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意大利
国际比较法律指南 – 相关机构与立法
10 12 月 2016
- 并购
可以选择吗？
虽然恶意收购的手段在意大利并不常见，但《统一财政法案》同时承认善意及恶意的要约收购。
在接近目标公司时须遵守哪些法规？
关于收购方在接近目标公司时应采取何种方式并不存在特别规定。在善意收购中，潜在的买家可以接近目标公司的管理人员并进行初步的谈判，进而得到目标公司的更多信息，用于决定是以兼并还是要约收购的形式收购目标公司。但是，以上接触须始终遵守有关股价敏感信息披露和禁止市场滥用行为的法规。
目标公司的董事会如何发挥作用？
除非目标公司的章程另有规定，否则须遵守被动规则。因此，在缺少股东特别审批的情况下，目标公司的董事必须避免采取任何可能危害要约收购目的的行动。
尽管如此，始终以股东最大利益为前提的目标公司的董事会可以对要约收购的结果施加影响。例如：当收购方为其竞争者时，或当另一个竞争要约有望启动时，目标公司的董事会可以拒绝收购方在收购启动前对其进行尽职调查。此外，由目标公司董事起草的报表可以包括其针对要约收购价款的公平性进行的评论。
善意或恶意的不同选择是否会影响收购过程？
除非目标公司决定对恶意收购采取防御措施，否则，选择善意或恶意收购并不明显地影响《统一财政法案》规定的收购过程，善意和恶意收购最大的区别是，在恶意收购中，收购期自要约文件公布后5日后开始，而非要约文件公布之日。
232/2016号法令提出了针对移居至意大利的税务居民的新型税务制度：
– 免除了所得税中意大利国外收入的部分
– 免除了继承税中意大利国外资产的部分
– 免除了房地产税中意大利国外资产的部分
– 只需支付10万欧元的替代税
主要特点：
2017年金融法中的所得税法提出了一条新规，即针对移居至意大利的税务居民制定了一条选择性税收制度。
新制度规定如下：
- 免除前五年的所有意大利国外收入所得税，除了由于出售满足一定要求参股1的资本利得。（1纳税人拥有达到一定数额要求的参股：若他持有至少2%拥有投票权的股份或5%上市公司资本；或至少20%拥有投票权的股份或25%非上市公司资本）。
- 免除IVIE（国外房地产税）和IVAFE（国外金融资产税）。
- 免除意大利国外资产的继承税。
- 每年只需支付10万欧元的替代税。
资格
根据意大利法律移居至意大利，并且在提交上述选择性税收优惠申请之前十年中的至少九年，没有出于税务目的居住在意大利的纳税人，有资格选择申请上述税收优惠。
如何申请
纳税人首先必须向意大利的税务机构提交一份裁定请求，以证明特别制度要求的存在。在得到意大利税务机关的肯定答复之后，纳税人有资格申请享受上述税务优惠政策。申请必须在“移居”发生的当年、纳税申报表的提交期限之内提交。纳税人必须向移居意大利前的最后（一个或多个）国家进行通知，意大利税务机构也会将相关信息传送给上述国家税务机构。
有其他收购方法吗？
意大利上市公司并购交易通常通过以下两种方式进行：（i）要约收购，在该方式中，对上市公司控股股权的收购将被要求以现金股权收购或股权互换收购的方式，或两者结合的方式进行；或（ii）法定的直接或反向合并。
双方需要哪些顾问？
在上市公司的并购交易中，双方通常会聘请法律和财务顾问、会计师和公共关系顾问。在某些情况下，可能还需要委派一名独立的专家就并购事宜的财务条款提出公平的意见。
需要多长时间？
上市公司的并购交易时间取决于其结构、审议的形式以及其是否为善意或恶意并购。根据交易可能所需的监管部门审批的类型，并购时间可以相应延长。
在就上市目标公司拥有投票权的所有股份进行强制性收购时，收购开放期限为15至25个“交易日”。其他收购的开放期限为15至40个交易日,但监管委员会有权将受理时间延长至55个交易日。此外，若出现竞争要约，受理时间可以进一步延长。
鉴于兼并上市公司的初步要求（即所有相关公司的董事会和股东大会均须批准兼并及兼并文件，并向监管委员会提交前述文件供其审批），其所需时间一般较长。为就兼并事宜进行投票而召开特别股东大会前至少30日，所有兼并文件必须存放在公司的注册地址（或公司官网公布的地址）。一旦兼并所涉及的公司的特别股东大会批准兼并，相关批准决议须存放在公司注册处(“Registro delle Imprese”)。仅在批准决议存放至公司注册处之日起60日后，兼并方可在公证人面前最终执行。兼并契约的副本须在兼并契约提交至公司注册处后10日内被交送至监管委员会。自兼并衍生出的新公司也必须在其在公司注册处备案后的30日内，将修订后的章程的副本提交至监管委员会。
主要障碍是什么？
现金要约收购：启动要约收购的初步条件是原则上与目标公司的主要股东和管理层达成协议。一旦决定启动要约收购，主要障碍在于满足所有条件、得到监管部门的批准和满足反垄断的兼并前控制等待期。此外，鉴于一般情况下，要约收购需第三方融资提供全部或部分资金，在实际启动收购之前，收购方须已获得银行提供融资的审批。
股权要约收购：由于在股权要约收购中，对价为股权互换，在启动股权要约收购之前，收购方须已获得所有所需的股东大会的决议和授权以达到股权互换的目的。
兼并：兼并的主要障碍是：（1）准备兼并文件这一程序的复杂性以及（2）兼并需要金融和会计专家就包括汇率公平在内的相关事宜进行确认。此外，兼并须获得特别股东大会的批准。
交易条款和价格的灵活性如何？
在自愿的现金或股权交换要约收购的情况下，收购方原则上可自由设定价格。
在强制性收购的情况下，收购价格为过去12个月中，收购方及其一致行动人在购买目标公司同类股票时所支付的最高价格；或者，如果在过去12个月中未购买过股票时，收购价格为过去12个月中目标公司同类股票的加权平均市场价格；或者，如果目标公司股票交易时间少于12个月时，收购价格为该少于12个月的期限内的加权平均市场价格。
强制股权收购须由已购买目标公司股票的任何一方（独自或与其一致行动人）通过以下方式执行：
- 将其在目标公司的投票权增长至目标公司有价证券的30%以上（在某些涉及中小型企业的案例中为25%）；
- 持有目标公司超过30%但少于50%的有价证券，并在之后的12个月中至少将其股票投票权增长5%；
- 不满足自愿要约收购的某些条件（涉及目标公司每类证券至少60%）；或
- 缺少可免于进行强制性要约收购的条款和条件。
在强制排除（squeeze-out）的收购中（即可使收购方收购目标公司100%的证券，或当收购方已购买了目标公司不少于95%的证券时），价格将按照《统一财政法案》和条例设定的标准确定。
现金或其他支付方式的区别是什么？
收购方可提供现金、现有或新股份、其他证券（即不同类型的股份、可转换债券、认股权证）或上述的任意组合。但是，在强制性要约收购的情况下，如果作为对价提供的证券不被允许在所有受监管的欧盟市场中交易，或者收购方在启动要约收购前12个月中，以现金形式至少收购了5%的拥有目标公司股东大会投票权的证券时，则收购方必须提供现金收购方式供目标公司选择。
在强制排除程序中，公司证券持有者有权要求以现金形式全额支付对价。
全部股东必须适用同等收购条件吗？
是的。对所有持有同类股份的股东须一视同仁，对目标公司所有持券人的收购条件必须是相同的。如果在收购期间，收购方以一个高于要约收购报价的价格收购目标证券的，则所有股东均拥有获得此等更高价格的权利。
有义务购买其他类型的目标证券吗？
一般情况下，收购方被允许向任何目标证券发出收购要约，但收购方没有自动购买目标公司其他类型的证券的义务。
与员工的协议条款存在限制吗？
没有特别的限制。若收购方与员工达成协议，则此协议的条款须在要约收购的文件中被注明。
员工、养老金托管人和其他利益相关者将扮演怎样的角色？
要约收购文件须传达给收购方和目标公司双方的员工代表（在没有员工代表的情况下须直接传达给员工），并且前述文件必须包括收购方关于目标公司员工工作条件的计划信息。
需要哪些文件？
进行上市公司要约收购时，须提交的主要文件尤其包括：（i）收购方公告（需向监管委员会备案，并披露收购方进行收购的意图）；（ii）收购方的收购文件；（iii）收购方支付对价的担保文件；（iv）目标公司的声明，其中须包含：分析要约收购所需的所有必要信息、目标公司董事会做出的关于要约收购的评估、为批准各项防御措施而作出的召集股东大会的决定，以及要约收购对目标公司利益（尤其是员工权利）潜在影响的阐述；以及（v）一份目标公司员工代表（若有任命）就收购对目标公司的影响进行的分析声明。
进行兼并时，须提交的主要文件尤其包括：（i）兼并计划案（由董事会编制，须包括兼并的汇率信息等）；（ii）董事会的兼并阐述报告（包括从法律和经济角度阐述合并的理由）；（iii）相关公司各自任命的财务专家就汇率确认给予的公平意见（汇率也须由上述各家公司法定地址所在地的法院院长任命的专家参与确认）的；及（iv）各家董事会和股东大会批准兼并计划的决议。
有特别的信息披露要求吗？
要约收购文件须包含以下主要信息：（i）收购方及其母公司的主要信息；（ii）目标公司的主要信息；（iii）收购方意图通过公开要约收购方式收购的证券的主要信息；(iv) 要约收购中证券的价格及要约收购的总体价值（v）要约收购的依据及触发要约收购义务的事件（如有）；（vi）收购方是否意图通过收购取消目标公司的上市地位；（vii）要约收购的先决条件(如有)；（viii）收购方所持参股（包括作为标的资产的多头持仓与发行人股份）；（ix）适用法律、法规所规定的所有沟通记录或授权；（x）用于公布要约相关文件及通告的互联网网站。此外，收购方须提供所有关于收购方和目标公司的财会信息文件。
主要成本是什么？
主要成本是各类财务、法律和会计顾问的费用、为收购价款提供支付担保的交单银行的潜在费用、为确保交易融资的安全可能产生的成本以及要约收购的申请费和适用印花税。
需要谁的许可？
所有要约收购的文件须经监管委员会核准。根据交易的规模和性质，须经相应的主管监管机构（即针对金融机构的欧洲中央银行或意大利银行，以及针对保险公司的保险监管局等）的核准。若为受保护行业，在作出要约收购前，可能还须经其他机构的核准。若引起兼并前竞争要约的，或若为受管制行业的，竞争和市场管理局或欧盟委员会可能会要求清仓。在兼并的情况下，兼并完成前始终须得到股东的核准。
需要哪些等级的核准或接受？
原则上，收购的完成与所收购股份的百分比无关。但是，如果收购方为其要约收购附加条件，进而确保：
- 对目标公司的法律控制：则收购方必须设法持有（在收购后）高达50%的参与控股+一票公司投票权；
- 对特别股东大会的控制：则收购方必须设法持有（在收购后）高达6%的投票权；或
- 公司的摘牌权和强制排除少数股东的权利：则在收购后，收购方至少须持有被收购公司95%（最低限额）的股份。
在兼并的情况下，为谨慎起见，需事先确保获得超过半数的有利投票。在某些情况下，收购方可获得不可撤销的授权以对兼并进行有利投票。
何时需要/可以通过现金支付对价？
以现金或证券形式支付的收购价款，以及适用的担保，必须在要约收购的承诺期开始之前作出。特别需强调的是，收购方必须在要约收购文件公布前一天之内，向监管委员会提交所有关于担保计划的必要文件。
意大利政府在即将由意大利议会审议的《预算法草案》中建议：为在意大利投资的外籍富裕个人提供简便的入境签证。若自雇人员以工作为目的移居意大利，则通过自雇所得的收入可申请税收减免。意大利的新税务优惠制度，类似于“英国税务居民但非英国居籍”制度（UK resident-not-domiciled regime）。
为了吸引外国资本，意大利政府正重点关注有意移居意大利的非居籍个人的税收新优惠。
一方面，人民迁移权和迁移流程的法律框架被修改：加入了为期两年的特别签证制度（可续签，在某些情况下或为三年）。上述签证制度适用于在意大利持续居住超过三个月的个人。
若要申请上述优惠，则非居籍个人需要证明其满足以下条件，或证明将在意大利进行以下投资：（1）购买并持有至少200万欧元政府债券至少两年，（2）在注册地址为意大利、并在意大利运营的公司股本的权益工具中投资至少100万欧元，并维持至少两年，（3）用于文化、教育、移民管理、科学研究或文化产品修复的至少100万欧元慈善捐款。
对于是否符合上述要求，相关部门会通过非居籍个人提交的一系列文件（根据待定程序）进行核实。如果得到积极的评价结果，那么符合要求的非居籍个人将获得“投资者签证”。
其他修正案将涉及所谓的《2015国际化法令》（第147/2015号法令，第16条），尤其雇员由于工作原因移居至意大利的特别制度。该制度内容将被扩展，以在税收优惠方面更具吸引力。
事实上，在意大利停留两周以上的自雇人员也将受益于该制度内容的扩展修改。此外，政府似乎愿意扩大无税区：至今为止，在意大利自雇工作或受雇工作收入的30%无需缴税，但之后该百分比可能提高至50%。
目前，税收减免只适用于欧洲公民。根据草案，该税收优惠覆盖范围可扩大至：所居住国已与意大利签署双重税务协定或互相交换信息协议的非欧盟国家居籍个人。此外，申请人必须持有大学学位并且在过去至少24个月持续受雇或自雇。
《预算法草案》为符合条件的非意大利居籍及其亲属制定新的税收制度，使他们愿意移居意大利。该草案类似于“英国税务居民但非英国居籍”制度，规定在意大利境外产生的所有收入与收益，在提交税收支配预算的正式申请之后，每年只需缴纳10万欧元的固定替代税。上述申请最多可持续15年，期间可撤销或提前终止。
