购多头所支出或收到的金额的总和。

在要约前及要约过程中，关于股份和衍生品小额增持的披露条件是什么？

信息披露适用于收购拥有表决权的上市公司股份，并且当个人持有至少2%拥有表决权的上市公司股票（或若为中小型企业则须持有5%）时须即刻履行信息披露义务。在该等情形下，收购方必须在相关交易结束后的五个“交易日”内，就持股比例和收购的股份数量通知目标公司和监管委员会。

信息披露是强制性的，无论投票权是否已授予第三方或由第三方持有，也无论投票权是否已被暂停。

当收购方收购的拥有投票权的目标上市公司有价证券超过以下比例时，收购方应履行同等信息披露义务: 5%; 10%; 15%; 20%; 25%; 30%; 50%; 66.6%; 90% 和 95%。

当符合上述参股比例的收购方减少其在目标上市公司中的股份时，该收购方应履行类似的信息披露义务。

在“潜在”持股的情况下，即通过实物交易的衍生品参股的（例如可转换债券或认股权证），当达到或超过以下比例时，收购方须履行进一步的披露义务：5%; 10%; 15%; 20%; 25%; 30%; 50% 和 75%。

在多头交易的情况下，即通过，特别是通过现金结算的衍生品参股的，当到达或超过以下比例时，收购方须履行附加的披露义务：5%; 20%; 30% 和50%。

需要注意的是，以上针对潜在持股和多头交易的披露条件与拥有投票权的标的证券的数量有关；因此，如果标的证券的数量是可变的，则拟考虑的数量应取最大值。

潜在持股的披露条件不考虑收购方持有且已被披露的上市公司证券。

在不存在其他多头交易的前提下，若相关数值已被超过，并且该数值已作为实际股权或潜在股权向监管委员会登记备案，则该多头交易无须履行披露义务。

在要约收购的情况下，收购方向监管委员会登记备案的沟通记录，必须包括收购方的持股证明，以及收购方拥有授予其对目标公司证券进行多头交易的全部金融衍生品的证明。

此外，若签署股东协议的任何一方涉及多于2%的上市公司股票资本时，该方必须向监管委员会和发行公司披露此等情况。

限制及后果是什么？

任何未履行《统一财政法案》规定下的披露责任和义务的个人将被处以行政或刑事处分，并被剥夺投票权。

可提供给买家的信息有哪些？

善意买家可能已在初步的接触中收集了目标公司的信息，或已被允许对目标公司进行尽职调查。相反的，恶意买家一般不会被允许对目标公司进行尽职调查，其仅可基于公开信息启动要约收购。公开信息包括公司注册处存档的文件和信息，如：

–   目标公司向市场发出的关于股价敏感信息的通知；

–   目标公司年度、半年度和季度财务报表；

–   股东结构和企业管理报告；

–   目标公司年度管制报告及合规报告；

–   目标公司章程和股东大会会议记录；

–   关于超过拥有投票权的证券2%的股权信息；

–  关于所有重要交易的文件和信息（如证券发行、并购、增资、收购、出售资产等）；

–   所有股东协议；

–   与相关方的交易细节；

–   关于员工和管理者股份期权计划的文件和信息；

–   所有财务分析师或评级机构报告。

谈判是保密的吗？获得资料是受限制的吗？

原则上，并无披露机密谈判的义务。事实上，收购方和目标公司可签署一份保密协议，以承诺在最终决定作出前，不泄露任何关于对被目标公司进行潜在收购的信息。

一旦做出收购决定，收购方必须立刻以新闻发布的方式公开前述决定，之后要约收购文件必须在20日内在监管委员会处备案。

在收购公告前，如果正在进行的谈判内容被泄露并在市场上造成舆论议论的，保密协议的签署双方通常将承诺立即就该等泄露向监管委员会咨询。在前述情况的任何情形下，目标公司和收购方均有义务向市场说明并澄清，并可能被要求披露与正在进行的谈判的状况相关的机密信息和其他关于目标公司及其子公司的信息。