此项规定无疑极具吸引力，如果得以实现，将可推动大量高资产净值个人居住在意大利。如此优惠的税制在过去从未被提出过。
意大利的商业纠纷可通过意大利法院得到有效解决（通过普通或简易程序）；或者在双方同意的情况下，通过仲裁解决。
法院进行初审需要约3至4年时间，二审需要约4至5年时间；而仲裁程序所需时间一般较短（约一年），它取决于双方约定条款情况以及当地的仲裁规则。
换言之，仲裁程序通常较快，尤其是当仲裁根据仲裁机构（例如米兰国际仲裁委员会）规则进行时。所以仲裁程序的费用高于法院程序的费用。
外国判决和国际仲裁裁决的强制执行
外国判决需要通过相应程序以在意大利得到承认和执行，程序取决于判决是否由欧盟成员国法院做出。
根据欧盟第1215/2012号条例、第44/2001号条例以及《布鲁塞尔公约》和《卢加诺二号公约》，由欧盟成员国做出的，或在该国强制执行的决定、判决或措施，若符合相应条件，则无需任何程序或强制声明，可自动在意大利司法管辖区得到承认。
对于由非欧盟成员国做出的判决，一系列涉及承认与执行民事案件判决的双边公约可作为法律依据。
意大利于1969年签署了关于承认和执行外国仲裁裁决的《纽约公约》（1958）。根据《纽约公约》条款规定下的意大利程序法，意大利承认外国仲裁裁决的约束力和强制性。
因此，若要在意大利执行外国仲裁裁决，则必须向另一方的注册地/居住地的上诉法院（若另一方注册地/居住地在意大利境内）或罗马上诉法院（若另一方注册地/居住地在意大利境外）备案。在此情况下，上诉法院只会监督裁决是否在形式上被执行，而不会涉及裁决中争议的内容。之后法院将颁布强制令，使仲裁裁决变成可强制执行的判决。
意大利判决及仲裁裁决在其他国家的执行
在意大利做出的判决和仲裁裁决的执行性视不同国家而定。
需要特别强调的是，根据欧盟法规、《布鲁塞尔公约》及《卢加诺公约》，意大利做出的判决可在上述法规及公约适用国强制执行。
如上文所述，意大利是《纽约公约》缔约国，而《纽约公约》是基于承认和执行其他缔约国仲裁裁决的互惠原则的公约。因此，在意大利做出的裁决同样强制适用于《纽约公约》的其他缔约国。
并购受何约束？
在意大利法律框架下收购上市公司，主要受以下法律法规约束：
- 《意大利民法典》（以下简称“《民法典》”）；
- 第58/1998号法令，即《统一财政法案》（Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria，以下简称 “财政法案”）
- 意大利全国公司和证券交易所监管委员会（Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa，以下简称“监管委员会”)颁发的条例以及，需特别强调的是，监管委员会颁布的第11971/1999号条例，以下简称“条例” (Regolamento Emittenti);及
- 由意大利证券交易所（即Borsa Italiana S.p.A.，一家组织和管理米兰证券交易所中意大利证券市场和在米兰证券交易所上市公司的公司）颁布的规章制度。
特别需要强调的是，通过兼并进行收购时，将适用《民法典》第2501条至第2505条的规定，以及欧盟不同成员国间进行公司兼并时，同样受第108/2008号法令约束，前述法令是对有关跨境兼并的第2005/56/CE号欧盟指令的落实。
在特殊情况下（主要取决于参与交易的公司所属的行业及其开展业务的性质），意大利的兼并和收购可能须接受意大利其他相关部门的监督和批准，例如：意大利竞争和市场管理局 (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato，以下简称“竞争和市场管理局”)；意大利保险监管局 (Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni，以下简称“保险监管局”)；负责监管银行和金融中介机构的活动的意大利银行；意大利电子通讯及传媒管理局 (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni，以下简称“电子通讯及传媒管理局”)；以及欧洲中央银行。
不同类型的公司是否适用不同的法规？
《民法典》针对不同类型的公司做出了不同规定。民营并购中最常见的目标公司为有限责任公司，即“S.r.l”(Società a responsabilità limitata)和民营股份制公司“S.p.A.” (Società per Azioni)。
在意大利的上市公司并购中，最常见的目标公司类型为民营股份制公司，其股票可在受监管的欧盟市场中交易。
被并购公司的司法性质和类型将影响股权交易的适用规定。事实上，《民法典》的规定一般适用于所有类型的意大利私营公司的收购，而已在受监管的欧盟市场上市的意大利上市公司亦将受《统一财政法案》和其他与收购意大利股份制上市公司相关的具体法规的约束。
有一类特殊的中小规模上市企业(以下简称“中小企业”)，将受不同于《统一财政法案》的其他法规的约束，包括产生通知义务，或启动强制性要约收购义务的不同条件。
外国买家是否适用特殊规则？
第56/2012号法律就非欧盟实体向战略领域（例如国防、基础设施、能源、运输和传媒）的意大利上市或非上市公司进行的投资，介绍了对意大利国家利益的保护。
特别需要强调的是，当非欧盟实体收购一家从事能源、运输和媒体领域的公司的控股股权时，其必须在10日内向意大利政府报备收购事宜。为评估股权是否为控股股权，须对股东之间可能签署的股权协议进行考量。
在向政府报备之前和在报备的15日之后，股权投票权被暂停使用。无论目标公司是否在被监管的市场上市，非欧盟实体收购方除有义务向意大利政府做出上述报备外，还须向监管委员会和公司作出独立报备（无论目标公司何时在受监管的市场上市，亦无论《统一财政法案》项下的适用条件何时被满足，该条规定应始终适用）。
国防领域的公司适用更严格的报备义务。任何实体在收购一家业务范围涉及国防领域的公司股权时，需在10日内，根据当时控制目标公司的实体性质，选择向意大利政府委员会或是意大利经济与财政部报备此次收购。在向政府报备前以及之后的15日内，涉及控股的投票权将被暂停使用。若受国家利益保护的目标公司为受监管的欧盟市场的上市公司，当超过下列数额时，即：2%; 3%; 5%; 10%; 15%; 20%或 25%，收购方有义务向意大利政府委员会或意大利经济财政部报备。当目标公司为受监管的欧盟市场的上市公司，并且满足相关条件时，除有义务向监管委员会报备外，收购方仍有义务向意大利政府委员会或意大利经济与财政部报备。
若非欧盟实体所在国家与意大利有贸易互惠，并在遵守意大利或欧盟订立的国际公约的情况下，非欧盟实体可以收购上述公司股份。
是否有特别行业规定？
涉及并购的特别规定将适用于以下公司：
-金融机构，须由意大利银行或欧洲中央银行批准该交易；
-保险公司，须由保险监管局批准该交易；
-业务涉及通讯、媒体和广播行业的公司，须受电子通讯及传媒管理局监管；
-业务涉及运输、公共设施、能源和国防行业的公司，可适用特殊规定；
责任的主要依据是什么？
违反某些特定禁令，例如内幕交易、操纵市场或发布虚假消息，可构成严重的民事或刑事责任依据。在某些情况下，例如，虚假陈述时，可产生额外责任。当未能遵守由《统一财政法案》制定的程序性规则和其他上市公司并购规则时，例如，未遵守授权要求、信息披露义务、要约收购文件的正确性以及向市场提供信息的真实性时，可产生具体的责任。
I. Introduction
The 1919 American legal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company provides a lens through which an analysis of disputes between majority and minority shareholders can start to be conceived. After allowing the Dodge Brothers, already a supplier to Ford, to become minority shareholders within the company, majority shareholder and executive Henry Ford unilaterally decided to terminate special dividends for shareholders in order to maintain further investment in new plants. This measure served as a way to sustain the production of cars at lower prices, a feature of the car manufacturer that Ford saw as tantamount to the public good and, perhaps less ostensibly, represented the preservation of a business model seen by Ford as essential to the Ford Motor Company’s long-term success. The development spurred the Dodge brothers to bring civil action against the Ford Motor Company, citing it as an injustice that deprived them of deserved dividends. In 1919, the Supreme Court of Michigan, ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers and stated that the action of Ford was not justified under the rule of “shareholder primacy,” thereby awarding the Dodge Brothers of the dividends to which they were entitled. The Supreme Court simultaneously decided, however, that the case also shaped the “business judgement rule,” which reserves the right of final judgment to the executive or relevant directors.■ This example testifies to the unmediated conflict between the interests majority and minority shareholders that exists at the heart of a limited company and corporations: namely, the majority’s stronghold over the corporation’s operations and its preference to reinvest the corporation’s profits in the business itself, which fundamentally runs counter to the common desire of minority shareholders to obtain the maximum return on their capital. Further, the outcome in Dodge v. Ford illuminates how, in the case that the majority seeks to abuse its power and circumvent the minority, it is often necessary that the minority exercise its ability to react. ■ The minority shareholder’s “right to control,” which includes the right to be informed and the right to inspect certain documents of the corporation, along with the right to exit, typically serve as the chief devices at its disposal. This derives from the fact that such rights are, in the common practice of law, considered sovereign and do not fall under the majority shareholder’s umbrella right to exercise propriety and “good faith.” In simpler terms, this means that the minority shareholder possesses the principle rights to veto and to exit.
II. Pre-existing Realities of Minority Shareholder Participation
Beyond a situation in which majority and minority shareholders have an already established relationship within a corporation or enter into special arrangements before acquiring or selling an equity interest, this article seeks to approach first the circumstances under which such a relationship lacks clear definition, for example in a succession mortis causa i.e. where the shares are owned by the heirs of a common relative and new minorities are thereby created. This happening typically occurs in family owned corporations in which the rights reserved to the minority shareholders are, therefore, even more crucial. Further, it should be noted that in the absence of applicable provisions within the corporate charter (also known as articles of incorporation), the corporation’s bylaws, and shareholder agreements governing the majority – minority shareholder relationship, the rights protected under the Italian Civil Code (“Codice Civile,” abbreviated as “c.c.”) solely take jurisdiction. On the surface, this would seem to preclude any advantage on the part of the majority shareholder and constitute a neutral majority – minority shareholder relationship. It should be noted that the present examination solely regards the so-called “Società per azioni” (abbreviated “S.p.A.”) “chiuse,” to which the English term “closely held corporations” in the U.S.A. stands as an equivalent. The main feature of a S.p.A “chiusa” is that it does not possess recourse to the risk capital market. ■ Further, unlike “Società a responsabilità limitata” (abbreviated “S.r.l.”) akin to a limited liability company in the U.S.A., shareholders in S.p.A.s do not possess the right of direct supervision over operations of the company. In S.p.A.s, in fact, supervision over operations is reserved to the Board of Statutory Auditors, which oversees that the directors of the corporation act in uniformity and in respect of the law, the charter and the bylaws, thus safeguarding, inter alia, the interest of the minority shareholders. In any case, however, the law stipulates that certain rights on the part of the minority in a S.p.A. are first and foremost reserved, namely the right to inspect some corporate records and the general right to information. These rights are, above all, limited to particular cases such that the shareholders cannot intervene in the corporation’s management, which is exclusively reserved to its administrators. It is important to note that the right of inspection, as protected under Article 2422 c.c., recognizes the shareholder’s right to verify the book of shareholders, which contains the information of all shareholders, in addition to the minutes of shareholders’ meetings. Such verification can be carried out also by means of an agent and copy of said records can be obtained at his or her expense. This right, however, is limited exclusively to the aforementioned records without offering the possibility to examine the other corporate records indicated under Article 2421 c.c., which include the minutes of the Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors, etc. Such further records can only be inspected by the directors, the statutory auditors, and other subjects whose duty lies in the control of the corporation, thereby not possessing any limitation in the right of general access to them. This reality derives from the fact that such examination constitutes the necessary instrument by which they can exercise their supervision powers over the company’s administration, organization, and proper accounting in respect to the law, the articles of incorporation, the corporation’s bylaws, the principles of sound management, the administrative system, the accounting system, and the organizing structure of the corporation. That being said, the single shareholder does possess the following channels through which he or she can exercise control over operations within a privately held S.p.A. which the legislature explicitly places at his or her disposal:
(i) To file a petition within the Board of Statutory Auditors, denouncing in any shape or form deemed appropriate by the shareholder a behavior on the part of the directors considered outside of compliance related to not adequately addressing proper organizational, administrative, and accounting duties under Article 2408 c.c.. The said denounce must obligatorily be taken into account and relayed to the management by the Board of Statutory Auditors who, if the petition is filed by a proportion of one – twentieth of the equity (i.e. 5%) must, in a prompt fashion, investigate this claim and inform the shareholders’ meeting of the results of the subsequent investigation in the conclusions of its report in the course of the annual shareholder’s meeting. Statutory Auditors have the duty to convene a general shareholders’ meeting in the following cases (a) omission or unjustified delay of such action on the part of directors (b) the recognition of reproachable practices on the part of the directors whose seriousness and urgency recommends that a meeting should be convened as covered under the second section of Article 2406 c.c. (it should be noted that this latter described ability and duty is not necessarily limited to the petition of the shareholders, but instead to the aforementioned practices considered to be of serious weight that must be correspondingly addressed in an urgent manner).