何时须发布公告以及何种信息须被公开？

一旦决定启动现金或股权置换要约，或收购方满足启动强制要约收购的条件的，收购方必须根据《统一财政法案》第102条的规定，通知市场及目标公司。在该阶段，收购文件一经监管委员会核准，将被立刻公开。关于要约收购的所有实质性内容，包括与目标公司董事和高管达成的所有协议，均须公之于众。

如果信息有误或被更改怎么办？

收购方必须在发现要约收购文件中的错误信息后立即将其修正。如果发生任何未经披露的新事件或新情况，监管委员会有权暂停收购，但暂停期间不得超过30天，且前述情形可能会导致受送达人对本次收购做出不利评估。

银行业的投资与并购：什么是“合格控股（qualifying holding）”？

8 6 月 2017

  • 意大利
  • 并购
  • 银行业

In all M&A operations one of the issues that deserves special attention as regards its analysis, ascertainment and negotiation is the tax liabilities. Even though the parties could agree on the amount of such contingencies, to negotiate the possible guarantees that the seller should grant in order to protect the buyer from a possible claim by the tax authorities, the term during which the guarantees should be in force, and to agree on the communication mechanisms between the parties (buyer and seller) and the legal defense strategies if such claim from the tax authorities arises, requires substantial negotiation efforts.

When the acquisition operation is formalized not through the purchase of shares, but through the purchase of the assets that form a business unit, the Spanish General Tax Law (“Ley General Tributaria” or “LGT”) provides a mechanism which implies an exception to the general principle provided by article 42 of the same law. Article 42 of LGT establishes the joint liability of the purchaser of a business unit for the tax liabilities of the selling company (“tax liability derived from company’s succession”). That is, in principle, according to article 42 of the LGT “the persons or entities that continue by any mean in the ownership or exercise of economic activities (the buyers) will be jointly liable with the previous owner for the tax liabilities derived from the exercise of such economic activities incurred by such previous owner”.

However, the joint tax liability of the buyer could be limited through the application before the tax authorities of the tax certificate regulated by article 175.2 of the LGT. This certificate should be applied for by the prospective buyer, with the authorization of the present owner (the seller), and, once issued, the tax liability of the buyer becomes limited to the debts, penalties and liabilities mentioned in the certificate. If the certificate is issued without mentioning any amount, or if the tax authorities do not issue it within a three months term from the application’s date, the applicant (the buyer) will be released from any tax liability derived from company’s succession.

The tax certificate for succession purposes includes the main taxes, as Value Added Tax and Corporate Income Tax, and can include as well debts derived from the withholding taxes on employees’ payroll, which in case of companies with a big number of employees could be of an outstanding amount. However, the buyer’s joint liability for salaries, related payroll amounts and social security contributions cannot be limited by such certificate, and such liability will always be joint with the business unit seller’s liability.

The application for the tax certificate should be filed before the acquisition of the business unit is completed, even if the issuance of the certificate takes place later tan the closing date (but of course, it is wiser to not close the acquisition before having the certificate). The certificate’s validity lasts for one year, as regards periodical tax obligations (for example, Value Added Tax, Corporate Income Tax and withholding taxes on salaries) and for three months as regards non periodical tax obligations.

It is very important to apply for the right tax certificate (“certificate for succession purposes according to article 175.2 of LGT”), and to not make a mistake and apply, for example, for the certificate regarding having fulfilled all tax obligations (“certificado de estar al corriente de las obligaciones fiscales”). Case law is plenty of judgments where a buyer applied for the wrong certificate, which showed no liabilities, and later on such buyer has been sentenced to pay the tax liabilities incurred by the previous owner of the business unit.

When M&A transactions in Brazil are deemed not successful by the investor the main reason for underperformance is generally the existence of debts or fiscal/labor contingencies materialized higher than evaluated, or unexpected material adverse changes.

The reasons for overlooking the debts and fiscal/labor contingencies is often the rush to close the investment. Either for avoiding a competitor to acquire the target, or to keep the leading position of the market share, for certain cases, the buyers may have not paid proper attention to what their advisors had to say before closing the deal.