(ii) Shareholders further reserve the right to report to the Court in case of grounded suspicions that the Board of Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors are in violation of their fiduciary duties and have committed serious mismanagement that could be the precursor to substantial damages for the corporation or for one or more controlled companies by such a S.p.A. In this case, shareholders who together constitute one-tenth (i.e. 10%) of equity interest have the ability to call for the procession of an investigation, while the cost of such investigation should be borne by the acting parties and as ordered by the Court. If such an investigation finds such a violation to be the case, the delivering of and appropriate decision follows. In the case that the responsible Board members or auditors resign, however, and/or are replaced with a new slate of duly proven professionals, the investigation can be avoided and suspended to a later determined date at the discretion of the Court. These professionals, however, have the obligation to address and eliminate in haste the practices of relevant mismanagement found in violation following the exclusion of their predecessors. The Court reserves the further right to convene a general shareholders’ meeting in the case that it believes the measures that have been undertaken failed to properly address the wrongdoing within the organization in an appropriate manner. In the most serious of cases, the Court can remove the directors and the statutory auditors, appointing a judicial administrator with envisioned powers for a duration deemed necessary. This individual, as appointed by the Court, therefore, has legal standing and is entitled to exercise the so called “azione di responsabilità” (the “liability action”) namely an action against the directors for their liability for breach of fiduciary duties, as stipulated in the last provision in Article 2393 c.c.
(iii) Shareholders also reserve the right to exercise the liability action in case of breach of fiduciary duties, namely the breach of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care and in case of mismanagement, on the part of the directors or the Statutory Board of Auditors, as provided in Article 2393 bis c.c.. This action requires the shareholders together composing at least one – fifth (i.e. 20%) of shared capital ownership; it should be noted that the bylaws might otherwise stipulate a greater threshold than one – fifth, but such can never exceed one-third ownership (i.e. approximately 33%). Article 2393 further specifies that the exercising of the liability action shall not be carried out if shareholders constituting one- fifth (i.e. 20%) of total capital vote to the contrary. If, however, shareholders constituting one – fifth of ownership approve such a measure, Italian law dictates that the incumbent directors are automatically removed.
(iv) The right is reserved to challenge and vacate shareholders’ meeting resolutions (including that relative to the approval of the financial statement as protected under Article 2434 bis c.c.) which are considered contrary to the law or the corporation’s bylaws as by Article 2377 c.c. In order to exercise this right, there must be a number of shareholders comprising one – twentieth (i.e. 5%) of shared capital. Further, acting upon this right can be accompanied by the commensurate action of the shareholders aimed at recovering the damages produced through the resolution undertaken. (v) As by Article 2429 c.c., the right to examine, during office hours, the companies’ project of financial statement in addition to the report of the directors, the report of the Board of Auditors, the report of the supervising auditing firm, on top of a summary of the data essential to the last financial statement of associated companies, in the fifteen day period preceding the general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for the approval of the corporate financial statement.
(v) The right to participate in the deliberations of the shareholders’ meeting and exercise the right of “veto” in the so called case of an extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting, on second call, involving “modifications of the bylaws, corporation’s name, substitution of its liquidators, and other matters expressly attributed to the extraordinary meeting by law,” as stipulated in Article 2365 c.c. in the case that there exist shareholders who hold a quorum of one – third (i.e. approximately 33%) of the shared capital only in the second meeting.
(vi) The right to call a summons for a general meeting convened without any delay, under Article 2367 c.c., which can be exercised by any quorum of shareholders constituting one – tenth (i.e. 10%) of shared capital.
(vii) The right to call for the postponement of the meeting if not sufficiently informed prior, in the case that shareholders holding a third (i.e. approximately 33%) of shared capital vote for such a measure, pursuant to Article 2374 c.c.
■ An analysis of the aforementioned critical percentage thresholds necessary for such shareholders’ participation within a closely held S.p.A, in fact, demonstrates that the relevant legal infrastructure provides a meagre pathway to minority representation. Beyond the 5% provision in Article 2377 c.c., which concerns the extenuating circumstance of challenging decisions made by the Board, minority shareholders remain relatively powerless in a private, closely held limited company and without the possibility to challenge decisions made by the majority shareholders (S.p.A. chiusa). Therefore, in order for a minority to be considered “qualified” and have its voice heard within the corporate governance of a closely held Italian corporation, it is necessary for it to hold a) the 5% shareholder ownership, which allows it to petition for the investigation of the Board of Directors or the Board of Statutory Auditors for behavior considered out of compliance (as by Article 2408 c.c.), and to vacate the decisions made in shareholders’ meetings (as by Article 2377 c.c.). b) the 10% quorum for a petition to the Court of the above cited serious wrongdoings on the part of the Board of Statutory Auditors and the Board of Directors, as by Article 2409 c.c., and to convene without hesitation the shareholder’s meeting, as by Article 2367 c.c.; c) the 20% threshold in total shared capital to bring about action of liability against the Board of Directors or the Board of Statutory Auditors, as by Article 2393 bis. c.c., or to oppose the resolution as by Article 2393 c.c. d) the 33% (+1%) quorum for the exercising of a veto in an extraordinary shareholders’ meetings on second call and for the request for the postponement of the shareholders’ meeting as by Article 2374 c.c.
■ Exit (withdrawal). The right to exit is the right of the minority to exit from the group of shareholders. The natural modality of exit is the sale of equity. Standing as the principal alternative to selling shares, in case of external events that place a significant change on the conditions of risk, the shareholder who cannot control such changes within the corporate scheme can employ the prospect of divesting, in full or in part, by means of this right of withdrawal. It is necessary for the shareholder to cite the exact cause, which prompts his or her exercising shareholder’s right to exit by means of withdrawal: namely, on one hand, such that the majority is able, in an informed manner, to influence managerial decisions regarding the corporation’s vitality and, on the other hand, the minority, in the case of feeling as a “prisoner” to the corporation, has a mechanism at its disposal to, in plain terms, get out. The withdrawal becomes, therefore, a powerful instrument of influence to be executed on the majority by the minority shareholder in addition to serving as a bargaining chip, which changes the premise of negotiation initially established by the shareholders, with the induction of specific motives of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal is disciplined by Article 2438 c.c. withdrawal and is exercisable in the case verified by the following circumstances: a) modification of the corporate purpose that influences in a significant manner the activity of the corporation; b) the transformation of the corporation; c) the transferring of corporate headquarters abroad; d) the revocation of its state of liquidation; e) the elimination of one or more of the causes for withdrawal stipulated within the bylaws; f) the modification of the bylaws that has bearing on the value of the equity interest of the shareholder in the case of his or her exit; g) modifications of the bylaws concerning the rights of voting and administration; h) postponement of its terms; i) introduction or removal of obligations or legal limitation regarding the circulation of shares; l) if the corporation is acknowledged for an indeterminate period of time, the shareholder can exercise withdrawal with a notice of 180 days in advance; m) in the case that the corporation is subject to direction and coordination in the sense of Article 2497 c.c. Relative to the circumstances above cited, it is of fundamental importance to remember how some of these cases, most precisely those indicated by letters a) through g), are causes of withdrawal considered mandatory, that is to say, which are not susceptible to modification even in the case of voluntary compliance on the part of the relevant shareholders, while those indicated by letters h) and i) are subject to change and might be derogated in the case of the approval of the shareholders. The first part of Article 2437 c.c., second section, in fact, explicated, “unless the bylaws stipulate differently,” these causes, referring to those belonging to the first group (a through g), are recognized implicitly as much as independently sustained. One might therefore, configure a partition of the causes for exit into three categories: those legally mandatory, those legally non-binding and subject to change, and those stipulated in the corporate bylaws. For the exercising of the right of withdrawal, it is necessary to respect the modalities foreseen in Article 2437 bis c.c.; further, it should be noted that the exercising of this right involves the liquidation of the equity interest according to the relevant criteria of determination disclosed in Article 2437 part 3 c.c.
The Italian Court of Cassation, United Sections (judgement no. 24244 of 27 November 2015), recently issued a judgement on the applicability of article 5 no. 1 of the Brussels I Regulation on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, now corresponding to article 7 no. 1 of the Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis).
The above-referenced provision sets a special forum in matters relating to a contract, providing for the competence of the courts located in the place of performance of the obligation in question. According to letter b) of this provision, in case of the sale of goods, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered.
In the case brought before the Court of Cassation, an Italian company – while objecting the claim of a French company regarding the conclusion of some sale agreements that the latter stated to have entered into with the first one – asked for a declaratory judgement stating the inexistence of any contractual obligation between the parties, and, alternatively, for a declaration that the alleged agreements were null and void.
First of all, the Court of Cassation asserted the applicability of article 5, letter b) of the Brussels I Regulation to the case de quo.
Albeit recognizing that the abovementioned provision seems to refer only to actions addressed to the performance of a contract and not to actions regarding the dissolution of a contractual obligation, the Italian Supreme Court has considered that also claims aiming at ascertaining the inexistence, invalidity or ineffectiveness of an agreement concern matters relating to a contract. More precisely, the Supreme Court has held that such claims involve an initial, actual or alleged, voluntary assumption of an obligation, of which they tend, in several ways, to default. In the light of this assumption and considering that the delivery of the goods was supposed to take place in France (according to the contractual documents evidenced during the proceedings), the Court of Cassation has found that Italian Courts were lacking jurisdiction over the case, thus confirming the judgement previously issued by the Court of Appeal.
The judgement of the Italian United Sections is important because it has definitively confirmed, consistently with the European uniform trend, that the place of delivery is the only autonomous linking factor to be applied to all claims grounded on contracts for the sale of goods and not only to claims based on the non-performance of the delivery obligation itself.
The author of this article is Silvia Petruzzino.
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Majority and minority shareholder disputes under Italian law
26 7 月 2016
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意大利
- 公司法
可以选择吗？
虽然恶意收购的手段在意大利并不常见，但《统一财政法案》同时承认善意及恶意的要约收购。
在接近目标公司时须遵守哪些法规？
关于收购方在接近目标公司时应采取何种方式并不存在特别规定。在善意收购中，潜在的买家可以接近目标公司的管理人员并进行初步的谈判，进而得到目标公司的更多信息，用于决定是以兼并还是要约收购的形式收购目标公司。但是，以上接触须始终遵守有关股价敏感信息披露和禁止市场滥用行为的法规。
目标公司的董事会如何发挥作用？
除非目标公司的章程另有规定，否则须遵守被动规则。因此，在缺少股东特别审批的情况下，目标公司的董事必须避免采取任何可能危害要约收购目的的行动。
尽管如此，始终以股东最大利益为前提的目标公司的董事会可以对要约收购的结果施加影响。例如：当收购方为其竞争者时，或当另一个竞争要约有望启动时，目标公司的董事会可以拒绝收购方在收购启动前对其进行尽职调查。此外，由目标公司董事起草的报表可以包括其针对要约收购价款的公平性进行的评论。
善意或恶意的不同选择是否会影响收购过程？
除非目标公司决定对恶意收购采取防御措施，否则，选择善意或恶意收购并不明显地影响《统一财政法案》规定的收购过程，善意和恶意收购最大的区别是，在恶意收购中，收购期自要约文件公布后5日后开始，而非要约文件公布之日。
232/2016号法令提出了针对移居至意大利的税务居民的新型税务制度：
– 免除了所得税中意大利国外收入的部分
– 免除了继承税中意大利国外资产的部分
– 免除了房地产税中意大利国外资产的部分
– 只需支付10万欧元的替代税
主要特点：
2017年金融法中的所得税法提出了一条新规，即针对移居至意大利的税务居民制定了一条选择性税收制度。
新制度规定如下：
- 免除前五年的所有意大利国外收入所得税，除了由于出售满足一定要求参股1的资本利得。（1纳税人拥有达到一定数额要求的参股：若他持有至少2%拥有投票权的股份或5%上市公司资本；或至少20%拥有投票权的股份或25%非上市公司资本）。
- 免除IVIE（国外房地产税）和IVAFE（国外金融资产税）。
- 免除意大利国外资产的继承税。
- 每年只需支付10万欧元的替代税。
资格
根据意大利法律移居至意大利，并且在提交上述选择性税收优惠申请之前十年中的至少九年，没有出于税务目的居住在意大利的纳税人，有资格选择申请上述税收优惠。
如何申请
纳税人首先必须向意大利的税务机构提交一份裁定请求，以证明特别制度要求的存在。在得到意大利税务机关的肯定答复之后，纳税人有资格申请享受上述税务优惠政策。申请必须在“移居”发生的当年、纳税申报表的提交期限之内提交。纳税人必须向移居意大利前的最后（一个或多个）国家进行通知，意大利税务机构也会将相关信息传送给上述国家税务机构。
有其他收购方法吗？
意大利上市公司并购交易通常通过以下两种方式进行：（i）要约收购，在该方式中，对上市公司控股股权的收购将被要求以现金股权收购或股权互换收购的方式，或两者结合的方式进行；或（ii）法定的直接或反向合并。
双方需要哪些顾问？
在上市公司的并购交易中，双方通常会聘请法律和财务顾问、会计师和公共关系顾问。在某些情况下，可能还需要委派一名独立的专家就并购事宜的财务条款提出公平的意见。
需要多长时间？
上市公司的并购交易时间取决于其结构、审议的形式以及其是否为善意或恶意并购。根据交易可能所需的监管部门审批的类型，并购时间可以相应延长。
在就上市目标公司拥有投票权的所有股份进行强制性收购时，收购开放期限为15至25个“交易日”。其他收购的开放期限为15至40个交易日,但监管委员会有权将受理时间延长至55个交易日。此外，若出现竞争要约，受理时间可以进一步延长。
鉴于兼并上市公司的初步要求（即所有相关公司的董事会和股东大会均须批准兼并及兼并文件，并向监管委员会提交前述文件供其审批），其所需时间一般较长。为就兼并事宜进行投票而召开特别股东大会前至少30日，所有兼并文件必须存放在公司的注册地址（或公司官网公布的地址）。一旦兼并所涉及的公司的特别股东大会批准兼并，相关批准决议须存放在公司注册处(“Registro delle Imprese”)。仅在批准决议存放至公司注册处之日起60日后，兼并方可在公证人面前最终执行。兼并契约的副本须在兼并契约提交至公司注册处后10日内被交送至监管委员会。自兼并衍生出的新公司也必须在其在公司注册处备案后的30日内，将修订后的章程的副本提交至监管委员会。
主要障碍是什么？
现金要约收购：启动要约收购的初步条件是原则上与目标公司的主要股东和管理层达成协议。一旦决定启动要约收购，主要障碍在于满足所有条件、得到监管部门的批准和满足反垄断的兼并前控制等待期。此外，鉴于一般情况下，要约收购需第三方融资提供全部或部分资金，在实际启动收购之前，收购方须已获得银行提供融资的审批。
股权要约收购：由于在股权要约收购中，对价为股权互换，在启动股权要约收购之前，收购方须已获得所有所需的股东大会的决议和授权以达到股权互换的目的。
兼并：兼并的主要障碍是：（1）准备兼并文件这一程序的复杂性以及（2）兼并需要金融和会计专家就包括汇率公平在内的相关事宜进行确认。此外，兼并须获得特别股东大会的批准。
交易条款和价格的灵活性如何？
在自愿的现金或股权交换要约收购的情况下，收购方原则上可自由设定价格。
在强制性收购的情况下，收购价格为过去12个月中，收购方及其一致行动人在购买目标公司同类股票时所支付的最高价格；或者，如果在过去12个月中未购买过股票时，收购价格为过去12个月中目标公司同类股票的加权平均市场价格；或者，如果目标公司股票交易时间少于12个月时，收购价格为该少于12个月的期限内的加权平均市场价格。
强制股权收购须由已购买目标公司股票的任何一方（独自或与其一致行动人）通过以下方式执行：
- 将其在目标公司的投票权增长至目标公司有价证券的30%以上（在某些涉及中小型企业的案例中为25%）；
- 持有目标公司超过30%但少于50%的有价证券，并在之后的12个月中至少将其股票投票权增长5%；
- 不满足自愿要约收购的某些条件（涉及目标公司每类证券至少60%）；或
- 缺少可免于进行强制性要约收购的条款和条件。
在强制排除（squeeze-out）的收购中（即可使收购方收购目标公司100%的证券，或当收购方已购买了目标公司不少于95%的证券时），价格将按照《统一财政法案》和条例设定的标准确定。
现金或其他支付方式的区别是什么？
收购方可提供现金、现有或新股份、其他证券（即不同类型的股份、可转换债券、认股权证）或上述的任意组合。但是，在强制性要约收购的情况下，如果作为对价提供的证券不被允许在所有受监管的欧盟市场中交易，或者收购方在启动要约收购前12个月中，以现金形式至少收购了5%的拥有目标公司股东大会投票权的证券时，则收购方必须提供现金收购方式供目标公司选择。
在强制排除程序中，公司证券持有者有权要求以现金形式全额支付对价。
全部股东必须适用同等收购条件吗？
是的。对所有持有同类股份的股东须一视同仁，对目标公司所有持券人的收购条件必须是相同的。如果在收购期间，收购方以一个高于要约收购报价的价格收购目标证券的，则所有股东均拥有获得此等更高价格的权利。
有义务购买其他类型的目标证券吗？
一般情况下，收购方被允许向任何目标证券发出收购要约，但收购方没有自动购买目标公司其他类型的证券的义务。
与员工的协议条款存在限制吗？
没有特别的限制。若收购方与员工达成协议，则此协议的条款须在要约收购的文件中被注明。
员工、养老金托管人和其他利益相关者将扮演怎样的角色？
要约收购文件须传达给收购方和目标公司双方的员工代表（在没有员工代表的情况下须直接传达给员工），并且前述文件必须包括收购方关于目标公司员工工作条件的计划信息。
需要哪些文件？
进行上市公司要约收购时，须提交的主要文件尤其包括：（i）收购方公告（需向监管委员会备案，并披露收购方进行收购的意图）；（ii）收购方的收购文件；（iii）收购方支付对价的担保文件；（iv）目标公司的声明，其中须包含：分析要约收购所需的所有必要信息、目标公司董事会做出的关于要约收购的评估、为批准各项防御措施而作出的召集股东大会的决定，以及要约收购对目标公司利益（尤其是员工权利）潜在影响的阐述；以及（v）一份目标公司员工代表（若有任命）就收购对目标公司的影响进行的分析声明。
进行兼并时，须提交的主要文件尤其包括：（i）兼并计划案（由董事会编制，须包括兼并的汇率信息等）；（ii）董事会的兼并阐述报告（包括从法律和经济角度阐述合并的理由）；（iii）相关公司各自任命的财务专家就汇率确认给予的公平意见（汇率也须由上述各家公司法定地址所在地的法院院长任命的专家参与确认）的；及（iv）各家董事会和股东大会批准兼并计划的决议。
有特别的信息披露要求吗？
要约收购文件须包含以下主要信息：（i）收购方及其母公司的主要信息；（ii）目标公司的主要信息；（iii）收购方意图通过公开要约收购方式收购的证券的主要信息；(iv) 要约收购中证券的价格及要约收购的总体价值（v）要约收购的依据及触发要约收购义务的事件（如有）；（vi）收购方是否意图通过收购取消目标公司的上市地位；（vii）要约收购的先决条件(如有)；（viii）收购方所持参股（包括作为标的资产的多头持仓与发行人股份）；（ix）适用法律、法规所规定的所有沟通记录或授权；（x）用于公布要约相关文件及通告的互联网网站。此外，收购方须提供所有关于收购方和目标公司的财会信息文件。
主要成本是什么？
主要成本是各类财务、法律和会计顾问的费用、为收购价款提供支付担保的交单银行的潜在费用、为确保交易融资的安全可能产生的成本以及要约收购的申请费和适用印花税。
需要谁的许可？
所有要约收购的文件须经监管委员会核准。根据交易的规模和性质，须经相应的主管监管机构（即针对金融机构的欧洲中央银行或意大利银行，以及针对保险公司的保险监管局等）的核准。若为受保护行业，在作出要约收购前，可能还须经其他机构的核准。若引起兼并前竞争要约的，或若为受管制行业的，竞争和市场管理局或欧盟委员会可能会要求清仓。在兼并的情况下，兼并完成前始终须得到股东的核准。
需要哪些等级的核准或接受？
原则上，收购的完成与所收购股份的百分比无关。但是，如果收购方为其要约收购附加条件，进而确保：
- 对目标公司的法律控制：则收购方必须设法持有（在收购后）高达50%的参与控股+一票公司投票权；
- 对特别股东大会的控制：则收购方必须设法持有（在收购后）高达6%的投票权；或
- 公司的摘牌权和强制排除少数股东的权利：则在收购后，收购方至少须持有被收购公司95%（最低限额）的股份。
在兼并的情况下，为谨慎起见，需事先确保获得超过半数的有利投票。在某些情况下，收购方可获得不可撤销的授权以对兼并进行有利投票。
何时需要/可以通过现金支付对价？
以现金或证券形式支付的收购价款，以及适用的担保，必须在要约收购的承诺期开始之前作出。特别需强调的是，收购方必须在要约收购文件公布前一天之内，向监管委员会提交所有关于担保计划的必要文件。
意大利政府在即将由意大利议会审议的《预算法草案》中建议：为在意大利投资的外籍富裕个人提供简便的入境签证。若自雇人员以工作为目的移居意大利，则通过自雇所得的收入可申请税收减免。意大利的新税务优惠制度，类似于“英国税务居民但非英国居籍”制度（UK resident-not-domiciled regime）。
为了吸引外国资本，意大利政府正重点关注有意移居意大利的非居籍个人的税收新优惠。
一方面，人民迁移权和迁移流程的法律框架被修改：加入了为期两年的特别签证制度（可续签，在某些情况下或为三年）。上述签证制度适用于在意大利持续居住超过三个月的个人。
若要申请上述优惠，则非居籍个人需要证明其满足以下条件，或证明将在意大利进行以下投资：（1）购买并持有至少200万欧元政府债券至少两年，（2）在注册地址为意大利、并在意大利运营的公司股本的权益工具中投资至少100万欧元，并维持至少两年，（3）用于文化、教育、移民管理、科学研究或文化产品修复的至少100万欧元慈善捐款。
对于是否符合上述要求，相关部门会通过非居籍个人提交的一系列文件（根据待定程序）进行核实。如果得到积极的评价结果，那么符合要求的非居籍个人将获得“投资者签证”。
其他修正案将涉及所谓的《2015国际化法令》（第147/2015号法令，第16条），尤其雇员由于工作原因移居至意大利的特别制度。该制度内容将被扩展，以在税收优惠方面更具吸引力。
事实上，在意大利停留两周以上的自雇人员也将受益于该制度内容的扩展修改。此外，政府似乎愿意扩大无税区：至今为止，在意大利自雇工作或受雇工作收入的30%无需缴税，但之后该百分比可能提高至50%。
目前，税收减免只适用于欧洲公民。根据草案，该税收优惠覆盖范围可扩大至：所居住国已与意大利签署双重税务协定或互相交换信息协议的非欧盟国家居籍个人。此外，申请人必须持有大学学位并且在过去至少24个月持续受雇或自雇。