  1. Local legal advisors

The legal advisors may take, for the perception of the executives eager to complete an acquisition, a bit longer than expected to round up facts and properly report the risks found. The perception for this lower pace to reach out the conclusions may differ from the executives due to the delay of seller to provide documents or clarify questions raised.

Slowing down a bit to the benefit of certainty is a sound advice.

Experienced Brazilian advisors shall always be included among the teams. Their knowledge on facing subtle change of applicable laws, rules or predominant court decisions is certainly valuable for better understanding the status of the target and the ways to mitigate risks.

Certain facts may not seem at first as significant risk for first timers dealing with Brazilian matters. However, the advisors do have a reason to raise the point and should be properly heard. Examples such as absence of one single clear certificate issued by a government department or a missing report on disposal of solid residues, that may not seem a big issue, could turn into a risk of suspension of activities of a plant.

An audit company is usually hired to identify tax and labor contingencies, but the audit company does not evaluate nor assess the numbers, only the maximum exposure. The legal advisors are in charge of the risk assessment and determination of the estimate of the contingencies. It is up to the buyer to accept and negotiate the relevant coverage for such contingencies.

Seller may not give full details of all issues of the target at first. It is the role of the advisors to investigate, request further documents and clarification to bring matters that affect the business to buyer’s attention. In a good faith scenario, seller would be willing to discuss the matters, to avoid future disputes or frustrations to buyer.

  1. Debt

Charges, penalties, interests and other compensations in financial operations turns these contracts full of minor details and very complex in anywhere in the world. Brazilian contracts are not exception. That is the reason why a proper assessment of the financial operations and obtain the real picture of the debt and related costs.

As usual, attention to change of control provisions are also relevant to mitigate risks – absence of consent or non-compliance of the required steps prior to closing the operation can cause acceleration of the financial operation and trigger cross-default provisions in other contracts that can also lead to acceleration of the financial operations.

  1. Tax/labor contingencies

Calculation and estimate of tax contingencies are specific for each tax and requires knowledge and a sound judgment to estimate exposure and appoint measures to cover the risks. Same level of care applies to labor-related contingencies.

Tax and labor matters are usually the most relevant risks to be observed in a Brazilian target. Complexity of regulation and the amount of obligations to fulfill makes these points significant.

  1. Material adverse change

Material adverse change clauses – “MAC Clauses” – are contractual provisions to mitigate negative effects or a substantial change to the parties. These provisions are admitted in Brazilian law, in view the M&A transaction documents are executed in good faith and respecting the parties’ freedom to commit to certain obligations.

Needless to say, the MAC Clauses should contain crystal clear language, with objective description of the facts, well defined applicable time period, cause and consequences duly described for proper and easy execution. If not, determination of MAC Clause event shall end on a dispute.

In the absence of MAC Clauses, Brazilian Civil Code contemplates the ability to any party in a continuous contractual relation to seek for the termination of the contract, by virtue of extraordinary and unpredictable facts, in the event such party is affected with excessive onus and generates extreme advantage to another party. Determination whether the parties were subject to extraordinary and unpredictable facts would depend nevertheless on ruling by a judge or arbitrator, as provided in the acquisition documents.

  1. Guarantees and Indemnification

For avoidance of future problems, the buyer should obtain strong and prompt executable guarantees. The (a) ability to withhold payments, (b) deposit of part of the purchase price in escrow account with clear rules for withdrawing the escrow amount are most likely measures to ensure a prompt indemnification. From previous experiences, other guarantees like pledge of shares, personal guarantee, lien or even chattel mortgage over real property are harder to execute and indemnify the prejudiced party.

De minimis clauses (minimum amount for a party to be indemnified – if not reached, the prejudiced party is not going to receive any indemnification) or basket (limitation of indemnifiable amount) are additions to the provisions for guarantees also acceptable for Brazilian M&A transactions.

The experienced advisors will make a difference to assist on the drafting of these provisions and to reflect what the parties discussed and agreed on the table.