《预算法草案》为符合条件的非意大利居籍及其亲属制定新的税收制度，使他们愿意移居意大利。该草案类似于“英国税务居民但非英国居籍”制度，规定在意大利境外产生的所有收入与收益，在提交税收支配预算的正式申请之后，每年只需缴纳10万欧元的固定替代税。上述申请最多可持续15年，期间可撤销或提前终止。
此项规定无疑极具吸引力，如果得以实现，将可推动大量高资产净值个人居住在意大利。如此优惠的税制在过去从未被提出过。
意大利的商业纠纷可通过意大利法院得到有效解决（通过普通或简易程序）；或者在双方同意的情况下，通过仲裁解决。
法院进行初审需要约3至4年时间，二审需要约4至5年时间；而仲裁程序所需时间一般较短（约一年），它取决于双方约定条款情况以及当地的仲裁规则。
换言之，仲裁程序通常较快，尤其是当仲裁根据仲裁机构（例如米兰国际仲裁委员会）规则进行时。所以仲裁程序的费用高于法院程序的费用。
外国判决和国际仲裁裁决的强制执行
外国判决需要通过相应程序以在意大利得到承认和执行，程序取决于判决是否由欧盟成员国法院做出。
根据欧盟第1215/2012号条例、第44/2001号条例以及《布鲁塞尔公约》和《卢加诺二号公约》，由欧盟成员国做出的，或在该国强制执行的决定、判决或措施，若符合相应条件，则无需任何程序或强制声明，可自动在意大利司法管辖区得到承认。
对于由非欧盟成员国做出的判决，一系列涉及承认与执行民事案件判决的双边公约可作为法律依据。
意大利于1969年签署了关于承认和执行外国仲裁裁决的《纽约公约》（1958）。根据《纽约公约》条款规定下的意大利程序法，意大利承认外国仲裁裁决的约束力和强制性。
因此，若要在意大利执行外国仲裁裁决，则必须向另一方的注册地/居住地的上诉法院（若另一方注册地/居住地在意大利境内）或罗马上诉法院（若另一方注册地/居住地在意大利境外）备案。在此情况下，上诉法院只会监督裁决是否在形式上被执行，而不会涉及裁决中争议的内容。之后法院将颁布强制令，使仲裁裁决变成可强制执行的判决。
意大利判决及仲裁裁决在其他国家的执行
在意大利做出的判决和仲裁裁决的执行性视不同国家而定。
需要特别强调的是，根据欧盟法规、《布鲁塞尔公约》及《卢加诺公约》，意大利做出的判决可在上述法规及公约适用国强制执行。
如上文所述，意大利是《纽约公约》缔约国，而《纽约公约》是基于承认和执行其他缔约国仲裁裁决的互惠原则的公约。因此，在意大利做出的裁决同样强制适用于《纽约公约》的其他缔约国。
并购受何约束？
在意大利法律框架下收购上市公司，主要受以下法律法规约束：
- 《意大利民法典》（以下简称“《民法典》”）；
- 第58/1998号法令，即《统一财政法案》（Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria，以下简称 “财政法案”）
- 意大利全国公司和证券交易所监管委员会（Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa，以下简称“监管委员会”)颁发的条例以及，需特别强调的是，监管委员会颁布的第11971/1999号条例，以下简称“条例” (Regolamento Emittenti);及
- 由意大利证券交易所（即Borsa Italiana S.p.A.，一家组织和管理米兰证券交易所中意大利证券市场和在米兰证券交易所上市公司的公司）颁布的规章制度。
特别需要强调的是，通过兼并进行收购时，将适用《民法典》第2501条至第2505条的规定，以及欧盟不同成员国间进行公司兼并时，同样受第108/2008号法令约束，前述法令是对有关跨境兼并的第2005/56/CE号欧盟指令的落实。
在特殊情况下（主要取决于参与交易的公司所属的行业及其开展业务的性质），意大利的兼并和收购可能须接受意大利其他相关部门的监督和批准，例如：意大利竞争和市场管理局 (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato，以下简称“竞争和市场管理局”)；意大利保险监管局 (Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni，以下简称“保险监管局”)；负责监管银行和金融中介机构的活动的意大利银行；意大利电子通讯及传媒管理局 (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni，以下简称“电子通讯及传媒管理局”)；以及欧洲中央银行。
不同类型的公司是否适用不同的法规？
《民法典》针对不同类型的公司做出了不同规定。民营并购中最常见的目标公司为有限责任公司，即“S.r.l”(Società a responsabilità limitata)和民营股份制公司“S.p.A.” (Società per Azioni)。
在意大利的上市公司并购中，最常见的目标公司类型为民营股份制公司，其股票可在受监管的欧盟市场中交易。
被并购公司的司法性质和类型将影响股权交易的适用规定。事实上，《民法典》的规定一般适用于所有类型的意大利私营公司的收购，而已在受监管的欧盟市场上市的意大利上市公司亦将受《统一财政法案》和其他与收购意大利股份制上市公司相关的具体法规的约束。
有一类特殊的中小规模上市企业(以下简称“中小企业”)，将受不同于《统一财政法案》的其他法规的约束，包括产生通知义务，或启动强制性要约收购义务的不同条件。
外国买家是否适用特殊规则？
第56/2012号法律就非欧盟实体向战略领域（例如国防、基础设施、能源、运输和传媒）的意大利上市或非上市公司进行的投资，介绍了对意大利国家利益的保护。
特别需要强调的是，当非欧盟实体收购一家从事能源、运输和媒体领域的公司的控股股权时，其必须在10日内向意大利政府报备收购事宜。为评估股权是否为控股股权，须对股东之间可能签署的股权协议进行考量。
在向政府报备之前和在报备的15日之后，股权投票权被暂停使用。无论目标公司是否在被监管的市场上市，非欧盟实体收购方除有义务向意大利政府做出上述报备外，还须向监管委员会和公司作出独立报备（无论目标公司何时在受监管的市场上市，亦无论《统一财政法案》项下的适用条件何时被满足，该条规定应始终适用）。
国防领域的公司适用更严格的报备义务。任何实体在收购一家业务范围涉及国防领域的公司股权时，需在10日内，根据当时控制目标公司的实体性质，选择向意大利政府委员会或是意大利经济与财政部报备此次收购。在向政府报备前以及之后的15日内，涉及控股的投票权将被暂停使用。若受国家利益保护的目标公司为受监管的欧盟市场的上市公司，当超过下列数额时，即：2%; 3%; 5%; 10%; 15%; 20%或 25%，收购方有义务向意大利政府委员会或意大利经济财政部报备。当目标公司为受监管的欧盟市场的上市公司，并且满足相关条件时，除有义务向监管委员会报备外，收购方仍有义务向意大利政府委员会或意大利经济与财政部报备。
若非欧盟实体所在国家与意大利有贸易互惠，并在遵守意大利或欧盟订立的国际公约的情况下，非欧盟实体可以收购上述公司股份。
是否有特别行业规定？
涉及并购的特别规定将适用于以下公司：
-金融机构，须由意大利银行或欧洲中央银行批准该交易；
-保险公司，须由保险监管局批准该交易；
-业务涉及通讯、媒体和广播行业的公司，须受电子通讯及传媒管理局监管；
-业务涉及运输、公共设施、能源和国防行业的公司，可适用特殊规定；
责任的主要依据是什么？
违反某些特定禁令，例如内幕交易、操纵市场或发布虚假消息，可构成严重的民事或刑事责任依据。在某些情况下，例如，虚假陈述时，可产生额外责任。当未能遵守由《统一财政法案》制定的程序性规则和其他上市公司并购规则时，例如，未遵守授权要求、信息披露义务、要约收购文件的正确性以及向市场提供信息的真实性时，可产生具体的责任。
I. Introduction
The 1919 American legal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company provides a lens through which an analysis of disputes between majority and minority shareholders can start to be conceived. After allowing the Dodge Brothers, already a supplier to Ford, to become minority shareholders within the company, majority shareholder and executive Henry Ford unilaterally decided to terminate special dividends for shareholders in order to maintain further investment in new plants. This measure served as a way to sustain the production of cars at lower prices, a feature of the car manufacturer that Ford saw as tantamount to the public good and, perhaps less ostensibly, represented the preservation of a business model seen by Ford as essential to the Ford Motor Company’s long-term success. The development spurred the Dodge brothers to bring civil action against the Ford Motor Company, citing it as an injustice that deprived them of deserved dividends. In 1919, the Supreme Court of Michigan, ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers and stated that the action of Ford was not justified under the rule of “shareholder primacy,” thereby awarding the Dodge Brothers of the dividends to which they were entitled. The Supreme Court simultaneously decided, however, that the case also shaped the “business judgement rule,” which reserves the right of final judgment to the executive or relevant directors.■ This example testifies to the unmediated conflict between the interests majority and minority shareholders that exists at the heart of a limited company and corporations: namely, the majority’s stronghold over the corporation’s operations and its preference to reinvest the corporation’s profits in the business itself, which fundamentally runs counter to the common desire of minority shareholders to obtain the maximum return on their capital. Further, the outcome in Dodge v. Ford illuminates how, in the case that the majority seeks to abuse its power and circumvent the minority, it is often necessary that the minority exercise its ability to react. ■ The minority shareholder’s “right to control,” which includes the right to be informed and the right to inspect certain documents of the corporation, along with the right to exit, typically serve as the chief devices at its disposal. This derives from the fact that such rights are, in the common practice of law, considered sovereign and do not fall under the majority shareholder’s umbrella right to exercise propriety and “good faith.” In simpler terms, this means that the minority shareholder possesses the principle rights to veto and to exit.