  1. Break-up Fees

A conscious buyer will certainly avoid the risk of incurring in heavy break-up fees, with proper assessment provided by competent advisors of what may happen until closing. Nevertheless, in certain cases, even after signing a binding document, it might make sense paying a break-up fee even if substantial rather than entering into a risky transaction.

Recent Brazilian M&A transactions have included break-up fees, applicable in case of the regulatory restrictions are too high or in case the buyer gives up the acquisition. The highest break-up fee known was included in an offer made by Paper Excellence (member of Asia Pulp and Paper, based in Indonesia) was BRL 4 billion (over USD 1 billion or around EUR 900 million). The deal was not closed as another bidder had better credit check (even proposing lower break-up fees).

In 2015, Ânima paid BRL 46 million (around USD 12.5 million or EUR 10.6 million) of break-up fees to Whitney do Brasil – education sector – for giving up the acquisition due to changes on students’ public financing rules. In 2018, Ultragaz paid BRL 280 million (around USD 75 million or EUR 64 million) in break-up fees to Liquigás, due to the veto by the Brazilian antitrust authority for the operation.

  1. Recommendations

In this regard, the recommendations to avoid the referred reasons for a not satisfactory failure in M&A transactions in Brazil are:

  • Rely on local advisors: make sure that local Brazilian experts are included in the advisory team – the proper Brazilian legal, accountancy, tax and business experts can provide you with the necessary and valuable information for the proper decision-making process;
  • Listen to what the local advisors have to say: some matters raised may not seem to harm the deal, but it is important to let your advisor give you the full explanation and the reasons why the advisor is concerned about the topic. The advisor has a reason to bring the matters to discussion;
  • On the buy-side, ensure the existence of proper guarantees – feasible and enforceable – for prompt reimbursement of the losses, instead of discussions or long disputes;
  • Be very attentive in the preparation and discussion of the indemnification, procedure for indemnifying a prejudiced party, accommodating the business negotiation and the coverage to the risks explained by the advisors;
  • MAC Clauses shall be clear, precise and objective; and
  • However hard may be, it might make sense paying a break-up fee instead of completing a risky transaction.

The author of this article is Paulo Yamaguchi

当银行控股权或投票权达到至少10%或其他相关比例（20%、30%或50%）时，银行参股可被描述为“合格控股”。另外，获得（多数）管理委员会成员的任命权利，或对银行管理产生重大影响的手段，也都属于“合格控股”的范畴。

作为欧洲银行监事，欧洲中央银行（以下简称“欧洲央行”）负责批准对所有成员国银行合格控股的拟议收购。

为何收购合格控股需要获得提前批准？

审批程序旨在确保只有通过审核的合格股东可进入银行系统，以防止任何破坏银行系统运作的行为。

评估尤其旨在确保拟收购方拥有良好的信誉、具有必要的财务稳健性，并确保目标银行必须一直在其要求范围内，同时保证所使用的资金并不来源于犯罪活动。

谁可以获得合格控股？

通常来讲，所有符合评估标准的自然人或法人都可获得银行的合格控股。

评估标准有哪些？

评估标准统一按照欧洲标准。CRD IV列出了五点针对拟议收购的评估要求：

 

拟议收购方的声誉

拟议收购方是否诚实守信，比如，无犯罪记录或法庭诉讼？

另一方面则是收购方的专业能力，即他们在金融行业的管理、投资成绩。

拟议的新管理人员

的信誉和经验

收购方是否打算对银行的管理机构进行变更？

如果是，则必须对新董事会成员做出适当的评估。

收购方财务稳健

拟议收购方能否为该拟议收购提供资金，并且在可预见的未来保持良好的财务状态？

以确认谁将负责为目标银行的资本附加提供资金。

对银行的影响

银行是否依旧必须遵守审慎要求？

例如，银行不应该被置于压力之下，因为部分收购资金是通过债务融资。

另外，收购方的结构也不应过于复杂，否则会妨碍监管机构有效监督银行。

涉及洗钱或

恐怖主义融资的风险

是否可以证实所涉及资金与犯罪活动或恐怖主义无关？

审查还会评估该收购是否可能涉及或增加潜在的洗钱或恐怖主义融资的风险。


如何作出决定？

拟议收购方向目标银行的国家银行监管机构发出其希望获得合格控股的意向的通知。国家监管机构进行初步评估之后向欧洲央行提供一份提案草案。欧洲央行与国家监管机构合作，做出自己的评估。并将结果通知拟议收购方及参与评估的国家监管机构。

评估不应超过60个工作日。若需要其他信息，在某些情况下评估期限可延长20至30个工作日。

如果在同一时间，两个或以上收购方希望收购同一家银行会如何？

若欧洲央行同时收到多个合格控股意向通知，则必须平等对待。欧洲央行无权就倾向于哪个拟议收购方收购目标银行作出决定。欧洲央行的任务是确保所有拟议购方符合上述五个标准。若多个拟议收购方符合上述标准，那么关于谁将收购目标银行的最终决定将由银行所有者做出。

申请期间，欧洲央行可以提出其他要求吗？

是的，额外要求或是在各国监管当局的提议下或是欧洲央行自己认为有必要提出。然而，对拟议收购方提出的所有要求都必须与上述五条标准有关。若提出的要求会对拟议收购方产生不利影响，则须举行听证会，使拟议收购方有机会做出反应。

若申请人收到不乐观结果怎么办？

若拟议收购被拒绝或拟议收购方认为该收购决定并不乐观，拟议收购方可就该决定向欧洲央行行政审议委员会提出异议。若该程序结果不令人满意，则拟议收购方也可向欧盟法院提出上诉。

若两家银行合并将会如何？会引发合格控股评估吗？

是的，若合并导致一家银行在另一家银行持有10%以上，或CRD IV中规定的其他相关比例（20%、30% 或50%）股份或投票权，则会引发合格控股评估。但是，若合并不意味着收购合格控股权，则适用制度取决于该国家法律。部分欧盟成员国规定必须在合并前批准，而部分成员国并未做出该规定。

 

目标公司董事会须公布讨论内容吗？

目标公司董事会无披露任何谈判及讨论的内容的义务，则须保密直至保密义务结束或要约收购完成。若泄密或目标公司股票价格有异常变动，则须发布公告。

目标公司可如何抵制管控的变化？

 

原则上，目标公司可以尝试实施若干防御措施以抵制恶意收购（例如执行“皇冠之珠”、回购、库存股票转让、免费发行认股权证、寻找“白衣骑士”等）。然而，被动规则通常适用于有价证券涉及要约收购的意大利上市公司，因此自公布之日起至收购结束或到期期间，目标公司通常应该避免采取任何可能妨碍要约收购成功的行动，但目标公司董事会批准此类防御行动的除外。

目标公司必须向监管委员会和其股票上市所在国的收购监管机构报告其放弃被动规则的所有决议。

对于外国收购者，若强制放弃所有可能干扰收购完成的行动的被动规则，或目标公司章程可能包含的突破性规定，不适用于由不受该等规定或收购方证券上市国家的同等规定约束的实体启动的要约收购或交换股权收购。

是一场公平的战斗吗？

最终，这主要取决于目标公司股东做出的决定。目标公司的董事会可能会因认为收购不符合公司最大利益而抵制收购。但董事会采取任何防御措施前，都须获得大多数股东的同意。

被允许的交易条件是哪些？有什么限制？

作为一般规则，要约收购的成功不可受限于收购方单方面提出的条件。

但是，自愿的现金或股权互换要约收购可以受限于某些前述条件。其中可能被允许的最常见的条件有：

  • 进行投标最低持股数量的要求；
  • 获得相关机构所有必要的核准；
  • 目标公司缺乏某些可能对收购产生负面影响，或决定中止收购的防御行为。

收购方的上述先决条件必须在以下文件中标明：（i）需向监管委员会备案的披露收购方收购意向的通讯记录；（ii）招募备忘录；（iii）收购的相关表格文件。

在强制收购的情况下，根据定义，强制收购不得受制于任何条件。

在收购过程中收购方可如何控制目标公司？

收购方在收购过程中仅可行使较少的控制权并对目标公司施加有限的影响；另一方面，目标公司董事在采取所有阻挠收购的行动前，须获得股东批准。

收购方何时开始管控公司？

一旦要约收购完成并支付收购价款后，目标公司的有价证券将被转移给收购方。届时，收购方必须召开目标公司股东大会以任命新一届董事会。为使收购方获得目标公司的控制权，在收购方无论何时通过要约收购获得目标公司至少75%的拥有普通股东会议投票权的证券后，根据《统一财政法案》的规定，在第一次为罢免或任命董事，或修改目标公司章程而召开的股东大会上，不可强制执行以下内容：