II. Pre-existing Realities of Minority Shareholder Participation
Beyond a situation in which majority and minority shareholders have an already established relationship within a corporation or enter into special arrangements before acquiring or selling an equity interest, this article seeks to approach first the circumstances under which such a relationship lacks clear definition, for example in a succession mortis causa i.e. where the shares are owned by the heirs of a common relative and new minorities are thereby created. This happening typically occurs in family owned corporations in which the rights reserved to the minority shareholders are, therefore, even more crucial. Further, it should be noted that in the absence of applicable provisions within the corporate charter (also known as articles of incorporation), the corporation’s bylaws, and shareholder agreements governing the majority – minority shareholder relationship, the rights protected under the Italian Civil Code (“Codice Civile,” abbreviated as “c.c.”) solely take jurisdiction. On the surface, this would seem to preclude any advantage on the part of the majority shareholder and constitute a neutral majority – minority shareholder relationship. It should be noted that the present examination solely regards the so-called “Società per azioni” (abbreviated “S.p.A.”) “chiuse,” to which the English term “closely held corporations” in the U.S.A. stands as an equivalent. The main feature of a S.p.A “chiusa” is that it does not possess recourse to the risk capital market. ■ Further, unlike “Società a responsabilità limitata” (abbreviated “S.r.l.”) akin to a limited liability company in the U.S.A., shareholders in S.p.A.s do not possess the right of direct supervision over operations of the company. In S.p.A.s, in fact, supervision over operations is reserved to the Board of Statutory Auditors, which oversees that the directors of the corporation act in uniformity and in respect of the law, the charter and the bylaws, thus safeguarding, inter alia, the interest of the minority shareholders. In any case, however, the law stipulates that certain rights on the part of the minority in a S.p.A. are first and foremost reserved, namely the right to inspect some corporate records and the general right to information. These rights are, above all, limited to particular cases such that the shareholders cannot intervene in the corporation’s management, which is exclusively reserved to its administrators. It is important to note that the right of inspection, as protected under Article 2422 c.c., recognizes the shareholder’s right to verify the book of shareholders, which contains the information of all shareholders, in addition to the minutes of shareholders’ meetings. Such verification can be carried out also by means of an agent and copy of said records can be obtained at his or her expense. This right, however, is limited exclusively to the aforementioned records without offering the possibility to examine the other corporate records indicated under Article 2421 c.c., which include the minutes of the Board of Directors, the Board of Statutory Auditors, etc. Such further records can only be inspected by the directors, the statutory auditors, and other subjects whose duty lies in the control of the corporation, thereby not possessing any limitation in the right of general access to them. This reality derives from the fact that such examination constitutes the necessary instrument by which they can exercise their supervision powers over the company’s administration, organization, and proper accounting in respect to the law, the articles of incorporation, the corporation’s bylaws, the principles of sound management, the administrative system, the accounting system, and the organizing structure of the corporation. That being said, the single shareholder does possess the following channels through which he or she can exercise control over operations within a privately held S.p.A. which the legislature explicitly places at his or her disposal:
(i) To file a petition within the Board of Statutory Auditors, denouncing in any shape or form deemed appropriate by the shareholder a behavior on the part of the directors considered outside of compliance related to not adequately addressing proper organizational, administrative, and accounting duties under Article 2408 c.c.. The said denounce must obligatorily be taken into account and relayed to the management by the Board of Statutory Auditors who, if the petition is filed by a proportion of one – twentieth of the equity (i.e. 5%) must, in a prompt fashion, investigate this claim and inform the shareholders’ meeting of the results of the subsequent investigation in the conclusions of its report in the course of the annual shareholder’s meeting. Statutory Auditors have the duty to convene a general shareholders’ meeting in the following cases (a) omission or unjustified delay of such action on the part of directors (b) the recognition of reproachable practices on the part of the directors whose seriousness and urgency recommends that a meeting should be convened as covered under the second section of Article 2406 c.c. (it should be noted that this latter described ability and duty is not necessarily limited to the petition of the shareholders, but instead to the aforementioned practices considered to be of serious weight that must be correspondingly addressed in an urgent manner).