  • 对目标公司投票权进行任何法定或合同限制；或
  • 目标公司章程规定的关于董事任免的任何特别权利，以及确定额外“增加”的投票权的章程规定。

收购方如何获得100%控制权？

在强制排除程序中，若收购方已通过要约收购认购目标公司不少于95%有投票权的有价证券，则收购方可认购目标公司所有有投票权的有价证券。在该情形下，若强制排除少数股东的意图已在收购文件中进行声明，在收购完成后的90日内，收购方有权从其他股东处认购剩余的有价证券。

是否有解约金？

在兼并案中解约金是常见的，通常由收购方和某些股东在协议中签订。

在收购案中解约金不常见，一般目标公司将承诺在收购不成功时向收购方支付解约金。在该情形下，鉴于要约收购在原则上须被告知目标公司股东，且可无须与目标公司本身的公司权益一致，因此前述条款的强制性可能会受到质疑。最终，任何解约金的金额不会妨碍对目标公司进行的任何潜在竞争收购。

目标公司可以同意不出售公司或其资产吗？

在提交公开竞标之前，如果目标公司的董事会认为收购方的收购符合目标公司的最佳利益，目标公司可与潜在收购方进行排他性的协商，或承诺不出售公司或其资产。收购方也可以将某些条件（如要求目标公司董事会或股东必须避免采取可能会对收购的成功产生负面影响的行动的条件）列入要约收购文件中。

目标公司可以同意发行股票或出售资产吗？

目标公司可能已在其章程中规定了抵制恶意收购的防御手段。但是，一旦启动要约收购，并且如果被动规则适用，则未经其股东的事先批准，目标公司必须避免采取可能对要约收购的成功产生负面影响的行动，例如发行新股票或出售其资产。

达成交易需要哪些承诺？

从目标公司的主要股东处得到其将出售股份的承诺，对交易的达成有很大助益。或者，收购方可以尝试，单独或与其一致行动人，收购目标公司超过30%的股份，进而触发发起强制要约收购的义务。否则，收购方可以在要约收购文件中添加要求最低持股数量的条款。

可以通过要约收购外的其他程序认购股份吗？

收购方可在要约收购外，自由认购目标公司的有价证券。但是，如果在收购期间，收购方以高于要约收购中定价的价格认购目标公司的有价证券的，根据条例规定，要约收购的价格必须相应增长。

可以在收购过程外购买其他金融衍生品吗？

购买潜在资产，即以有价证券作为提供对象的金融衍生品（例如期权、远期、期货、掉期交易等）时，条例同样适用。因此，若在收购期间，收购方以收购对象的有价证券作为标的资产作多头交易（即在收购方对呈积极趋势的基础资产感兴趣的情况下，收购金融衍生品），并且认购价格高于收购定价，那么要约定价必须相应增长。在这种情况下，价格被考虑为：基础证券的合约价，加上收购多头所支出或收到的金额的总和。

在要约前及要约过程中，关于股份和衍生品小额增持的披露条件是什么？

信息披露适用于收购拥有表决权的上市公司股份，并且当个人持有至少2%拥有表决权的上市公司股票（或若为中小型企业则须持有5%）时须即刻履行信息披露义务。在该等情形下，收购方必须在相关交易结束后的五个“交易日”内，就持股比例和收购的股份数量通知目标公司和监管委员会。

信息披露是强制性的，无论投票权是否已授予第三方或由第三方持有，也无论投票权是否已被暂停。

当收购方收购的拥有投票权的目标上市公司有价证券超过以下比例时，收购方应履行同等信息披露义务: 5%; 10%; 15%; 20%; 25%; 30%; 50%; 66.6%; 90% 和 95%。