(ii) Shareholders further reserve the right to report to the Court in case of grounded suspicions that the Board of Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors are in violation of their fiduciary duties and have committed serious mismanagement that could be the precursor to substantial damages for the corporation or for one or more controlled companies by such a S.p.A. In this case, shareholders who together constitute one-tenth (i.e. 10%) of equity interest have the ability to call for the procession of an investigation, while the cost of such investigation should be borne by the acting parties and as ordered by the Court. If such an investigation finds such a violation to be the case, the delivering of and appropriate decision follows. In the case that the responsible Board members or auditors resign, however, and/or are replaced with a new slate of duly proven professionals, the investigation can be avoided and suspended to a later determined date at the discretion of the Court. These professionals, however, have the obligation to address and eliminate in haste the practices of relevant mismanagement found in violation following the exclusion of their predecessors. The Court reserves the further right to convene a general shareholders’ meeting in the case that it believes the measures that have been undertaken failed to properly address the wrongdoing within the organization in an appropriate manner. In the most serious of cases, the Court can remove the directors and the statutory auditors, appointing a judicial administrator with envisioned powers for a duration deemed necessary. This individual, as appointed by the Court, therefore, has legal standing and is entitled to exercise the so called “azione di responsabilità” (the “liability action”) namely an action against the directors for their liability for breach of fiduciary duties, as stipulated in the last provision in Article 2393 c.c.
(iii) Shareholders also reserve the right to exercise the liability action in case of breach of fiduciary duties, namely the breach of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care and in case of mismanagement, on the part of the directors or the Statutory Board of Auditors, as provided in Article 2393 bis c.c.. This action requires the shareholders together composing at least one – fifth (i.e. 20%) of shared capital ownership; it should be noted that the bylaws might otherwise stipulate a greater threshold than one – fifth, but such can never exceed one-third ownership (i.e. approximately 33%). Article 2393 further specifies that the exercising of the liability action shall not be carried out if shareholders constituting one- fifth (i.e. 20%) of total capital vote to the contrary. If, however, shareholders constituting one – fifth of ownership approve such a measure, Italian law dictates that the incumbent directors are automatically removed.
(iv) The right is reserved to challenge and vacate shareholders’ meeting resolutions (including that relative to the approval of the financial statement as protected under Article 2434 bis c.c.) which are considered contrary to the law or the corporation’s bylaws as by Article 2377 c.c. In order to exercise this right, there must be a number of shareholders comprising one – twentieth (i.e. 5%) of shared capital. Further, acting upon this right can be accompanied by the commensurate action of the shareholders aimed at recovering the damages produced through the resolution undertaken. (v) As by Article 2429 c.c., the right to examine, during office hours, the companies’ project of financial statement in addition to the report of the directors, the report of the Board of Auditors, the report of the supervising auditing firm, on top of a summary of the data essential to the last financial statement of associated companies, in the fifteen day period preceding the general shareholders’ meeting scheduled for the approval of the corporate financial statement.
(v) The right to participate in the deliberations of the shareholders’ meeting and exercise the right of “veto” in the so called case of an extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting, on second call, involving “modifications of the bylaws, corporation’s name, substitution of its liquidators, and other matters expressly attributed to the extraordinary meeting by law,” as stipulated in Article 2365 c.c. in the case that there exist shareholders who hold a quorum of one – third (i.e. approximately 33%) of the shared capital only in the second meeting.
(vi) The right to call a summons for a general meeting convened without any delay, under Article 2367 c.c., which can be exercised by any quorum of shareholders constituting one – tenth (i.e. 10%) of shared capital.
(vii) The right to call for the postponement of the meeting if not sufficiently informed prior, in the case that shareholders holding a third (i.e. approximately 33%) of shared capital vote for such a measure, pursuant to Article 2374 c.c.
■ An analysis of the aforementioned critical percentage thresholds necessary for such shareholders’ participation within a closely held S.p.A, in fact, demonstrates that the relevant legal infrastructure provides a meagre pathway to minority representation. Beyond the 5% provision in Article 2377 c.c., which concerns the extenuating circumstance of challenging decisions made by the Board, minority shareholders remain relatively powerless in a private, closely held limited company and without the possibility to challenge decisions made by the majority shareholders (S.p.A. chiusa). Therefore, in order for a minority to be considered “qualified” and have its voice heard within the corporate governance of a closely held Italian corporation, it is necessary for it to hold a) the 5% shareholder ownership, which allows it to petition for the investigation of the Board of Directors or the Board of Statutory Auditors for behavior considered out of compliance (as by Article 2408 c.c.), and to vacate the decisions made in shareholders’ meetings (as by Article 2377 c.c.). b) the 10% quorum for a petition to the Court of the above cited serious wrongdoings on the part of the Board of Statutory Auditors and the Board of Directors, as by Article 2409 c.c., and to convene without hesitation the shareholder’s meeting, as by Article 2367 c.c.; c) the 20% threshold in total shared capital to bring about action of liability against the Board of Directors or the Board of Statutory Auditors, as by Article 2393 bis. c.c., or to oppose the resolution as by Article 2393 c.c. d) the 33% (+1%) quorum for the exercising of a veto in an extraordinary shareholders’ meetings on second call and for the request for the postponement of the shareholders’ meeting as by Article 2374 c.c.
■ Exit (withdrawal). The right to exit is the right of the minority to exit from the group of shareholders. The natural modality of exit is the sale of equity. Standing as the principal alternative to selling shares, in case of external events that place a significant change on the conditions of risk, the shareholder who cannot control such changes within the corporate scheme can employ the prospect of divesting, in full or in part, by means of this right of withdrawal. It is necessary for the shareholder to cite the exact cause, which prompts his or her exercising shareholder’s right to exit by means of withdrawal: namely, on one hand, such that the majority is able, in an informed manner, to influence managerial decisions regarding the corporation’s vitality and, on the other hand, the minority, in the case of feeling as a “prisoner” to the corporation, has a mechanism at its disposal to, in plain terms, get out. The withdrawal becomes, therefore, a powerful instrument of influence to be executed on the majority by the minority shareholder in addition to serving as a bargaining chip, which changes the premise of negotiation initially established by the shareholders, with the induction of specific motives of withdrawal. The right of withdrawal is disciplined by Article 2438 c.c. withdrawal and is exercisable in the case verified by the following circumstances: a) modification of the corporate purpose that influences in a significant manner the activity of the corporation; b) the transformation of the corporation; c) the transferring of corporate headquarters abroad; d) the revocation of its state of liquidation; e) the elimination of one or more of the causes for withdrawal stipulated within the bylaws; f) the modification of the bylaws that has bearing on the value of the equity interest of the shareholder in the case of his or her exit; g) modifications of the bylaws concerning the rights of voting and administration; h) postponement of its terms; i) introduction or removal of obligations or legal limitation regarding the circulation of shares; l) if the corporation is acknowledged for an indeterminate period of time, the shareholder can exercise withdrawal with a notice of 180 days in advance; m) in the case that the corporation is subject to direction and coordination in the sense of Article 2497 c.c. Relative to the circumstances above cited, it is of fundamental importance to remember how some of these cases, most precisely those indicated by letters a) through g), are causes of withdrawal considered mandatory, that is to say, which are not susceptible to modification even in the case of voluntary compliance on the part of the relevant shareholders, while those indicated by letters h) and i) are subject to change and might be derogated in the case of the approval of the shareholders. The first part of Article 2437 c.c., second section, in fact, explicated, “unless the bylaws stipulate differently,” these causes, referring to those belonging to the first group (a through g), are recognized implicitly as much as independently sustained. One might therefore, configure a partition of the causes for exit into three categories: those legally mandatory, those legally non-binding and subject to change, and those stipulated in the corporate bylaws. For the exercising of the right of withdrawal, it is necessary to respect the modalities foreseen in Article 2437 bis c.c.; further, it should be noted that the exercising of this right involves the liquidation of the equity interest according to the relevant criteria of determination disclosed in Article 2437 part 3 c.c.
The Italian Court of Cassation, United Sections (judgement no. 24244 of 27 November 2015), recently issued a judgement on the applicability of article 5 no. 1 of the Brussels I Regulation on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, now corresponding to article 7 no. 1 of the Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis).
The above-referenced provision sets a special forum in matters relating to a contract, providing for the competence of the courts located in the place of performance of the obligation in question. According to letter b) of this provision, in case of the sale of goods, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered.
In the case brought before the Court of Cassation, an Italian company – while objecting the claim of a French company regarding the conclusion of some sale agreements that the latter stated to have entered into with the first one – asked for a declaratory judgement stating the inexistence of any contractual obligation between the parties, and, alternatively, for a declaration that the alleged agreements were null and void.
First of all, the Court of Cassation asserted the applicability of article 5, letter b) of the Brussels I Regulation to the case de quo.
Albeit recognizing that the abovementioned provision seems to refer only to actions addressed to the performance of a contract and not to actions regarding the dissolution of a contractual obligation, the Italian Supreme Court has considered that also claims aiming at ascertaining the inexistence, invalidity or ineffectiveness of an agreement concern matters relating to a contract. More precisely, the Supreme Court has held that such claims involve an initial, actual or alleged, voluntary assumption of an obligation, of which they tend, in several ways, to default. In the light of this assumption and considering that the delivery of the goods was supposed to take place in France (according to the contractual documents evidenced during the proceedings), the Court of Cassation has found that Italian Courts were lacking jurisdiction over the case, thus confirming the judgement previously issued by the Court of Appeal.
The judgement of the Italian United Sections is important because it has definitively confirmed, consistently with the European uniform trend, that the place of delivery is the only autonomous linking factor to be applied to all claims grounded on contracts for the sale of goods and not only to claims based on the non-performance of the delivery obligation itself.
The author of this article is Silvia Petruzzino.