当符合上述参股比例的收购方减少其在目标上市公司中的股份时，该收购方应履行类似的信息披露义务。

在“潜在”持股的情况下，即通过实物交易的衍生品参股的（例如可转换债券或认股权证），当达到或超过以下比例时，收购方须履行进一步的披露义务：5%; 10%; 15%; 20%; 25%; 30%; 50% 和 75%。

在多头交易的情况下，即通过，特别是通过现金结算的衍生品参股的，当到达或超过以下比例时，收购方须履行附加的披露义务：5%; 20%; 30% 和50%。

需要注意的是，以上针对潜在持股和多头交易的披露条件与拥有投票权的标的证券的数量有关；因此，如果标的证券的数量是可变的，则拟考虑的数量应取最大值。

潜在持股的披露条件不考虑收购方持有且已被披露的上市公司证券。

在不存在其他多头交易的前提下，若相关数值已被超过，并且该数值已作为实际股权或潜在股权向监管委员会登记备案，则该多头交易无须履行披露义务。

在要约收购的情况下，收购方向监管委员会登记备案的沟通记录，必须包括收购方的持股证明，以及收购方拥有授予其对目标公司证券进行多头交易的全部金融衍生品的证明。

此外，若签署股东协议的任何一方涉及多于2%的上市公司股票资本时，该方必须向监管委员会和发行公司披露此等情况。

限制及后果是什么？

任何未履行《统一财政法案》规定下的披露责任和义务的个人将被处以行政或刑事处分，并被剥夺投票权。

可提供给买家的信息有哪些？

善意买家可能已在初步的接触中收集了目标公司的信息，或已被允许对目标公司进行尽职调查。相反的，恶意买家一般不会被允许对目标公司进行尽职调查，其仅可基于公开信息启动要约收购。公开信息包括公司注册处存档的文件和信息，如：

–   目标公司向市场发出的关于股价敏感信息的通知；

–   目标公司年度、半年度和季度财务报表；

–   股东结构和企业管理报告；

–   目标公司年度管制报告及合规报告；

–   目标公司章程和股东大会会议记录；

–   关于超过拥有投票权的证券2%的股权信息；

–  关于所有重要交易的文件和信息（如证券发行、并购、增资、收购、出售资产等）；

–   所有股东协议；

–   与相关方的交易细节；

–   关于员工和管理者股份期权计划的文件和信息；

–   所有财务分析师或评级机构报告。

谈判是保密的吗？获得资料是受限制的吗？

原则上，并无披露机密谈判的义务。事实上，收购方和目标公司可签署一份保密协议，以承诺在最终决定作出前，不泄露任何关于对被目标公司进行潜在收购的信息。

一旦做出收购决定，收购方必须立刻以新闻发布的方式公开前述决定，之后要约收购文件必须在20日内在监管委员会处备案。

在收购公告前，如果正在进行的谈判内容被泄露并在市场上造成舆论议论的，保密协议的签署双方通常将承诺立即就该等泄露向监管委员会咨询。在前述情况的任何情形下，目标公司和收购方均有义务向市场说明并澄清，并可能被要求披露与正在进行的谈判的状况相关的机密信息和其他关于目标公司及其子公司的信息。

何时须发布公告以及何种信息须被公开？

一旦决定启动现金或股权置换要约，或收购方满足启动强制要约收购的条件的，收购方必须根据《统一财政法案》第102条的规定，通知市场及目标公司。在该阶段，收购文件一经监管委员会核准，将被立刻公开。关于要约收购的所有实质性内容，包括与目标公司董事和高管达成的所有协议，均须公之于众。

如果信息有误或被更改怎么办？

收购方必须在发现要约收购文件中的错误信息后立即将其修正。如果发生任何未经披露的新事件或新情况，监管委员会有权暂停收购，但暂停期间不得超过30天，且前述情形可能会导致受送达人对本次收购做出不利评估。

Simone Rossi

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